Briggs v. Potter

Decision Date15 September 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-1381.,05-1381.
Citation463 F.3d 507
PartiesJohn C. BRIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John E. POTTER, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Brent W. Boncher, Schenk, Boncher & Rypma, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Michael L. Shiparski, Assistant United States Attorney, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brent W. Boncher, Schenk, Boncher & Rypma, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Michael L. Shiparski, Assistant United States Attorney, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Martina M. Stewart, U.S. Postal Service, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before: MARTIN, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Briggs brings this age- and sex-discrimination lawsuit against the United States Postal Service (hereinafter "Postal Service") after he failed to obtain a promotion to the position of Environmental Compliance Specialist. Briggs claims that a younger, female employee who was less qualified was awarded the promotion because of her sex and age in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant-Appellant the Postal Service argues that Jennifer Jendras, the employee who was promoted instead of Briggs, was an overall stronger candidate. The Postal Service argues that its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Jendras include her greater educational attainment, her greater years of experience working in an environmentally related field, as well as Briggs's weaker interview performance. The district court granted summary judgment to the Postal Service, concluding that Briggs had failed to present any direct evidence of discrimination or to demonstrate pretext under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Briggs now appeals, arguing that he has established genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to the Postal Service. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Postal Service on both Briggs's age- and sex-discrimination claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff-Appellant Briggs has worked in Michigan for the Postal Service in a variety of positions since 1975. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 73-76 (Briggs Dep. at 6-9). Briggs began working on environmental issues in December 1995, when he was promoted to the position of District Environmental Compliance Coordinator ("DECC") in Grand Rapids, Michigan. As a DECC, Briggs was at an Executive and Administrative Schedule ("EAS") pay grade of 19. J.A. at 97 (Briggs Dep. at 30). In 2001, the Postal Service engaged in a national reorganization which reduced the number of environmental compliance positions. J.A. at 97-98 (Briggs Dep. at 30-31). As part of this reorganization, the seven DECC positions that existed in the Great Lakes Area, consisting of the states of Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana, were eliminated and replaced with four Environmental Compliance Specialists ("ECS") for the region. The job postings released in June 2001 for the new ECS positions stated that only the existing DECCs were eligible to apply for the ECS positions, which meant that the pool of applicants was limited to Briggs and the six other DECCs in the Great Lakes. The ECS positions would be compensated at the EAS-23 pay grade. Two of the new ECS positions would be located in Detroit, one would be in Chicago, and one in Indianapolis.

Because Briggs was the DECC working in district farthest from the locations of the new ECS positions and his home was not a commutable distance to any of the ECS positions, he would have needed to relocate his family if he were to be selected for an ECS position. (Briggs Dep. at 36). Before applications for the ECS positions were being accepted, Briggs contacted Phillip Pickard by telephone to discuss his concerns about the need to relocate. Pickard held the title of Manager of Environmental Programs, would be supervising those who would be selecting the new ECS positions, and was one of Briggs's functional managers. Briggs questioned Pickard over the telephone about why the two new ECS positions in Michigan were to be located on the east side of the state rather than on the west side where Briggs worked as a DECC. Pickard explained that the Postal Service faced a greater likelihood of environmental fines and citations on the east side of the Michigan. Briggs responded that he didn't think that it was fair that he was the only DECC who would have to relocate in order to be eligible for an ECS position. Briggs reports that Pickard responded, "Well, based on your background and experience . . . [y]ou're very well qualified; you won't have a problem finding a job someplace else." J.A. at 111 (Briggs Dep. at 44). Confused by this response, Briggs asked Pickard what he meant by that statement. Pickard replied, "Well, there are other DECCs who have much less time than you do in the postal service and would have a lot harder time finding a residual position if they weren't one of the successful bidders [for the ECS positions]." Id. Briggs expressed his concern that Pickard's statements suggested that the decision-makers had already begun to consider whom to place in the various ECS positions, and then ended the phone conversation.

After considering the relocation, Briggs decided he would be willing to move to Detroit or Chicago, and so he applied for those three ECS positions. In June 2001, Briggs submitted written applications for these three positions, along with the required "KSA" essays to demonstrate that he possessed the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities for the ECS position. Towards the end of July 2001, Briggs and the other ECS applicants were asked to come to the Postal Service's area office in Bloomingdale, Illinois to interview with Pickard and the review board. Judy Wingo-Stalinger, an Area Environmental Compliance Specialist and a functional manager of Briggs and the other DECCs, was the chairperson of the ECS selection review committee. After the interviews, the review committee issued recommendations about the ECS candidates to Pickard, and Briggs was not one of the four recommended candidates. Pickard was not obligated to follow the recommendations of the review board, but because he agreed with their choices, he approved their four recommended candidates for the four ECS positions. Out of the seven applicants, six were men and one, Jennifer Jendras, was a woman. Five of the seven applicants including Briggs were over the age of forty, and two including Jendras were in their thirties. Jendras was chosen for the Chicago position, and the two Michigan and the Indianapolis positions were offered to male employees in their forties. After Briggs was not selected for the ECS position, he worked for a few months as a Manager of Retail Sales before becoming a Manager of Injury Compensation. Both of these positions were at the EAS-19 pay grade. In December 2003, Briggs was promoted to the position of Manager of Vehicle Maintenance for the Greater Michigan district, compensated at the EAS-21 pay grade.

On October 23, 2003, Briggs filed this lawsuit against the Postal Service, alleging that he was denied the promotion to the ECS position in favor of Jendras because of his age and sex in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Discovery ensued, and on December 10, 2004, the Postal Service filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Briggs's claims. Briggs opposed the motion, arguing that under a theory of either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination, he had established genuine issues of material fact on his age and sex claims that required submission to a jury. In an opinion dated March 1, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment to defendant after it determined that Briggs had not established any genuine issues of fact about whether the Postal Service's asserted reason for hiring Jendras, that she was an overall superior candidate, was a pretext for discrimination. The district court also rejected portions of Briggs's affidavit for consideration at the summary-judgment stage, because the court found that the statements were assertions of argument rather than of fact, and were inconsistent with his previous deposition. The court then rejected Briggs's claim that Pickard's conversation with him in June 2001 constituted direct evidence of age or sex discrimination.' Finally, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to defendant on Briggs's § 1981 claim. The district court dismissed Briggs's claims with prejudice, and Briggs filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

"We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir.1998). The district court's grant of summary judgment to the Postal Service was proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A dispute over a material fact is not considered `genuine' unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 544 (6th Cir.2003).

A. The District Court's Refusal to Consider Portions of Briggs's Affidavit

As a preliminary matter, we review the district court's refusal to consider a portion of Briggs's affidavit, which Briggs submitted as an appendix to his motion in opposition to the Postal Service's motion for...

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