State v. Thrall, 1114

• Decision Date: 15 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 1114,1114
• Citation: 39 Conn.Supp. 347,464 A.2d 854
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Edwin THRALL.

Page 854

464 A.2d 854

39 Conn.Supp. 347

STATE of Connecticut v. Edwin THRALL.

No. 1114.

Superior Court of Connecticut,

Appellate Session.

Argued Dec. 22, 1981.

Decided April 15, 1983.

Edwin Thrall, pro se, appellant (defendant).

Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Edward F. Spinella, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

BIELUCH, Judge.

The defendant was arrested without a warrant for alleged violations of the law on May 31, 1979. On the same day he was arraigned in the Superior Court in the thirteenth geographical area on five counts: (1) attempted assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59; (2) attempted assault on a police officer in violation of § 53a-167c; (3) assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-61; (4) interfering with a police officer in violation of § 53a-167a; and (5) reckless endangerment in violation of § 53a-63. The first two counts are felonies and the remaining three counts are misdemeanors. Probable cause was found for the warrantless arrest at the original presentment. On June 12, 1979, the criminal action was transferred to the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford for prosecution because of the felony charges against the defendant.

The defendant appeared in the judicial district on June 19, 1979, and elected to be tried by a jury of six after pleading not guilty to a single count information charging him with the felony offense of attempted assault in the first degree. Nineteen months later two amendments to the information were filed by the assistant state's attorney. The first, on January 16, 1981, added count two, assault on a peace officer, a felony, and count three, reckless endangerment in the first degree, a misdemeanor. On the eve of trial, January 20, 1981, the state filed a fourth count, charging the defendant with interfering with an officer, another misdemeanor. The defendant pleaded not guilty to those additional offenses. His jury trial began on January 21, 1981. The defendant appeared pro se. He was acquitted of the two felony counts, attempted assault in the first degree and assault on a peace officer, but convicted of the two misdemeanor charges, reckless endangerment in the first degree and interfering with an officer. From those convictions, he has appealed assigning five claims of error.

The defendant's first and principal claim of error alleges that the state's delay beyond the statute of limitations of one year in charging him with the two respective misdemeanors in counts three and four, of which he was convicted, was fatal to its case. He contends that "[t]he Prosecutor unjustly and unlawfully resurrected charges that had been dropped over one and a half years ago, after court proceedings had already begun, and prosecuted me in direct violation of Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 54-193." In support of this assignment of error, the defendant relies upon the statute of limitations for misdemeanors. General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 54-193, now § 54-193(b), limits prosecution for misdemeanors to one year after commission of the offense. We do not agree with this claim of the defendant.

An arrest in a criminal case is the apprehension or detention of a person to answer to an alleged or suspected crime. Walters v. Platt, 22 Conn.Sup. 1, 3, 158 A.2d 255 (1956). "A criminal is arrested to secure his custody and to keep him to respond to sentence if convicted .... Presumably the prosecuting authority has a case against him, although in law he is presumed innocent ...." Ryan v. Ebecke, 102 Conn. 12, 18, 128 A. 14 (1925). An arrest may be made in two ways. First, it may be made pursuant to an arrest warrant. No such arrest or bench warrant may be issued unless the request for it by the prosecuting attorney includes facts, supported by oath or affirmation, from which the court or judge issuing the warrant can make an independent determination of probable cause that the accused committed a crime. State v. Townsend, 167 Conn. 539, 552-53, 356 A.2d 125, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846, 96 S.Ct. 84, 46 L.Ed.2d 67 (1975). Second, it may be made without an arrest warrant "when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others." General Statutes § 54-1f(a), formerly General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 54-1f. The defendant in this case was arrested without a warrant. No transcript of the evidence has been filed in this court. The record, therefore, does not show whether the defendant was arrested on sight upon the commission of the alleged crimes or on the speedy information of others.

An arrest without a warrant constitutes the commencement of criminal prosecution against the arrestee or suspect. The statutory limitation of one year after the commission of an offense for the prosecution of a misdemeanor is clocked by an arrest without a warrant. Consequently, the arrest of the defendant on May 31, 1979, was a timely prosecution of the defendant for the misdemeanor offenses alleged to have been committed by him on that day.

The issue raised by the defendant concerns the two misdemeanor charges refiled before the start of his January 21, 1981, trial by the assistant state's attorney on January 16 and 20, 1981, respectively. That was more than nineteen months after the transfer of the defendant's prosecution from the geographical area to the judicial district because the two felony charges against him fell outside the jurisdiction of part B of the criminal division. Part B of the criminal division had been assigned by the chief court administrator to geographical area thirteen, where the defendant was first presented. The initial felony charges brought against the defendant in geographical area thirteen were attempted assault in the first degree, a class B felony, and attempted assault on a police officer, a class C felony, both of which were under the jurisdiction of part A of the criminal division, assigned to the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain.

Since July 1, 1978, Connecticut has had a single tier court system. The Superior Court is, as provided by statute, the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except for probate matters. General Statutes § 51-164s. It is divided into judicial districts; General Statutes § 51-344; and geographical areas. General Statutes § 51-348. Pursuant to General Statutes § 51-164t, "[t]he superior court shall consist of such divisions and parts thereof as shall be provided by the rules of the superior court ...." Under the provisions of Practice Book § 2, the Superior Court in 1979 was "divided into three divisions: family, civil and criminal." At the time of the defendant's prosecution, the criminal division consisted "of the following parts: (a) Major crimes: Capital felonies, class A, B and C felonies, and unclassified felonies punishable by sentences of ten years or more. (b) All other crimes, motor vehicle violations, and infractions." Practice Book § 5. ¹

By virtue of General Statutes § 54-1d, "[d]efendants in criminal actions shall be brought to the court in the geographical area established pursuant to section 51-348, in which the crime was alleged to have been committed, for arraignment." In accordance with this statutory requirement, the defendant was presented for arraignment in geographical area thirteen of the Superior Court at Windsor on the day of his arrest, May 31, 1979. The crimes for which he was arrested allegedly occurred in East Windsor within that geographical area. He was advised of his rights by the judge under the provisions of General Statutes § 54-1b. Bond was set by the court at $10,000 with surety. Since the defendant was arrested without a warrant, the judge made the required finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime before detaining him upon his failure to post the required bail. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862-63, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

While the divisions and parts of the Superior Court are established by rules of the court, "[t]he chief court administrator shall assign to each such division or part thereof such number of judges as he deems advisable and shall designate the holding of sessions of such divisions and parts at such times and localities as he deems to be in the best interest of court business, taking into consideration the convenience of litigants and their counsel, and the efficient use of courthouse personnel and facilities." General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 51-164t. Accordingly, for the year July 1, 1978--June 30, 1979, "Criminal Division Part B" prosecutions were assigned to geographical area thirteen. Allotment of Judges, July 1, 1978, p. 31. Under this designation by the chief court administrator no crime greater than a class D felony could be prosecuted in geographical area thirteen. The original two felony counts against the defendant were class B and class C felonies, respectively. Pursuant to the same statutory authority given to the chief court administrator, it was ordered that "[a]ll defendants charged with crimes within the purview of Part A of the Criminal Division shall, by order of the court, be transferred as soon as possible after arraignment to Part A of the Criminal Division." ² Allotment of Judges, July 1, 1978, p. 22. In compliance with this directive, the defendant was transferred to the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, at Hartford, and on June 12, 1979, was released on bail after posting a 10 percent cash bond.

At the defendant's arraignment in the judicial district on June 19, 1979, the assistant state's attorney filed a long form information charging him with attempted assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59(a)(1) and 53a-49, a class B felony. The defendant, appearing pro se, pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial. The case thereafter remained on the trial list until January 16, 1981, when the...