Rushen v. Spain

• Decision Date: 12 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-2083,82-2083
• Citation: 464 U.S. 114,78 L.Ed.2d 267,104 S.Ct. 453
• Parties: Ruth RUSHEN, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al. v. Johnny SPAIN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

464 U.S. 114

104 S.Ct. 453

78 L.Ed.2d 267

Ruth RUSHEN, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al.

v Johnny SPAIN.

No. 82-2083.

Dec. 12, 1983.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent was one of six inmates involved in a 1971 San Quentin prison escape that resulted in the death of three prisoners and three corrections officers. The State of California jointly tried respondent and five other prisoners on numerous charges, including murder, conspiracy, and assault. The prosecution attempted to show that the Black Panther Party had organized the escape attempt and to link respondent to the conspiracy through his membership in that party. Respondent's defense was that state police had organized the breakout and ambushed the escapees to eliminate an important faction of the Black Panther Party.

During voir dire, the court admonished prospective jurors to reveal their associations, if any, with crimes of violence and their attitudes toward radical groups, including the Black Panthers. Patricia Fagan, who became a juror, testified at voir dire that she had no personal knowledge of violent crimes—as a witness, victim, or otherwise—and that she did not associate the Black Panther Party with any form of violence. However, in the course of the 17-month long trial, evidence was introduced of a crime, unrelated to those at issue in respondent's trial, of which juror Fagan had some knowledge. A defense witness identified a Black Panther named Pratt as a police informant involved in the alleged police plot. The prosecution sought to impeach this witness by introducing evidence that Pratt was in custody for the 1968 murder of a Santa Monica woman during the entire period at issue. This evidence triggered juror Fagan's recollection of the murder of a childhood friend, who was the woman Pratt had been convicted of killing.

Upon hearing the evidence about Pratt, juror Fagan twice went to the trial judge's chambers to tell him of her personal acquaintance with Pratt's 1968 murder victim. She told him that she feared that she might cry if the 1968 murder were explored further at trial. The judge asked her on each occasion whether her disposition of the case would be affected. She assured him that it would not. The judge told her not to be concerned and that the matter probably would not be mentioned again. He made no record of either conversation, and he did not inform the defendants or their counsel about them.

At the close of trial, the jury found respondent guilty of two counts of murder and of conspiracy to escape, and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The jury also convicted two other defendants of assault, and found insufficient evidence to support the numerous remaining charges. Respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Counsel for respondent subsequently learned of the ex parte communications between judge and juror and moved for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, juror Fagan testified that she had not remembered her friend's death during voir dire and that her subsequent recollection did not affect her ability impartially to judge respondent's innocence or guilt. She admitted telling other jurors that she personally knew Pratt's 1968 murder victim, but denied making any disparaging remarks about the Black Panther Party. The trial judge concluded that the ex parte communications "lacked any significance" and that respondent suffered no prejudice therefrom. See App. C to Pet. for Cert. 22. Accordingly, he denied the motion for new trial.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. It found the ex parte communication to be federal constitutional error that was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" because the jury's deliberations, as a whole, were unbiased. Id., at 28-35. The California Supreme Court denied review.

Respondent then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court issued the writ, ruling that the ex parte communications between judge and juror violated both respondent's right to be present during all critical stages of the proceedings and his right to be represented by counsel. Furthermore, the District Court held that automatic reversal was necessary because the absence of a contemporaneous record made intelligent application of the harmless error standard impossible. Alternatively, it concluded that a post-trial hearing could not establish that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it found that respondent's conviction had to be vacated because of the state court's failure to hold a contemporaneous hearing about, or to make a contemporaneous record of, the ex parte communication. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the basis that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error.¹

We emphatically disagree. Our cases recognize that the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial and the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each criminal defendant.² "At the same time and without detracting from the fundamental importance of [these rights], we have implicitly recognized the necessity for preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. Cases involving [such constitutional] deprivations are [therefore] subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered . . . and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 667, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981); see also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 38-40, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2094-2095, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). In this spirit, we have previously noted that the Constitution "does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation . . . [because] it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors does not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial. The lower federal courts' conclusion that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error ignores these day-to-day realities of courtroom life and undermines society's interest in the administration of criminal justice.³

This is not to say that ex parte communications between judge and juror are never of serious concern or that a federal court on habeas may never overturn a conviction for prejudice resulting from such communications. When an ex parte communication relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties.⁴ The prejudicial effect of a failure to do so, however, can normally be determined by a post-trial hearing. The adequacy of any remedy is determined solely by its abil- ity to mitigate constitutional error, if any, that has occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, supra, 449 U.S., at 365, 101 S.Ct., at 668; Rogers v. United States, supra, 422 U.S., at 40, 95 S.Ct., at 2095. Post-trial hearings are adequately tailored to this task. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S., at 218-219, and n. 8, 102 S.Ct., at 946-947 and n. 8; Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed.2d 654 (1954).

The final decision whether the alleged constitutional error was harmless is one of federal law. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Nevertheless, the factual findings arising out of the state courts' post-trial hearings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The substance of the ex parte communications and their effect on juror impartiality are questions of historical fact entitled to this presumption. Thus, they must be determined, in the first instance, by state courts and deferred to, in the absence of "convincing evidence" to the contrary, by the federal courts. See Marshall v. Lonberger, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 843, 850, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983). Here, both the state's trial and appellate courts concluded that the jury's deliberations, as a whole, were not biased. This finding of "fact"—on a question the state courts were in a far better position than the federal courts to answer—deserves a "high measure of deference," Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1307, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982), and may be set aside only if it "lack[s] even 'fair support' in the record." Marshall v. Lonberger, supra, --- U.S., at ----, 103 S.Ct., at 850. The absence of a contemporaneous recording will rarely deprive the finding of "even 'fai[r] suppor[t]' in the record." See id., at ----, 103 S.Ct., at 850.

The post-trial hearing in this case created more than adequate support for the conclusion that juror Fagan's presence on the jury did not prejudice respondent. The 1968 murder was not related to the crimes at issue in the trial. Pratt was not connected to any of the offenses for which respondent was convicted and he did not testify at the trial. Juror Fagan never willfully concealed her association with the Santa Monica crime and she repeatedly testified that, upon recollection, the incident did not affect her impartiality.⁵ She turned to the most natural source of information—the trial judge to disclose the information she should have but failed to recall during voir dire. Their ex parte communication was innocuous. They did not discuss any fact in controversy or any law applicable to the case. The judge simply assured her that there was no cause for concern. Thus, the state courts had convincing evidence that the jury's deliberations, as a whole, were not biased by the undisclosed...