State v. Williams

Citation465 P.3d 1053
Decision Date15 June 2020
Docket NumberSCWC-13-0001285
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua R.D. WILLIAMS, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Hawai'i
I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Joshua R.D. Williams ("Williams") was charged with the attempted murder in the second degree of David Quindt, Jr. ("Quindt").

On certiorari, we conclude the Circuit Court of the First Circuit ("circuit court") erred by precluding Williams from testifying to the jury about what he believed Quindt said to him that caused him to act in self-defense. By so doing, the circuit court prohibited Williams from presenting state of mind evidence relevant to his self-defense claim, thus violating his due process right to be accorded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.1

II. BACKGROUND

The attempted murder charge arose from an altercation between Williams and Quindt on the night of March 12, 2012. The primary disputed issue at trial was whether Williams acted in self-defense.

A. Pre-Trial: Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence 404(b) Notice of Prior Bad Acts

Prior to trial, Williams filed a Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence ("HRE") Rule 404(b)2 notice of prior bad acts ("notice"). Williams sought to present to the jury Quindt's statements to him, in which Quindt told Williams about Quindt's violent past. Williams proffered the statements as relevant to his claim that he feared for his life during the altercation. The notice stated that "[d]uring the 2-3 week time period prior to the date of the incident" Quindt would "boast and brag" about the following seven acts:

a. Doing time for the crime of murder in California[;]
b. That he did hard time in California;
c. That he knows how to fight because of the time he spent in jail and that he had to learn to fight to survive;
d. That he knows about gang-bangers and gang-members; e. That he has experience with violence from spending time in jail;
f. That he "got away" with murder by beating the charge — because someone else took credit for it;
g. That he did the crime but got off on a technicality.

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai‘i ("State") then filed a motion in limine, opposing admission of the evidence. In its motion, the State sought to preclude "an allegation that [Quindt] has been arrested for murder and was incarcerated on murder charges" and "[a]ny and all references to David Quindt as being [a] [h]ard criminal’, ‘gang banger’, or any other similar references." The State contended that "[s]uch evidence is ... irrelevant because it does not go to David Quindt's credibility as to the instant offense that Defendant is charged with."

At the hearing on Williams’ notice and the State's motion, defense counsel explained that the statements included in the notice "have to do with my client's state of mind and the things that were in his head as a result of statements made by Mr. Quindt that caused him to then be concerned for his personal safety. So they go directly to his state of mind."3

The State objected to Williams testifying that Quindt told him Quindt was convicted of murder. The State further objected to Williams revealing to the jury that Quindt claimed he was subsequently exonerated of murder; according to the State such evidence would "create a lot of confusion for the jury[.]" The State argued that it would be too prejudicial and too confusing to the jury for Williams to present the proffered statements.

The circuit court granted the government's request and thus prevented Williams from offering his chosen testimony to the jury. The circuit court ordered Williams not to testify to the jury that Quindt would boast and brag about having done time for the crime of murder in California; nor could he testify that Quindt would boast and brag about having done hard time in California; and Williams was precluded from offering in his defense his eyewitness testimony that Quindt told him "he knows how to fight because of the time he spent in jail and that he had to learn to fight to survive[.]"

Instead, the circuit court curtailed the testimony the defendant could offer in his own defense. As to statement (a), that Quindt would boast and brag about having done time for the crime of murder in California, and statement (b), that Quindt would boast and brag about having done hard time in California, the circuit court concluded that the statements were "one and the same." Thus, the circuit court prohibited Williams from telling the jury that Quindt would boast and brag about having done time for the crime of murder, and Williams was not permitted to explain to the jury that Quindt told him he did hard time in California.

In reference to statement (c), that Quindt "knows how to fight because of the time he spent in jail and that he had to learn to fight to survive," the circuit court did not explain why it prohibited Williams from informing the jury that Quindt learned to fight "to survive."

As to statement (d), the circuit court ruled that the defense could not reference Quindt's familiarity with "gang-bangers and gang-members" because the statement was "too general." The circuit court rejected defense counsel's position that Williams interpreted the term "gangbanger" as "something beyond just ... minor gang activity" but rather as "something a little bit more serious and involv[ing] more violence."

The circuit court also prevented Williams from offering statement (e), that Quindt "has experience with violence from spending time in jail." The circuit court concluded without explanation that the statement was "too general." The circuit court did not elaborate as to why statement (e) was too general.

The circuit court also excluded as irrelevant statement (f), that Quindt would boast and brag about getting away with murder, and statement (g), that Quindt would boast and brag that he "got off on a technicality[.]" According to the circuit court, exoneration "is irrelevant to violent conduct" because the "question is what [Williams] believed this man could do."

In sum, the circuit court would not permit Williams to testify fully about what Quindt told him, which Williams contended caused him to fear Quindt and to use violence to protect himself. In place of his proffered testimony about Quindt's statements to him, the circuit court ordered Williams to testify only that Quindt said he was convicted of murder and that "[Quindt] knows how to fight. He learned how to fight in jail."

B. Circuit Court Proceedings

A three-day jury trial commenced on January 17, 2013.

1. The State's Case in Chief

Quindt testified as follows:

On March 10, 2012, Williams was renting a room from Quindt. Williams and his son moved in with Quindt approximately three weeks prior to the altercation.

Before the altercation, Quindt felt "tired," "exhausted," and "frustrated." His planned tasks for the day were taking up more time than he anticipated. Quindt had been working on a tattoo for Williams that took longer than expected. Quindt was also scheduled to perform a piercing for a friend of Williams following the tattoo appointment. Quindt and Williams went to Williams’ friend's house to do the piercing. On the way to Williams’ friend's house, Quindt picked up Williams’ son and dropped him off at Quindt's home.

When they arrived at Quindt's home, Quindt's frustration grew. Quindt waited in the car for two to three minutes while Williams took his son into the home. Quindt felt frustrated because he was doing a favor for Williams by doing a piercing for his friend, and he asked Williams to hurry because he wanted to "get home and rest and work on some drawings [for tattoos]." Quindt also had previously had back surgery and "long, strenuous sitting" hurt his back.

When Williams returned to the car, Quindt and Williams began arguing about the wait. Williams "got irritated, started kind of yelling at [him]." Quindt told Williams, "please don't disrespect me." As Quindt drove down the street, Williams jumped out of the vehicle. Quindt then stopped the vehicle and told Williams to get back in the car. Quindt did not push Williams to the ground while trying to get him back into the car and did not throw him into the car. Williams reentered the vehicle to sit in the right passenger backseat, which Quindt thought "was a little weird."

Once Williams returned to the backseat of the car, Quindt became more upset on the drive because Williams began talking on his phone to his ex-girlfriend.4 Quindt told Williams that he should not be speaking with his ex-girlfriend because Williams had a restraining order against her. Quindt had been helping Williams with his custody case, and he told Williams, "You're going to mess your case up of getting custody for [your son.]"

Quindt and Williams were yelling and swearing at each other. Quindt told Williams to "get the fuck out of my house." Williams said "I'll get out. You can keep everything that's there, the food, all the stuff, clothes."

While driving, Quindt felt Williams hit him on the side of his face. At first, Quindt thought he had been punched, but then he felt blood running down his neck.5 Williams had struck Quindt with a knife. Quindt then "started fighting, gassing the car, hitting the brake, gassing the car, trying to throw [Williams] off balance."

Quindt continued to drive the car until he reached the Waianae Mall parking lot. Quindt then put the vehicle in park, jumped out, and ran in front of it into the headlights. Williams was on his phone, and Quindt overheard Williams calling his mother.

Quindt then attempted to call 911 to get help to take him to the hospital, but when he tried to dial 911, the blood on the telephone's screen prevented him from doing so. Quindt went to the car and told Williams, "[I]f I die, you're going to get in more trouble. I need you to take me to the hospital." Williams then drove Quindt to Waianae Coast Comprehensive Health Center.

Quindt told Williams "don't worry, I won't get you into trouble" because he was "afraid for [his] life." Quindt...

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