State v. Dinkel
| Citation | 465 P.3d 166 |
| Decision Date | 12 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 113,705,113,705 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Brooke Danielle DINKEL, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Richard Ney, of Ney, Adams & Miller, of Wichita, argued the cause, and David L. Miller, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.
Amy E. Norton, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with her on the brief for appellee.
A jury convicted Brooke Dinkel of two counts of rape of a child under the age of 14. Dinkel appealed, arguing that the exclusion of various pieces of evidence violated evidentiary rules and her constitutional right to present a defense. She also argued her trial lawyer was ineffective on several grounds. Most of Dinkel's claims related to her defense that the alleged victim—K.H.—raped her and that she continued the sexual contact because K.H. was blackmailing her and she had a mental disease or defect. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions based largely on its conclusion that rape of a child has no mental culpability requirement, so the defendant's intent is irrelevant. We hold the Court of Appeals erred in concluding whether K.H. forced the sexual encounter was irrelevant. We retain jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court for a Van Cleave hearing to determine whether defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the State never established the voluntary act requirement.
Dinkel was a middle school counselor. In 2014, the State charged her with 10 counts of rape of a child under 14 and 10 counts of criminal sodomy. The State alleged that Dinkel had been having a sexual relationship with K.H., a 13-year-old boy who was a student at the school where Dinkel worked. Dinkel would later offer three primary defenses at trial: K.H. physically forced the first sexual encounter; and any sexual encounters thereafter were a result of K.H. blackmailing Dinkel or Dinkel's mental disease or defect.
Prior to trial, Dinkel filed a "notice of mental disease or defect" in which she informed the court of her intent to rely on a mental disease or defect defense at trial. The notice indicated that Dinkel had been "suffering from a variety of psychological problems, which when compounded by the physical violence perpetrated by the alleged victim K.H., created a situation where [Dinkel] lacked the requisite mental state to commit the crimes charged." The notice explained that Dinkel intended to support this defense with testimony from Dr. Marilyn Hutchinson, Ph.D., who had evaluated Dinkel.
The State responded in opposition, arguing that the court should not allow the defense at trial because Dr. Hutchinson never concluded that a mental disease or defect prevented Dinkel from forming the required mental state of the crime. The State further argued that Hutchinson claimed in her report that Dinkel was "sexually assaulted" by K.H. and that this was an "improper opinion testi[mony] about the defendant's guilt or innocence."
The district court ruled that it would not allow any testimony from Hutchinson. The court observed that Hutchinson's report concluded that " ‘[a]fter a lifelong history of multiple sexual and physical assaults, Miss Dinkel was sexually assaulted by formidably-sized teenager who was her counselee.’ " The court then noted that the report went on to "talk about [Hutchinson's] opinion as to what happened, but does not tie that to any mental state that would have provided or would have established that Ms. Dinkel was unable to form the requisite intent to commit the crime."
At trial, the State put on evidence indicating that Dinkel took special interest in K.H. at the beginning of the 2012 school year. According to the State's evidence, Dinkel became inappropriately involved with K.H. She brought him food in detention, met with him in her locked office, hired him for projects around her house, and gave him a credit card. K.H. testified that the relationship turned sexual in late 2012 and that the sexual activity continued into the next year. K.H. maintained that the sex was mutually consensual.
Dinkel testified in her own defense. She stated that she been looking out for K.H. and eventually hired him to do some work around her house and provided him with a credit card for lunch money. She acknowledged that the relationship took a turn in December 2012 when K.H. forcibly raped her. Dinkel asserted that K.H., who was 6'2" and weighed at least 170 pounds, pushed her down on the bed and held her there while he penetrated her vagina with his penis. Dinkel testified that she "just laid there" during the assault. Dinkel did not explicitly admit that there was any other sexual contact beyond the initial encounter, but she did insinuate that she would succumb to any of K.H.'s sexual demands after the rape.
During Dinkel's testimony, the court admitted evidence of a Facebook message allegedly sent from K.H. to Dinkel suggesting that K.H. had forced the first sexual encounter and blackmailed Dinkel into continuing the sexual relationship.
On cross-examination, the State tried to get Dinkel to admit that she had falsified the Facebook message, but Dinkel denied doing so. The State put on Officer Carlos Londono as a rebuttal witness over Dinkel's objection. Londono testified about how one might create a fake Facebook account and about some peculiarities surrounding the Facebook message that K.H. allegedly sent to Dinkel.
During trial, Dinkel moved for reconsideration of the district court's earlier ruling regarding Hutchinson's testimony. The court ruled that it would not allow Hutchinson to testify that Dinkel was credible in saying she was raped by K.H. But the court allowed Hutchinson to give limited testimony about whether some of Dinkel's actions that followed the first sexual encounter were normal behaviors for someone who had suffered a forced sexual trauma.
The jury convicted Dinkel of two counts of rape of a child under 14 and acquitted Dinkel of the remaining 18 charges. The district court sentenced Dinkel to 165 months' imprisonment with lifetime postrelease supervision for the first rape conviction and a concurrent 165 months' imprisonment with lifetime postrelease supervision on the second rape conviction.
Dinkel appealed her convictions. She argued that the district court erred when it kept out Hutchinson's full testimony, when it did not offer an instruction on mental disease or defect, and when it permitted Londono to testify. Dinkel also argued that her counsel had been ineffective in a variety of ways. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a Van Cleave hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Both sides presented evidence at the Van Cleave hearing. The district court considered eight claims of ineffective assistance of defense trial counsel and concluded that counsel had been deficient in only one regard—for failing to pursue the admissibility of text messages suggesting that K.H. was sexually active and aggressive with other women. However, the court concluded that Dinkel failed to show that this prejudiced her case and, consequently, had failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Dinkel timely appealed from the Van Cleave hearing, contesting all the district court's conclusions. The Court of Appeals rejected all of Dinkel's claims, including those in her original appellate briefing and her challenges to the district court rulings at the Van Cleave hearing. State v. Dinkel , No. 113,705, 2018 WL 1439992 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion). The panel's decisions were based largely on its sua sponte consideration of the required mental state of rape of a child and its conclusion that the defendant's intent is irrelevant to the commission of this crime.
Dinkel petitioned for review. She argued that the panel erred when it concluded a defendant's intent is irrelevant to the crime of rape of a child and challenged all the panel's holdings. We granted review.
While the Court of Appeals considered each of Dinkel's claimed errors individually, early in its decision the panel concluded that rape of a child requires no culpable mental state. The panel then held that Dinkel's defense theories based on forcible rape, blackmail, and her corresponding mental condition were not legally relevant because those theories would only negate mental culpability. 2018 WL 1439992, at *6-8. At this stage of our review we focus on only whether the panel erred when holding that Dinkel's forcible rape theory was irrelevant to her case.
To examine this holding, we must interpret various statutes. We perform an unlimited review when interpreting statutes.
State v. Russ , 309 Kan. 1240, 1242, 443 P.3d 1060 (2019).
The legislative intent behind a statute governs our interpretation of that statute. Corvias Military Living, LLC v. Ventamatic , Ltd ., 310 Kan. 824, 830, 450 P.3d 797 (2019). To identify this intent, we give "common words their ordinary meanings." 310 Kan. at 830, 450 P.3d 797. If language in a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not "speculate about the legislative intent behind that clear language." 310 Kan. at 830, 450 P.3d 797.
There are five ways to commit rape in Kansas.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Genson, No. 121,014
...a crime only if such person voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission or possession."); State v. Dinkel , 311 Kan. 553, 559-60, 465 P.3d 166 (2020) (finding a defendant who cannot argue lack of mens rea may still argue, when appropriate, that the voluntary act or omissio......
-
State v. Genson
...district court. His proffer did not suggest that he was physically incapable of registering in November 2017. Cf. State v. Dinkel , 311 Kan. 553, 560, 465 P.3d 166 (2020). Since he did not pursue such a claim or proffer evidence to support it, we do not consider whether Genson's mental illn......
-
State v. Stanley
...to be to cause a result, or to engage in conduct.’ " State v. Thach , 305 Kan. 72, 83, 378 P.3d 522 (2016) ; see State v. Dinkel , 311 Kan. 553, 560, 465 P.3d 166 (2020). Put simply, conduct is intentional when it is " ‘purposeful and willful and not accidental.’ " State v. Baacke , 261 Kan......
-
State v. Genson
...His proffer did not suggest that he was physically incapable of registering in November 2017. Cf. State v. Dinkel, 311 Kan. 553, 560, 465 P.3d 166 (2020). Since he did not pursue such a claim or proffer evidence to support it, we do not consider whether Genson's mental illness might have im......