State v. Ernes

Decision Date17 June 2020
Docket NumberSCWC-17-0000507
Citation465 P.3d 763
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Erik ERNES, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court
I. Introduction

This case arises from Erik Ernes's ("Ernes") conviction of the offense of assault against a law enforcement officer in the second degree, in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 707-712.6 (2014).1 On October 11, 2016, Ernes fell asleep while riding the bus home from work. After making several unsuccessful attempts to wake Ernes, who appeared intoxicated, representatives of the bus company called the Honolulu Police Department ("HPD") to request assistance. An HPD officer responded to the scene and succeeded in waking Ernes through sternum rubs. Apparently startled, Ernes then punched the HPD officer in the face with his fist. He was arrested, charged, and convicted after a bench trial.2 The Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") affirmed Ernes's conviction in a summary disposition order ("SDO"). State v. Ernes, SCWC-17-0000507, 2019 WL 2929017 (Haw. App. July 8, 2019).

Ernes presents the following question on certiorari:

Whether the ICA gravely erred in finding that the District Court did not reversibly err in failing to obtain a valid on-the-record waiver of Ernes’ constitutional right to a jury trial.

We hold that under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the defendant's language barrier and the lack of information regarding defendant's background and experience, State v. Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawai‘i 465, 472, 312 P.3d 897, 904 (2013), the record does not reflect an on-the-record exchange sufficient to constitute the true colloquy required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of Ernes's constitutional right to a jury trial. State v. Baker, 132 Hawai‘i 1, 6, 319 P.3d 1009, 1014 (2014).

II. Background
A. District court proceedings

On February 15, 2017, the district court3 held a hearing to determine whether Ernes would demand a jury trial or whether he would waive that right. Ernes was provided with a court-appointed Chuukese interpreter. Defense counsel opened by stating, "Your Honor, at this time, my client will be waiving his right to jury trial, will be pleading not guilty, [and will be] asking for ... a Chuukese interpreter for trial." The district court then addressed Ernes as follows:4

Court: Okay, good morning, Mr. Ernes.
Ernes: (In English) Good morning.
Court: I just received a waiver of jury trial form.5 Did you sign it?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. Did you review it with your attorney?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. Did she explain to you what a jury trial is?
Ernes: (In English) Yes.
Court: Okay. For the record, a jury trial is where you have an opportunity to help select 12 people from the community. The State needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to all 12 jurors, and all 12 jurors must agree before you can be found guilty. Is that your understanding?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Yes. Okay. Is your mind clear today?
Ernes: (In English) Yes.
Court: Okay, how much education do you have? High school? College?
Ernes: (In English) No, just have high school.
Court: High school? Okay. Do you understand your right to a jury trial?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Yes. Is anyone forcing you to give up this right?
Ernes: (In English) No.
Court: All right, thank you. Court will find defendant knowing, voluntary, (indiscernible) right to jury trial, enter a not guilty plea, request Chuukese interpreter next proceeding.

The district court accepted Ernes's jury trial waiver and not guilty plea. Ernes was convicted after a bench trial.6

B. ICA proceedings

Ernes appealed his conviction to the ICA. With respect to the jury trial waiver issue,7 the ICA concluded that Ernes failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that his jury trial waiver was involuntary. Ernes, SDO at 2. The ICA reasoned:

Ernes does not dispute that he signed a Waiver of Jury Trial form that waived his right to a jury trial. Ernes admits that the District Court thereafter inquired whether Ernes reviewed the waiver form, whether his attorney reviewed the form with him, whether his attorney explained the concept of a jury trial, whether he understood that a jury trial is an opportunity to help select twelve people from the community, and whether he understood that the State was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to all twelve jurors, and all twelve jurors must agree before he can be found guilty. Ernes answered in the affirmative to all of those inquiries. Therefore, it appears from the record that Ernes voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and, thus, he has the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his waiver was involuntary.

Ernes, SDO at 2-3 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).

The ICA cited to State v. Macaso, No. CAAP-15-0000198, 2016 WL 2941071 (Haw. App. Apr. 13, 2016), for the proposition that "stopping and addressing Ernes after stating each component of a jury trial" was not required for the district court to obtain a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial. Ernes, SDO at 3. The ICA also determined that Ernes "failed to point to any specific facts to support his claim that the colloquy conducted [by the district court] was insufficient." Id. It therefore concluded that Ernes knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Id.

C. Certiorari application

On certiorari, Ernes contends that the ICA misconstrued his argument on appeal:

The ICA contended that Petitioner argued that the court was required to present the concept of the jury trial into "segments[,"] pausing after each "right[.]" ... [T]he ICA noted its determination in [ Macaso ] that "stopping after each right of the Tachibana advisement to determine whether the defendant understands that right is not a per se requirement for an adequate Tachibana colloquy."
That is not the point in this case. Petitioner is not arguing for a per se requirement in the taking of an oral jury waiver, even after a written waiver has been signed. Rather, Petitioner is advocating the required colloquy actually be ... what it was intended to be, i.e., a conversation between a defendant and the court [that] allows the court to determine that the defendant has an actual understanding of the rights that the defendant is waiving.

Ernes further argues on certiorari that the district court's colloquy was defective because it failed to engage him in a verbal exchange in which it ascertained his understanding of the proceedings and his rights, citing to State v. Celestine, 142 Hawai‘i 165, 170, 415 P.3d 907, 912 (2018), and State v. Pomroy, 132 Hawai‘i 85, 93, 319 P.3d 1093, 1101 (2014). He maintains that the district court's "single compound question" and his one-word answers did not constitute a true colloquy, but rather was in the nature of an advisement. In addition, Ernes asserts that "[it] is revealing that [although he] answered some questions in English, [he] had to answer the single jury trial rights question through the interpreter." He further argues that the district court did not properly consider the fact that he required the assistance of an interpreter. Ernes also contends the district court failed to "ask any questions to elicit whether [he] had any limitations [that] might influence his comprehension of the compound question regarding his jury trial rights." Ernes concludes that the jury trial waiver was invalid because the district court failed to engage him in "any exchange to ascertain whether [the] waiver of his jury trial right was based on his understanding of [that] right[.]"

III. Standard of review
The validity of a criminal defendant's waiver of [the] right to a jury trial presents a question of state and federal constitutional law. ... We answer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case. Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the right/wrong standard.

Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawai‘i at 468-69, 312 P.3d at 900-01 (citation omitted).

IV. Discussion

When a criminal defendant has the right to a jury trial, the trial court is required to "inform the defendant of the right to jury trial in the circuit court[,] and that the defendant may elect to be tried without a jury in the district court." Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure ("HRPP") Rule 5(b)(1) (2014). This serves several purposes: "(1) it more effectively insures voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers[;] (2) it promotes judicial economy by avoiding challenges to the validity of waivers on appeal[;] and (3) it emphasizes to the defendant the seriousness of the decision[.]" State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai‘i 63, 68, 996 P.2d 268, 273 (2000) (quoting United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1985) ).

A defendant may waive the right to trial by jury either orally or in writing, provided that such waiver is knowing and voluntary, and comes directly from the defendant. State v. Ibuos, 75 Hawai‘i 118, 121, 857 P.2d 576, 578 (1993). But, even where the defendant executes a written waiver form, "the court should also engage in an oral colloquy with the defendant to establish that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawai‘i at 469, 312 P.3d at 901. The validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial is reviewed "under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case, taking into account the defendant's background, experience, and conduct." Friedman, 93 Hawai‘i at 70, 996 P.2d at 275 (citation omitted). As set forth below, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case, the district court's colloquy was insufficient in establishing a valid waiver of Ernes's right to a jury trial.

Our analysis of the validity of Ernes's jury trial waiver is guided by Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawai‘i 465, 312 P.3d 897 ; Friedman, 93...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Araiza v. State
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • 26 Enero 2021
    ...counsel by failing to negotiate an immigration-safe plea; (2) the circuit court's plea colloquy was insufficient under State v. Ernes, 147 Hawai‘i 316, 465 P.3d 763 (2020) ; (3) her Rule 40 counsel had been ineffective; and (4) the circuit court committed plain error by appointing an unqual......
  • State v. Pedro
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • 4 Junio 2021
    ...a [defendant's choice] was made knowingly and intelligently, the opposite is by no means true." State v. Ernes, 147 Hawai‘i 316, 330, 465 P.3d 763, 777 (2020) (Recktenwald, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Indeed, Pedro has never alleged that his English proficiency or educational atta......
  • State v. Puck
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • 23 Noviembre 2021
    ...and circumstances of the particular case. State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai‘i 63, 69, 996 P.2d 268, 274 (2000) ; see State v. Ernes, 147 Hawai‘i 316, 323, 465 P.3d 763, 770 (2020) ("the issue is whether, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case, taking into account the defenda......
  • State v. Puck, CAAP-18-0000778
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • 23 Noviembre 2021
    ... ... at 1286, 1288 ... The ... validity of a waiver of a fundamental right is reviewed under ... the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular ... case. State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai'i 63, 69, 996 ... P.2d 268, 274 (2000); see State v. Ernes, 147 ... Hawai'i 316, 323, 465 P.3d 763, 770 (2020) ("the ... issue is whether, under the totality of the circumstances ... surrounding the case, taking into account the defendant's ... background, experience, and conduct, the record reflects that ... the [trial] court ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT