465 U.S. 89 (1984), 81-2101, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

Docket Nº:No. 81-2101.
Citation:465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67
Party Name:PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL et al., Petitioners v. Terri Lee HALDERMAN et al.
Case Date:January 23, 1984
Court:United States Supreme Court

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465 U.S. 89 (1984)

104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67



Terri Lee HALDERMAN et al.

No. 81-2101.

United States Supreme Court.

Jan. 23, 1984

Argued Feb. 22, 1983.

Reargued Oct. 3, 1983.

Class action was brought by mentally retarded citizens challenging the fact and condition of confinement in a state institution for the mentally retarded. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Raymond J. Broderick, J., 446 F.Supp. 1295, rendered judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants, various state and local officials and institutions, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 612 F.2d 84, substantially affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694, reversed and remanded. On remand, the Court of Appeals, 673 F.2d 647, affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Powell, held that: (1) Eleventh Amendment prohibited federal district court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law with respect to conditions of confinement at institution, since state was real, substantial party in interest; (2) Eleventh Amendment barred state law claims brought in district court under pendent jurisdiction; and (3) judgment could not be upheld against county officials on basis of their state law obligations where any relief granted against county officials alone on basis of state statute would be partial and incomplete at best.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion.

Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun joined.

[104 S.Ct. 902] Syllabus[*]


Respondent Halderman, a resident of petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally retarded, brought a class action in Federal District Court against Pennhurst and various state and county officials (also petitioners). It was alleged that conditions at Pennhurst violated various federal constitutional and statutory rights of the class members as well as their rights under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act). Ultimately, the District Court awarded injunctive relief based in part on the MH/MR Act, which was held to provide a right to adequate habilitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded, and rejecting petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim. The court reasoned that since that Amendment did not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of federal claims, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 the same result obtained with respect to a pendent state-law claim.

Held: The Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Pp. 906 - 921.

(a) The principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III of the Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the State is the real, substantial party in interest, regardless of whether the suit seeks damages or injunctive relief. The Court in Ex parte Young, supra, recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit challenging the federal constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State. Pp. 906 - 909.

(b) In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, this Court recognized that the need to promote the supremacy of federal law that is the basis of Young must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. Thus, the Court declined to extend the Young doctrine to

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encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the States' constitutional immunity. Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfilled Young' s underlying purpose of vindicating the supreme authority of federal law while at the same time preserving to an important degree the States' constitutional immunity. But this need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. When a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform [104 S.Ct. 903] their conduct to state law, this conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. Pp. 909 - 911.

(c) The dissenters' view is that an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to override the State's protection from injunctive relief under the Eleventh Amendment because such conduct isultra vires the official's authority. This view rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. At least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacity will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is against it. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628. Under the dissenters' view, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. Pp. 911 - 917.

(d) The principle that a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. Pp. 917 - 919.

(e) While it may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims results in federal claims being brought in state court or in bifurcation of claims, such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State. Pp. 919 - 920.

(f) The judgment below cannot be sustained on the basis of the state-law obligation of petitioner county officials, since any relief granted against these officials on the basis of the MH/MR Act would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Pp. 920 - 921.

673 F.2d 647, reversed and remanded.


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H. Bartow Farr III and Allen C. Warshaw reargued the cause for petitioners. With them on the briefs were Thomas M. Kittredge, Joel I. Klein, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Robert B. Hoffman, Debra K. Wallet, Alan J. Davis, and Mark A. Aronchick.

David Ferleger reargued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Halderman et al. Thomas K. Gilhool reargued the cause for respondents Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens et al. With him on the brief were Frank J. Laski and Michael Churchill. Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Cooper and Wilkinson, Brian K. Landsberg, and Frank Allen filed a brief for the United States.*

* A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, and Carl Valvo, William L. Pardee, and Judith S. Yogman, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Charles A. Graddick of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona (by Anthony Ching, Solicitor General), J.D. MacFarlane of Colorado, Carl R. Ajello of Connecticut, Richard S. Gebelein of Delaware,Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Tyrone C. Fahner of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Steven L. Beshear of Kentucky, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska,Richard H. Bryan of Nevada, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert O. Wefald of North Dakota, Hector Reichard of Puerto Rico, David L. Wilkinson of Utah,Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, Steven Freudenthal of Wyoming, and Aviata F. Fa'Aleveo of American Samoa.

H. Bartow Farr, III, Washington, D.C., and Allen C. Warshaw, Harrisburg, Pa., for petitioners.

Thomas K. Gilhool and David Ferleger, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondents.


Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law.

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This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10, 101 S.Ct., at 1534-1536, it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that history.

This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons who were or might become...

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