466 U.S. 981 (1984), 83-6199, Williams v. Illinois

Docket Nº:No. 83-6199.
Citation:466 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 2364, 80 L.Ed.2d 836
Party Name:Hernando WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS. Wendell Byron DIXON v. ILLINOIS. Lonnie YATES v. ILLINOIS. No. 83-5785. No. 83-5966.
Case Date:May 14, 1984
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 981

466 U.S. 981 (1984)

104 S.Ct. 2364, 80 L.Ed.2d 836

Hernando WILLIAMS

v.

ILLINOIS.

Wendell Byron DIXON

v.

ILLINOIS.

Lonnie YATES

v.

ILLINOIS.

No. 83-5785.

No. 83-5966.

No. 83-6199.

United States Supreme Court.

May 14, 1984

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1984.

OPINION

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgments of the Supreme [104 S.Ct. 2365] Court of Illinois and the Appellate Court of Illinois insofar as they left undisturbed the death sentences imposed in these three cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that capital punishment were constitutional under certain circumstances, I would vote to grant these petitions because they present a substantial constitutional challenge to the Illinois state's attorneys' practice of using peremptory challenges to exclude Negro jurors from participating in capital cases.

Hernando Williams, Wendell Dixon, and Lonnie Yates are Negroes. In unrelated indictments, the people of Illinois charged each of these men with serious felonies, punishable by death under Illinois law. Each was tried by jury, and each now claims that the prosecution violated the Federal Constitution by using peremptory challenges to remove Negroes from the jury venire. 1 In petitioner Dixon's case, 20% of the jury venire were Negroes. The prosecution used five of seven peremptory challenges to exclude the Negro members from the venire. An all-white jury then convicted Dixon and sentenced him to death. In petitioner Williams' case, 22% of the venire were Negroes. The prosecution used 11 of its 20 peremptory challenges to exclude Negroes, and an all-white jury sentenced Williams to death. In petitioner Yates' case, the record does not indicate what percentage of the

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venire were Negroes, but the record does show that the State used 13 of 16 peremptory challenges to remove Negroes from the venire. The jury that convicted Yates and sentenced him to death included a single Negro.

The claim raised in these petitions is distressingly familiar. Whenever a Negro defendant is charged with a capital offense, there is a substantial chance that the prosecution will employ its peremptory challenges to remove Negroes and other minorities from the jury panel. See Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867, 867-868, and n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 40, 43 and n. 3, 78 L.Ed.2d 179 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (listing cases in 19 different jurisdictions raising the issue since 1979). Illinois provides a striking, but by no means isolated, illustration of the dimensions of the problem. Since 1959, the Supreme Court of Illinois has reviewed at least 33 cases in which criminal defendants have alleged prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude Negro jurors. See People v. Payne, 99 Ill.2d 135, 152-153, 75 Ill.Dec. 643, 651-652, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1210-1211 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting) (list of cases). Petitioners in these three cases stand at the end of a long line of Negro criminal defendants who claim that the State of Illinois has denied them trial by a fair cross-section of the community.

The intentional exclusion of Negro...

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