467 N.E.2d 791 (Ind.App. 4 Dist. 1984), 4-783A209, Lambert v. Parrish
| Citation | 467 N.E.2d 791 |
| Date | 04 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | 4-783A209. |
| Parties | Lloyd L. LAMBERT and Dorothy S. Lambert, Appellants, v. Wayne L. PARRISH, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
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John E. Eisele, and Theodore F. Smith, Jr., Anderson, for appellants.
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Danford R. Due, Donn H. Wray, Stewart, Irwin, Gilliom, Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, Robert W. Miller, Bagot, Free, Shearer & Miller, Anderson, for appellee.
MILLER, Presiding Judge.
As the appellant, the Reverend Lloyd Lambert, sat at his desk at work one February day in 1978, a man burst into his office and told him that the Reverend's wife, Dorothy, had been in a bad automobile accident at the end of the alley behind the office. Rev. Lambert ran from his office, and, as he headed up the alley, slipped on a patch of ice, injuring his back.
Claiming his injuries were proximately caused by the accident and his attempt to rescue his wife (the rescue doctrine) Rev. Lambert joined with Dorothy in suing Wayne Parrish, the driver of the other automobile involved in Dorothy's accident. The Lambert's four-count complaint alleged that, as a proximate result of Parrish's negligent operation of his automobile, Rev. Lambert and Dorothy had each suffered personal injury and loss of consortium and services. The trial court granted Parrish's motion for partial summary judgment on Count III, for Rev. Lambert's personal injuries, and on Count IV, for Dorothy's loss of consortium and services of her husband. After the trial court finalized its grant of partial summary judgment pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56(C), the Lambert's brought this interlocutory appeal, claiming the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Rev. Lambert's injuries were not proximately caused by any negligence by Parrish. We agree and reverse finding, contrary to the trial court, that the so-called "rescue doctrine" should be applied to this case on remand.
FACTS
Viewing the evidence relevant to Counts III and IV of the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-movants in this case, as we must when reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, Jones v. City of Logansport, (1982) Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 1138, 1143, it appears that at about 9:00 A.M. on February 28, 1978, the Rev. Lloyd Lambert was working in his second floor office at the Christian Center, in Anderson, Indiana. Rev. Lambert had been the director of the Center in the same location for over twenty-five years. The Center, a place of residence and rehabilitation for the homeless and others in need of help, is located on the west side of Main Street, facing east, and is bounded on the north by an alley that connects Main Street with Meridian Street, one block to the west. At about 9:00 that morning, unknown to Rev. Lambert, his wife, Dorothy, was involved in an automobile accident with Parrish at the west end of the alley, where it meets Meridian Street. Allegedly, the accident was caused by Parrish's negligence.
As Rev. Lambert prepared for a meeting that morning, a person he believes to have been an employee at the Center rushed into his office and excitedly told the Reverend, "Your wife is in a bad accident out back of the Center and is hurt." R. 335. Rev. Lambert, believing his wife was seriously injured and suspecting "the worst," bolted from his office, ran down the stairs two at a time, and exited the front door of the Center. He turned north and ran ten or twelve feet, then turned west into the alley. He had run another ten to fifteen feet down the alley when he slipped on a patch of ice, became airborne, and landed face down. This fall is alleged to be the cause of Rev. Lambert's back injury for which he seeks damages from Parrish.
Although there is some conflict in the evidence, the facts most favorable to the Lamberts indicate that as Rev. Lambert lay in the alley, 1 he looked up and saw his
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wife's car at the other end of the alley, the hood partially raised and steam rising from the front end. Some people were standing around the car, including a man wearing a uniform at the car door. Rev. Lambert could not discern whether this man was a police officer or an ambulance attendant. Someone helped Rev. Lambert to his feet, and he proceeded more cautiously to the west end of the alley. When he arrived at the scene of the accident, Dorothy had been placed in an ambulance. She had struck her head on the steering wheel of her car and was stunned, though her injuries were in no way life threatening, as Rev. Lambert had believed. Rev. Lambert got into the ambulance with his wife and both were taken to the hospital emergency room.
The Lamberts' complaint against Parrish was in four counts, as described above. Parrish filed a motion to dismiss counts III and IV for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, T.R. 12(B)(6), or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment, T.R. 56(B). The trial court granted Parrish partial summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that, assuming Parrish's negligence, such negligence was not the proximate cause of Lloyd Lambert's injuries, and that the rescue doctrine did not apply to the facts of this case. We find the rescue doctrine does apply here and jury questions exist on the issue of proximate cause. Therefore we must reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. T.R. 56(C).
DECISION
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Lloyd Lambert's injuries were not proximately caused by the assumed negligence of Parrish. 2 Our standard of review when the grant of summary judgment is challenged on appeal is well settled:
"Under Ind.R.Tr.P. 56(C), a summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits and testimony, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If there is any doubt as to the existence of a factual issue, the motion should be resolved in favor of the non-mover. In ascertaining the existence of any doubt, the contents of all pleadings, papers and affidavits are liberally construed in favor of the non-movant. Summary judgment should not be granted if the facts give rise to conflicting inferences which would alter the outcome. Even though conflicting facts on some elements of a claim exist, summary judgment may be proper when there is no dispute or conflict regarding a fact which is dispositive of the action."
Woodward Insurance, Inc. v. White, (1982) Ind., 437 N.E.2d 59, 62 (citations omitted).
It is also clear that proximate causation is generally a question of fact, and, thus, typically not suitable for determination on summary judgment. Department of Commerce v. Glick, (1978) 175 Ind.App. 449, 372 N.E.2d 479; New York Central Railroad Co. v. Cavinder, (1965) 141 Ind.App. 42, 211 N.E.2d 502. "Only in cases where the facts are undisputed and lend themselves to a single inference or conclusion will questions of ... proximate cause become questions of law for the trial court." Petroski v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14, 24, 354 N.E.2d 736, 744.
Regarding the nature of proximate cause itself, "it is well settled that for a negligent
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act or omission to be a proximate cause of injury, the injury need be only a natural and probable result thereof; and the consequence be one which in the light of the circumstances should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated. [Citations omitted.]" Elder v. Fisher, (1966) 247 Ind. 598, 605, 217 N.E.2d 847, 852.
"In addition, 'if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.' Tabor v. Continental Baking Co. (1942), 110 Ind.App. 633, 644, 38 N.E.2d 257, 261." (emphasis supplied)
Geyer v. City of Logansport, (1977) 267 Ind. 334, 340, 370 N.E.2d 333, 337. Because the rescue doctrine has an important impact on the analysis of both the negligence and contributory negligence issues in a case such as the present one, we now turn to the question of when that doctrine is applicable.
Applicability of the Rescue Doctrine
Our supreme court recognized the viability of the rescue doctrine in our jurisdiction in Neal v. Home Builders, Inc., (1953) 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280. There, the defendants were building a house directly across the street from the home of the plaintiff, his wife (the decedent), and their three sons. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew the neighborhood children, including his sons, played inside the dangerous, unfinished structure, and that the defendants, therefore had a duty to keep children out. One morning, the plaintiff's wife, recognizing the distressed cries of her youngest son, 3 left her home, ran across the street, and entered the unfinished structure. The boy had become trapped on a stepladder that led to the second story of the building. In trying to free her son from his plight upon the stepladder, the decedent lost her footing and fell to her death. The plaintiff sued the defendant-home builders. Regarding the plaintiff's theory of recovery, the supreme court stated:
"If [plaintiff] is to recover under the allegations of his complaint, it must be done under the 'rescue doctrine.' This rule is clearly stated in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, Sec. 63, p. 554:
'One who has, through his negligence, endangered the safety of another may be held liable for injuries sustained by a third person in attempting to save such other from injury.'
It has been applied in the jurisdictions which have adopted it only where the situation which invites rescue is created by the...
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