Arizona v. Rumsey
| Citation | 467 U.S. 203,81 L.Ed.2d 164,104 S.Ct. 2305 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-226,83-226 |
| Parties | ARIZONA, Petitioner v. Dennis Wayne RUMSEY |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Arizona's statutory capital sentencing scheme provides that, after a murder conviction, the trial judge, with no jury, must conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether death is the appropriate sentence. The judge must choose between two options: death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years. The death sentence may not be imposed unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is present, but must be imposed if there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The judge must make findings with respect to each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing hearing involves the submission of evidence and the presentation of argument, the State having the burden of proving the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. After a jury convicted respondent of armed robbery and first-degree murder, the trial judge conducted the required sentencing hearing and ultimately found that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present. He ruled, contrary to the State's contention, that the statutory aggravating circumstance relating to killing for pecuniary gain applied only to murders for hire and did not apply to all murders committed in order to obtain money, such as murders committed during a robbery. Accordingly, respondent was sentenced on his murder conviction to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years, but he was also sentenced to 21 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, with the sentences to run consecutively. Respondent appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, challenging the imposition of the consecutive sentences, and the State filed a cross-appeal, contending that the trial court had committed an error of law in interpreting the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance to apply only to contract killings. Rejecting respondent's challenge to his sentence and ruling for the State on its cross-appeal, the court set aside the life sentence and remanded for redetermination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and for resentencing on the murder conviction. On remand, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing; rejected respondent's argument that imposing the death penalty would violate Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270; found that the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance was present and that there was no mitigating circumstance sufficient to call for leniency; and sentenced respondent to death. On respondent's mandatory appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that under Bullington, respondent's death sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and ordered that the sentence be reduced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years.
Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits Arizona from sentencing respondent to death. This case is controlled by Bullington, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding—barring imposition of the death penalty upon reconviction after an initial conviction, set aside on appeal, had resulted in rejection of the death sentence because that proceeding was comparable to a trial on the issue of guilt and the initial sentence of life imprisonment in effect acquitted the defendant of the death penalty. The capital sentencing proceeding in Arizona shares the characteristics of the Missouri proceeding that made it resemble a trial for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, respondent's initial life sentence constitutes an acquittal of the death penalty, and the State cannot now sentence respondent to death on his conviction for first-degree murder. Although the trial court initially relied on a misconstruction of the statute defining the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance, reliance on an error of law does not change the double jeopardy effects of a judgment that amounts to an acquittal on the merits of the issue in the sentencing proceeding—whether death was the appropriate punishment for respondent's offense. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, distinguished. Pp. 209-212.
136 Ariz. 166, 665 P.2d 48, affirmed.
William J. Schafer, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioner.
James R. Rummage, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.
The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State of Arizona from sentencing respondent to death after the life sentence he had initially received was set aside on appeal. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona that Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), squarely controls the disposition of this case. Under the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause adopted in that decision, imposition of the death penalty on respondent would be unconstitutional.
An Arizona jury convicted respondent of armed robbery and first degree murder. The trial judge, with no jury, then conducted a separate sentencing hearing to determine, according to the statutory scheme for considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (Supp.1983-1984), whether death was the appropriate sentence for the murder conviction. Petitioner, relying entirely on the evidence presented at trial, argued that three statutory aggravating circumstances were present. Respondent, presenting only one witness, countered that no aggravating circumstances were present but that several mitigating circumstances were. One of the principal points of contention concerned the scope of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp.1983-1984), which defines as an aggravating circumstance the murder's commission "as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value." Respondent argued that this provision applies only to murders for hire, whereas petitioner argued that it applies to all murders committed in order to obtain money.
Several days after the sentencing hearing, the trial judge, who imposes sentence without the assistance of a jury under the Arizona scheme, returned a "special verdict" setting forth his findings on each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The judge found that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present. App. 53-58. In particular, with respect to the aggravating circumstance defined in § 13-703(F)(5), the trial judge found:
App. 54-55.
Having found no aggravating circumstances, the trial court was statutorily barred from sentencing respondent to death. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp.1983-1984); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3. The court accordingly sentenced respondent to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years, the sentence statutorily mandated for first degree murder when the death penalty is not imposed. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(A) (Supp.1983-1984). With respect to the armed robbery conviction, the court found that respondent had committed a "dangerous offense" involving use of a deadly weapon and that there was an aggravating circumstance not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance—respondent had "planned this robbery . . . in order to obtain what [he] knew was only a few hundred dollars. . . ." App. 66. As authorized by Arizona law, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 13-604 and 13-702 (1978 and Supp.1983-1984), the court accordingly sentenced respondent to 21 years' imprisonment for armed robbery. The prison terms for the two convictions were to run consecutively.
Respondent appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Arizona, arguing that imposition of consecutive sentences in his case violated both federal and state law. Under Arizona law, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-4032(4) (1978), respondent's appeal permitted petitioner to file a cross-appeal from the life sentence; in that cross-appeal petitioner contended that the trial court had committed an error of law in interpreting the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance to apply only to contract killings. The State Supreme Court rejected respondent's challenge to his sentence. It agreed with petitioner, however, that the trial court had misinterpreted § 13-703(F)(5): "theft committed in the course of a murder" could constitute an aggravating circumstance under that section. 130 Ariz. 427, 431, 636 P.2d 1209, 1213 (1981). Because of the trial court's misinterpretation, the State Supreme Court concluded, "the sentence of life imprisonment previously imposed will have to be set aside and the matter remanded for redetermination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and resentencing." Id., at 432, 636 P.2d, at 1214. The sentence for armed robbery was left undisturbed.
On remand the trial court held a new sentencing hearing. Neither petitioner nor respondent presented any new evidence, although they had the opportunity to do so. The court heard argument, however, both on the lawfulness of imposing the death penalty on resentencing and on the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Petitioner argued that neither federal nor state law barred sentencing respondent to death. Petitioner also urged the court to find the three statutory...
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