Bland v. State

• Citation: 468 N.E.2d 1032
• Decision Date: 09 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 384,384
• Parties: Clarence H. BLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 114.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 1032

468 N.E.2d 1032

Clarence H. BLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 384 S 114.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 9, 1984.

Patrick Murphy, Anderson, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of Arson, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to thirteen (13) years imprisonment.

The facts are these. Appellant and Phyllis Chaney were living together in Chaney's rental home in Anderson. They had been previously married but had been divorced for a number of years. Appellant occupied a basement room in the home and provided domestic services for the home. The pair had frequent disputes over appellant's drinking.

On October 1, 1983, the police were summoned to the home by Chaney who claimed appellant had stolen her car. On October 2, the police again were called to the home. This time Chaney was very agitated and asked the police to remove appellant from the home. When the police went downstairs to speak with appellant, he informed them that Chaney was wanted on two outstanding warrants from another county. After confirming this fact, the police removed Chaney from the home. As they were doing so, Chaney's landlord appeared. Chaney requested the landlord to remove appellant and to secure the home. Later that night the police were called to the home by the landlord on the report of a possible burglary in progress. The police searched the home and found appellant inside the dwelling. He was arrested. At that time he threatened to burn the home down.

Appellant was released the next day. He promptly asked the landlord for permission to enter the home to recover certain personal items. The landlord refused and appellant left. That evening, October 3, appellant travelled to Indianapolis. Around 1:00 A.M., on October 4, Chaney's automobile, which was parked at her son's home in Indianapolis, burned. The police testified the fire was caused by an arsonist. Appellant was identified by a witness as being the man standing in a telephone booth less than two blocks from the automobile.

On October 5, at 2:00 A.M., the Anderson Fire Department responded to a call that a fire was in progress in the Chaney home. After extinguishing the fire, the arson investigators determined that the fire was caused by arson, and had its origin in at least three separate locations. The fire department retained an audio tape of the report of the fire. Chaney identified appellant's voice as that on the tape.

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it permitted evidence related to the Indianapolis fire to be introduced. As a general rule evidence of prior crimes is not admissible. However, a variety of exceptions have developed around this rule. We recognize the admissibility of prior crimes if the evidence is relevant to establish intent, motive, knowledge, plan or identity. Lewis v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 50; Follrad v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 635. This evidence was admissible as it was relevant to the issues of motive and plan.

The evidence is indicative of appellant's motive of revenge against Chaney through the burning of her possessions. The methods used to ignite the fires were similar as were the times of day when the fires were set. Appellant was seen in a telephone booth near one fire, and he was identified as the caller in the second. These factors are demonstrative of a common plan. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the prior crime.

Appellant next contends the court erred when it denied him permission to impeach witness Chaney by questioning her concerning welfare fraud allegations pending against her. As a result of this denial, appellant maintains he was denied the opportunity to effectively and completely cross-examine Chaney as to her veracity, interest in testifying, prejudices and biases. Appellant was permitted to proffer the following evidence: Chaney had welfare fraud charges pending against her in Marion County; appellant had reported to the Madison County Welfare Department certain alleged violations of that county's welfare regulations; the Madison County Welfare Department had suspended Chaney's benefits and there were no criminal charges pending against Chaney in Madison County. Appellant contends fraud of any type, including welfare fraud, demonstrates a lack of veracity. Secondly, he argues Chaney's knowledge of appellant having reported her to the welfare department goes to the issue of her motive and interest in offering testimony. Lastly, he maintains the fact that benefits were suspended, but no criminal charges filed, is suggestive of a bargain agreement to induce Chaney's testimony.

A witness may not be impeached by specific acts of misconduct which have not been reduced to criminal convictions. Randall v. State, (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 916. In the case at bar, there was no conviction against Chaney in either Madison or Marion County on welfare fraud charges. Thus, the court was correct when it excluded all references to the fraud allegations.

This Court acknowledges an affirmative duty of the State to disclose all agreements with potential witnesses which may have influenced the witness. Sims v. State, (1983) Ind., 456 N.E.2d 386. A defendant does have the right to make an initial inquiry as to the existence of any agreement. However, he has no right to discredit the testimony of a witness by questioning that person as to nonexistent agreements. Sims, supra; Campbell v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 568.

First, this Court notes appellant did not inquire of Chaney as to the existence of any agreements. In addition, at the time the evidence was proffered, the deputy prosecutor testified he was unaware of any agreement or of any investigation of Chaney in Madison County. Thus, the only evidence of an agreement is appellant's suggested inference. It is incumbent on a defendant to do more than create an inference of an agreement in the face of a direct denial by the State of the existence of an agreement. The...