State v. Steffen
| Decision Date | 18 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20180467-CA,20180467-CA |
| Citation | 468 P.3d 568 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Jordan Vincent STEFFEN, Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Douglas J. Thompson and Bryson R. King, Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 A jury convicted Jordan Vincent Steffen on two counts of child endangerment, two counts of lewdness involving a child, and one count of aggravated child sexual abuse. Steffen challenges his convictions on multiple grounds, arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by excluding evidence that the alleged victim had previously been sexually abused, (2) made two erroneous discovery rulings under rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (3) abused its discretion by denying his request for mistrial. We affirm.
¶2 In October 2015, the State charged Steffen with two counts of lewdness involving a child, eight counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, one count of sodomy on a child, two counts of endangerment of a child, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of rape of a child, and one count of tampering with a witness. The primary basis for these charges centered on sexually abusive acts that the State alleged Steffen committed against his girlfriend's daughter, A.Z., when she was between eleven and twelve years old.
¶3 At a preliminary hearing, A.Z. testified about the sexual abuse Steffen committed but did not mention abuse by any other individual. About a month after the hearing, Steffen moved to admit evidence, under rule 412 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that A.Z.’s grandfather had previously sexually abused her (the prior abuse evidence). According to Steffen, the prior abuse evidence was relevant to "rebut [A.Z.’s] ‘sexual innocence inference’ by establishing [her] degree of sexual knowledge at the time the allegations were made."2 After holding an evidentiary hearing at which A.Z. described her grandfather's abusive acts, the district court ruled that the prior abuse evidence was inadmissible under rule 412. Although the court noted that "evidence offered to rebut" the sexual innocence inference was relevant, it concluded that the prior abuse evidence should be excluded because the
¶4 Following its ruling on the prior abuse evidence, the district court scheduled Steffen's trial. A few weeks before trial, however, Steffen moved for a continuance due to late evidentiary disclosures by the State. Ultimately, the court determined that the late disclosures prejudiced Steffen's "ability to prepare an adequate defense by the time scheduled for trial" and granted a three-month continuance.
¶5 On the second day of the rescheduled trial, during opening arguments, the State revealed that it intended to call A.Z.’s mother (the mother) as a witness and that she would testify that she had coerced A.Z. into not disclosing an act of lewdness by Steffen to law enforcement. Despite an ongoing obligation to disclose inculpatory evidence, the State had not notified the defense about that fact. Upon objection from the defense, the district court ordered "the State to disclose [to the defense] all investigator notes or reports regarding statements of A.Z. and [the] mother about the disclosure of [the lewd act] to [the mother] and directions by [the] mother that A.Z. not make disclosures" to law enforcement. The next day, the district court declared a mistrial as a result of the State's nondisclosure.
¶6 In accordance with the district court's earlier order, the State emailed the defense "the factual portion of [its paralegal's] notes" taken during interviews with A.Z. and the mother.3 The next day, Steffen moved to compel the State to disclose all its witness interview notes, arguing that allowing the State to have "unfettered access" to witnesses' factual statements without disclosing the "notes on th[ose] factual assertions" to the defense violated his right to due process. The court denied Steffen's motion to compel, reasoning that the complete interview notes contained the prosecution's core opinion work product and that with disclosure of "the paralegal's notes, [Steffen could] fairly and effectively cross examine and confront [the mother] at trial."
¶7 Shortly after the district court denied Steffen's motion to compel, the State filed a motion for specific discovery requesting the "reports, notes, and recordings of any interviews or investigations by the defense investigator(s), either of [Steffen's] witnesses, or the State's witnesses." After the time to oppose the motion expired, the State filed a motion to compel discovery. Steffen opposed the motion to compel, arguing that "the attorney work product privilege" protected the items sought by the State from disclosure. The court found that the State had "shown good cause for the disclosure" of the requested information and entered the following order:
¶8 Before the start of the new trial, Steffen again moved to admit the prior abuse evidence, but this time offered a different reason. In that motion, Steffen argued that the prior abuse evidence was necessary to rebut one of the State's expert witnesses who would testify that A.Z. began cutting herself after Steffen began abusing her. Steffen intended to rebut the expert's testimony by demonstrating that A.Z. began cutting herself in response to the grandfather's abuse and that her self-harm was not attributable to Steffen. In response, however, the State said that it would "not be asserting, either directly or indirectly, that the physical evidence of A.Z.’s cutting injuries ‘originated with the accused.’ " After noting the State's decision not to introduce any evidence that A.Z. cut herself, the district court rejected Steffen's alternative argument that the prior abuse evidence was admissible under rule 412.
¶9 Steffen's trial began shortly thereafter. During the State's direct examination of A.Z., the State moved to introduce a portion of a law enforcement interview with A.Z. that, according to the State, had been edited to remove any mention of her cutting or self-harm. The district court admitted the interview and allowed it to be played to the jury. Toward the end of the recording, A.Z. told the interviewer that she went to the bathroom after an incident in which Steffen abused her. The interviewer then asked, "What happened after you went to the bathroom?" to which A.Z. responded, "I cut."
¶10 In a later discussion with the district court and outside the presence of the jury, the State apologized for its error in allowing the "I cut" statement (the cutting statement) to be played for the jury. The State averred that it was an innocent mistake caused by a problem with its editing software, and Steffen accepted that characterization of the incident. Nevertheless, Steffen moved for dismissal due to "cumulative due process violations" or, in the alternative, a mistrial. Steffen's counsel reminded the court that the State's failure to make timely disclosures had previously resulted in a continuance of the first trial and later in a mistrial. Counsel then discussed how playing the cutting statement to the jury prejudiced Steffen in multiple ways and "affect[ed] his ability to have a fair trial." The court declined to either dismiss the case or declare a mistrial. However, the court did rule that Steffen could admit the previously excluded prior abuse evidence to rebut the "causal connection" that A.Z. "cut herself because of [Steffen's] sexual assault." But despite finally being authorized by the court to introduce the prior abuse evidence, Steffen did not do so, asserting that the changed ruling came too late to allow Steffen to present the necessary witnesses and evidence.
¶11 At the conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted Steffen on ten of the charged counts, but found him guilty on five: two counts of lewdness involving a child, two counts of child endangerment, and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child.4 Steffen now appeals.
¶12 Steffen raises a number of issues on appeal. First, he contends that the district court exceeded its discretion by excluding the prior abuse evidence. "We afford district courts a great deal of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence and will not overturn an evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Cuttler , 2015 UT 95, ¶ 12, 367 P.3d 981 (cleaned up). "But whether the district court applied the proper legal standard in assessing the admissibility of that evidence is a question of law that we review for correctness." Id. (cleaned up).
¶13 Next, Steffen contends that the district court issued two erroneous discovery rulings under rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. "While a [district] court is generally allowed broad discretion in granting or denying discovery, the proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the [district] court's decision for correctness." State v. Spry , 2001 UT App 75, ¶ 8, 21 P.3d 675 (cleaned up).
¶14 Lastly, Steffen contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion for mistrial. A district court's decision to...
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State v. Eddington
...to serve" because "the application of rule 412 significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of a defendant's defense." State v. Steffen, 2020 UT App 95, ¶ 17, P.3d 568 (quotation simplified). "It is not enough to show that [rule 412] excludes favorable evidence." Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 7......