468 U.S. 85 (1984), 83-271, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents
|Docket Nº:||No. 83-271|
|Citation:||468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70|
|Party Name:||National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents|
|Case Date:||June 27, 1984|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued March 20, 1984
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In 1981, petitioner National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) adopted a plan for the televising of college football games of its member institutions for the 1982-1985 seasons. The plan recites that it is intended to reduce the adverse effect of live television upon football game attendance. The plan limits the total amount of televised intercollegiate football games and the number of games that any one college may televise, and no member of the NCAA is permitted to make any sale of television rights except in accordance with the plan. The NCAA has separate agreements with the two carrying networks, the American [104 S.Ct. 2952] Broadcasting Cos. and the Columbia Broadcasting System, granting each network the right to telecast the live "exposures" described in the plan. Each network agreed to pay a specified "minimum aggregate compensation" to the participating NCAA members, and was authorized to negotiate directly with the members for the right to televise their games. Respondent Universities, in addition to being NCAA members, are members of the College Football Association (CFA), which was originally organized to promote the interests of major football-playing colleges within the NCAA structure, but whose members eventually claimed that they should have a greater voice in the formulation of football television policy than they had in the NCAA. The CFA accordingly negotiated a contract with the National Broadcasting Co. that would have allowed a more liberal number of television appearances for each college and would have increased the revenues realized by CFA members. In response, the NCAA announced that it would take disciplinary action against any CFA member that complied with the CFA-NBC contract. Respondents then commenced an action in Federal District Court, which, after an extended trial, held that the controls exercised by the NCAA over the televising of college football games violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, and accordingly granted injunctive relief. The court found that competition in the relevant market -- defined as "live college football television" -- had been restrained in three ways: (1) the NCAA fixed the price for particular telecasts; (2) its exclusive network contracts were tantamount to a group boycott of all other potential broadcasters
and its threat of sanctions against its members constituted a threatened boycott of potential competitors; and (3) its plan placed an artificial limit on the production of televised college football. The Court of Appeals agreed that the Sherman Act had been violated, holding that the NCAA's television plan constituted illegal per se price-fixing, and that, even if it were not per se illegal, its anticompetitive limitation on price and output was not offset by any procompetitive justifications sufficient to save the plan, even when the totality of the circumstances was examined.
Held: The NCAA's television plan violates § 1 of the Sherman Act. Pp. 98-120.
(a) While the plan constitutes horizontal price-fixing and output limitation, restraints that ordinarily would be held "illegal per se," it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule in this case where it involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all. The NCAA and its members market competition itself -- contests between competing institutions. Thus, despite the fact that restraints on the ability of NCAA members to compete in terms of price and output are involved, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires consideration, under the Rule of Reason, of the NCAA's justifications for the restraints. But an analysis under the Rule of Reason does not change the ultimate focus of the inquiry, which is whether or not the challenged restraints enhance competition. Pp. 98-104.
(b) The NCAA television plan, on its face, constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market, and the District Court's findings establish that the plan has operated to raise price and reduce output, both of which are unresponsive to consumer preference. Under the Rule of Reason, these hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior place upon the NCAA a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense that competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market. The NCAA's argument that its television plan can have no significant anticompetitive effect, since it has no market power, must be rejected. As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output, and, as a factual matter, it is evident from the record that the NCAA does possess market power. Pp. 104-113.
[104 S.Ct. 2953] (c) The record does not support the NCAA's proffered justification for its television plan that it constitutes a cooperative "joint venture" which assists in the marketing of broadcast rights, and hence is procompetitive. The District Court's contrary findings undermine such a justification. Pp. 113-115.
(d) Nor, contrary to the NCAA's assertion, does the television plan protect live attendance, since, under the plan, games are televised during
all hours that college football games are played. Moreover, by seeking to insulate live ticket sales from the full spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the product itself is insufficiently attractive to draw live attendance when faced with competition from televised games, the NCAA forwards a justification that is inconsistent with the Sherman Act's basic policy. "The Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable." National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696. Pp. 115-117.
(e) The interest in maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams that the NCAA asserts as a further justification for its television plan is not related to any neutral standard or to any readily identifiable group of competitors. The television plan is not even arguably tailored to serve such an interest. It does not regulate the amount of money that any college may spend on its football program or the way the colleges may use their football program revenues, but simply imposes a restriction on one source of revenue that is more important to some colleges than to others. There is no evidence that such restriction produces any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition rates, or any other revenue-producing activity. Moreover, the District Court's well-supported finding that many more games would be televised in a free market than under the NCAA plan is a compelling demonstration that the plan's controls do not serve any legitimate procompetitive purpose. Pp. 117-120.
707 F.2d 1147, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 120.
STEVENS, J., lead opinion
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia contend that the National Collegiate Athletic Association has unreasonably restrained trade in the televising of college football games. After an extended trial, the District Court found that the NCAA had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act,1 and granted injunctive relief. 546 F.Supp. 1276 (WD Okla.1982). The Court of Appeals agreed that the statute had been violated, but modified the remedy in some respects. 707 F.2d 1147 (CA10 1983). We granted certiorari, 464 U.S. 913 (1983), and now affirm.
Since its inception in 1905, the NCAA has played an important role in the regulation of amateur collegiate sports. It has adopted and promulgated playing rules, standards of amateurism, standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic squads and coaching staffs. In some sports, such as baseball, [104 S.Ct. 2954] swimming, basketball, wrestling, and track, it has sponsored and conducted national tournaments. It has not done so in the sport of football, however. With the
exception of football, the NCAA has not undertaken any regulation of the televising of athletic events.2
The NCAA has approximately 850 voting members. The regular members are classified into separate divisions to reflect differences in size and scope of their athletic programs. Division I includes 276 colleges with major athletic programs; in this group, only 187 play intercollegiate football. Divisions II and III include approximately 500 colleges with less extensive athletic programs. Division I has been subdivided into Divisions I-A and I-AA for football.
Some years ago, five major conferences, together with major football-playing independent institutions, organized the College Football Association (CFA). The original purpose of the CFA was to promote the interests of major football-playing schools within the NCAA structure. The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, respondents in this Court, are members of the CFA.
History of the NCAA Television Plan
In 1938, the University of Pennsylvania televised one of its home games.3 From 1940 through the 1950 season, all of Pennsylvania's home games were televised. App. 303. That was the beginning of the relationship between television and college football.
On January 11, 1951, a three-person "Television Committee," appointed during the preceding year, delivered a report to the NCAA's...
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