Zuniga-Rodriguez v. State
| Decision Date | 28 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 121,441,121,441 |
| Citation | 469 P.3d 688 (Table) |
| Parties | Rafael ZUNIGA-RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Rafael Zuniga-Rodriguez appeals from a judgment of the trial court denying his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after concluding that his trial counsel's ineffective assistance did not prejudice him. The trial court concluded that even if his trial counsel's ineffectiveness fell below an objectively reasonable standard for a defense counsel, Zuniga-Rodriguez' convictions should be upheld under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We disagree. As a result, we reverse his convictions, vacate his sentences, and remand with directions.
Zuniga-Rodriguez' underlying criminal case
In 2015, Zuniga-Rodriguez was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school, among other charges.
On January 15, 2016, the State moved for a Jackson v. Denno hearing to establish the admissibility of Zuniga-Rodriguez' statements to law enforcement. See Jackson v. Denno , 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial court held that the statements were voluntary and were admissible.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Zuniga-Rodriguez was represented by court-appointed counsel, Nick Heiman. The jury convicted Zuniga-Rodriguez of possession of methamphetamine (a lesser included offense of his original charge), misdemeanor possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, and possession of methamphetamine without a Kansas tax stamp affixed. The jury acquitted him of aggravated endangerment of a child and felony possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia.
On April 20, 2016, the trial court sentenced Zuniga-Rodriguez to 18 months' probation based on Senate Bill 123 and ordered the following underlying sentence: 15 months' imprisonment for his possession of methamphetamine conviction; 9 months in jail for his misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia conviction; and 6 months in jail for his tax stamp violation. The trial court ordered the jail time to run concurrent with the prison time.
Zuniga-Rodriguez' direct appeal
Zuniga-Rodriguez appealed to this court. See State v. Zuniga-Rodriguez , No. 116,031, 2017 WL 2834690 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 307 Kan. 994 (2018). In that appeal, he argued that the trial court erred when it improperly admitted inculpatory statements. This court held that the issue was not properly before the court because Zuniga-Rodriguez did not lodge a contemporaneous objection during trial to the admission of his statements to police. 2017 WL 2834690, at *2.
On April 17, 2018, this court issued its mandate in his appeal.
Zuniga-Rodriguez' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
On July 25, 2018, Zuniga-Rodriguez moved pro se for relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. In that motion, he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the search of his residence. On August 3, 2019, he filed a supplemental motion expounding on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court appointed counsel and ordered counsel to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Zuniga-Rodriguez had been discharged from probation for the conviction that he now challenged.
On December 14, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the show cause order. After hearing arguments, the trial court ordered that the motion could proceed and ordered Zuniga-Rodriguez to supplement his initial motion to correct insufficiencies.
On January 14, 2019, Zuniga-Rodriguez' trial counsel supplemented the original motion. This supplemental pleading further explained Zuniga-Rodriguez' claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the search of his residence and that trial counsel should have objected to the introduction of that evidence at trial. In the supplemental pleading, he also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of his statements to law enforcement.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The appellate defender who represented Zuniga-Rodriguez on appeal testified that he did not raise the issue of whether the search of Zuniga-Rodriguez' trash can at his residence was lawful because trial counsel did not preserve that issue for appeal. The trial counsel, however, testified that he did not move to suppress the evidence from the trash can pull because he did not believe it was an issue that would be successful in a motion to suppress. Also, trial counsel acknowledged that Zuniga-Rodriguez asked him about possibly moving to suppress the evidence from the trash can pull. But the trial counsel believed there was "nothing there." The trial counsel also admitted that he did not preserve the issue of Zuniga-Rodriguez' statements to police because he failed to lodge a timely objection to the statements' admission.
Ultimately, the trial court held that trial counsel erred in failing to move to suppress Zuniga-Rodriguez' statements to the police and in failing to object to their admission at trial. Nevertheless, the trial court held that although trial counsel's actions were erroneous, Zuniga-Rodriguez failed to sustain his burden to show that his trial counsel's actions prejudiced him.
Also, the trial court held that Zuniga-Rodriguez' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence seized during the trash can pull. Yet, the trial court again concluded that even if Zuniga-Rodriguez' trial counsel had moved to suppress this evidence, the outcome would not have been different because the affidavit to support the trash can pull would have been subject to the good-faith exception of the warrant requirement. Then the trial court held that there was no basis to believe that the police officers misled the judge issuing the search warrant or that they were aware the warrant's application was so deficient that it should not have been signed by the judge.
Zuniga-Rodriguez now timely appeals.
On appeal, Zuniga-Rodriguez argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) failing to move to suppress the evidence seized from the trash can pull at his residence and (2) failing to object to the admission of his statements made to police while they executed the search warrant on his residence.
According to a well-known standard, the trial court has three options when handling a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion:
" Sola-Morales v. State , 300 Kan. 875, 881, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014).
Our standard of review depends on which of those three options a trial court chooses to use. Sola-Morales , 300 Kan. at 881. Here, the trial court denied Zuniga-Rodriguez' 60-1507 motion after a full evidentiary hearing. After such a hearing on a 60-1507 motion, the trial court must issue "findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented." Supreme Court Rule 183(j) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 225). An appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. Appellate review of the trial court's ultimate conclusions of law is de novo. Fuller v. State , 303 Kan. 478, 485, 363 P.3d 373 (2015).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a criminal defendant must establish (1) the performance of defense counsel was deficient under the totality of the circumstances, and (2) prejudice, i.e. , that there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result absent the deficient performance." Sola-Morales , 300 Kan. at 882 (). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Butler , 307 Kan. 831, 853, 416 P.3d 116 (2018). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, with a reasonable probability meaning a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Kelly , 298 Kan. 965, 969-70, 318 P.3d 987 (2014).
We draw guidance from the standard set out in Strickland : "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 466 U.S. at 697. Therefore, we will begin our focus with the second step of the Strickland standard. Assuming, as the trial court ruled, that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the evidence seized in the trash can pull and that trial counsel should have objected to the admission of the statements to police, did trial counsel's failure to do so prejudice Zuniga-Rodriguez?
We turn to the question of whether the affidavit in support of the search warrant to search Zuniga-Rodriguez' residence was...
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