Hall v. City of Taft

• Citation: 302 P.2d 574,47 Cal.2d 177
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 19 October 1956
• Parties: Guy HALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The CITY OF TAFT, a Municipal Corporation, Glen Black, Jack Kirsher, Ted Pheal, William O. Erickson, Dale Huey, as members of the City Council thereof, and Walter McKee, as Chief of Police thereof, Defendants and Appellants. L. A. 24244.

Page 574

302 P.2d 574

47 Cal.2d 177

Guy HALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The CITY OF TAFT, a Municipal Corporation, Glen Black, Jack Kirsher, Ted Pheal, William O. Erickson, Dale Huey, as members of the City Council thereof, and Walter McKee, as Chief of Police thereof, Defendants and Appellants.

L. A. 24244.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 19, 1956.

Henry G. Baron, City Atty., Taft, and Allen Grimes, Modesto, for appellants.

Mack, Bianco, King & Eyherabide and Dominic Bianco, Bakersfield, for respondent.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Johnson & Stanton, Gardiner Johnson and Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of respondent.

CARTER, Justice.

Defendants, Taft, a non-chartered city of the sixth class, its council and chief of police appeal from a judgment enjoining it from enforcing against plaintiff, a building contractor, its building ordinance.

There is no dispute as to the facts. On April 22, 1955, plaintiff as contractor entered into a contract with Taft Union High School and Junior College District, hereafter called district, a school district duly organized under the state laws, to construct in Taft for the district, a school building for $614,113. The plans and specifications for the building were approved by the State Department of Education and State Division of Architecture. Plaintiff commenced construction which was to be completed in 320 days, but work was 'stopped' by Taft, the city, demanding that plaintiff obtain a building permit from it involving a $300 fee and submission to the building ordinance ¹ of Taft. The district has employed an inspector to assure that the building is constructed according to the plans and specifications. Defendants assert that plaintiff has refused to obtain a permit from the city for the construction of the building and they intend to enforce the penal and civil provisions of the building ordinance of the city.

The issue is whether a municipal corporation's building regulations are applicable to the construction of a public school building by a school district in the municipality. Taft argues that it had power to adopt police regulations building construction regulations under the Constitution. ²

The public schools of this state are a matter of statewide rather than local or municipal concern; their establishment, regulation and operation are covered by the Constitution and the state Legislature is given comprehensive powers in relation thereto. The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws 'Providing for the management of common schools.' Cal.Const. art. IV, § 25, subd. 27. 'A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement.' Emphasis added; id., art. IX, § 1. There is a State Board of Education, an elected superintendent of public instruction and there are county superintendents whose salary and qualifications are prescribed by the Legislature, id., art. IX, §§ 3, 3.1, 7. The proceeds of all public lands that have been or may be granted by the United States to the state and other property is 'inviolably' appropriated to the support of the common schools, id., art. IX, § 4, and 'Out of the revenue from state taxes for which provision is made in this article, together with all other state revenues, there shall first be set apart the moneys to be applied by the State to the support of the Public School System and the State University.' Id., art. XIII, § 15. 'The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a school has been established.' Emphasis added; id., art. IX, § 5. 'The Public School System shall include all kindergarten schools, elementary schools, secondary schools, technical schools, and State colleges, established in accordance with law and, in addition, the school districts and the other agencies authorized to maintain them. No school or college or any other part of the Public School System shall be, directly or indirectly, transferred from the Public School System or placed under the jurisdiction of any authority other than one included within the Public School System. * * *

'The Legislature shall provide for the levying annually by the governing body of each county, and city and county of such school district taxes, at rates not in excess of the maximum rates of school district tax fixed or authorized by the Legislature, as will produce in each fiscal year such revenue for each school district as the governing board thereof shall determine is required in such fiscal year for the support of all schools and functions of said district authorized or required by law.' Emphasis added; id., art. IX, § 6. A school district may lie in more than one county and may issue bonds. Id., art IX, § 6 1/2. No money shall ever be appropriated for 'any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools * * *.' Id., art. IX, § 8. 'The Legislature shall have power, by general law, to provide for the incorporation and organization of school districts, high school districts, and junior college districts, of every kind and class, and may classify such districts.' Emphasis added; id., art. IX, § 14. In harmony with those provisions it has been held that the power of the state Legislature over the public schools is plenary, subject only to any constitutional restrictions. Pass School Dist. of Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Dist., 156 Cal. 416, 418, 105 P. 122, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 485; Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429, 32 P. 558; Worthington School Dist. v. Eureka Dist., 173 Cal. 154, 159 P. 437; Merrill Elementary School Dist. of Tehama County v. Rapose, 125 Cal.App.2d 819, 271 P.2d 522; see Woodcock v. Dick, 36 Cal.2d 146, 222 P.2d 667; Seidel v. Waring, 36 Cal.2d 149, 222 P.2d 669. The public school system is of statewide supervision and concern and legislative enactments thereon control over attempted regulation by local government units. Esberg v. Badaracco, 202 Cal. 110, 259 P. 730; Cloverdale Union High School Dist. of Sonoma County v. Peters, 88 Cal.App. 731, 264 P. 273; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926; Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415, 109 P.2d 29; Kennedy v. Miller, supra, 97 Cal. 429, 32 P. 558; Worthington School Dist. v. Eureka Dist., supra, 173 Cal. 154, 159 P. 437; Board of Education of City of San Rafael v. Davidson, 190 Cal. 162, 210 P. 961; Phelps v. Prussia, 60 Cal.App.2d 732, 141 P.2d 440; Lansing v. Board of Education, 7 Cal.App.2d 211, 45 P.2d 1021; People ex rel. Davidson v. Mertz, 2 Cal.2d 136, 39 P.2d 422; Gerth v. Dominguez, 1 Cal.2d 239, 34 P.2d 135. It is said in Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., supra, 193 Cal. 664, 669, 226 P. 926, 928: 'It (the education of the children of the state) is in a sense exclusively the function of the state which cannot be delegated to any other agency. The education of the children of the state is an obligation which the state took over to itself by the adoption of the Constitution. To accomplish the purposes therein expressed the people must keep under their exclusive control, through their representatives, the education of those whom it permits to take part in directing the affairs of state.' School districts are agencies of the state for the local operation of the state school system. Cloverdale Union High School Dist. of Sonoma County v. Peters, supra, 88 Cal.App. 731, 738, 264 P. 273; Board of Education of City of San Rafael v. Davidson, supra, 190 Cal. 162, 168, 210 P. 961; Butler v. Compton Junior College Dist., 77 Cal.App.2d 719, 176 P.2d 417; Lansing v. Board of Education, supra, 7 Cal.App.2d 211, 45 P.2d 1021; Merrill Elementary School Dist. of Tehama County v. Rapose, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d 819, 271 P.2d 522. The beneficial ownership of property of the public schools is in the state. It is said in Pass School Dist. of Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Dist., supra, 156 Cal. 416, 419, 105 P. 122, 124, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 485: 'To the contention that a transfer of ownership thus accomplished works the taking of property without due process of law, it should be sufficient to point out that in all such cases the beneficial owner of the fee (of public school property) is the state itself, and that its agencies and mandatories the various public and municipal corporations in whom the title rests are essentially nothing but trustees of the state, holding the property and devoting it to the uses which the state itself directs. The transfer of title without due process of law, of which appellant so bitterly complains, is nothing more, in effect, than the naming by the state of other trustees to manage property which it owns and to manage the property for the same identical uses and purposes to which it was formerly devoted. In point of law, then, the beneficial title to the estate is not affected at all. All that is done is to transfer the legal title under the same trust from one trustee to another. In this sense the trustees of the Hollywood City School District became, by operation of law, successors to the trustees of the Pass School District, as is directly held in (School Township of) Allen v. School Town of Macey, 109 Ind. 559, 10 N.E. 578, where it is said: 'It is now a well-recognized legal inference deducible as well from general principles as from the decided cases that under the Constitution and laws of this state, public school property is held in trust for school purposes by the persons or corporations authorized for the time being to control such property, and that it is in the power of the Legislature to provide for a change in the trusteeship of such property in certain contingencies presumably...