People v. Crooker

• Decision Date: 21 November 1956
• Docket Number: Cr. 5856
• Citation: 303 P.2d 753,47 Cal.2d 348
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Russell CROOKER, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 753

303 P.2d 753

47 Cal.2d 348

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Russell CROOKER, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 5856.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 21, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1956.

Robert W. Armstrong, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Deputy Atty. Gen., S. Ernest Roll, Dist. Atty., Jere J. Sullivan, Fred N. Whichello and Lewis Watnick, Deputy Dist. Attys. Los Angeles, for respondent.

McCOMB, Justice.

This is an automatic appeal from a judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree after trial before a jury.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the People, it discloses that Norma McCauley on July 4, 1955, attended a barbecue dinner at which Mr. Baird was present. About 12:15 a. m., July 5, 1955, he accompanied Mrs. McCauley in her car to her home. Two other persons followed them in Mr. Baird's car. They arrived at Mrs. McCauley's home at 1100 Somera Road Los Angeles, around 12:30 a. m. Mr. Baird entered the house with Mrs. McCauley, said goodnight, walked out to his car and left in it with the persons who had followed him to Mrs. McCauley's residence.

Defendant, who had been employed as a houseboy in the deceased's home, freely and voluntarily wrote and signed a confession in which he stated that late in the evening of July 4, 1955, he went to the deceased's home, entered the house through the rear and hid in a closet in her children's room until they were asleep.

He stated in it that Mrs. McCauley came home about 12 or 1 o'clock and he waited until she was in her own bedroom. He then entered it and talked with her for over an hour in an endeavor to have her tell him 'her reasons and feelings for leaving me.' He said she would not talk about it.

Finally, being sleepy, she began to doze and was going to sleep, whereupon he found a kitchen knife about ten inches long with a blade about six inches. He then went back to the chaise lounge upon which she was reclining, put the knife in his coat pocket and knelt beside her for a long time. After she was asleep he took her throat in his hands and she chocked and started to scream.

Hearing the maid, he reached for the knife and pushed and pushed on it, but Mrs. McCauley still made sounds and struggled. He then choked her with some clothes which he put around her throat. After this he left the house, returned to his apartment and fell asleep until shortly before noon.

After trial the jury returned a verdict reading: 'We, the Jury in the above entitled action, find the Defendant, John Russell Crooker, Jr., guilty of murder, a felony, as charged in * * * the * * * information and find it murder of the first degree.'

Defendant relies for reversal of the judgment on these grounds:

First: That he was denied due process of law because of the refusal of the investigating officers to allow him to consult with an attorney upon demand being made that he be permitted to do so.

This contention is without merit. Defendant testified that he made repeated requests for an attorney from the time of his arrest and throughout his questioning by the officers. Officer Gotch testified that the first time defendant asked to call an attorney was at the Central Station, when the following occurred:

'Q. When he made the request for an attorney, what did you tell him? A. I asked him who did he want for an attorney.

'Q. And he said what? A. He stated he didn't know.

'Q. What else did he say on this subject? A. I stated to him that after our investigation was concluded he could call an attorney, and if he didn't have funds to hire an attorney, when he went to Court a public defender would be assigned to handle his case.

'He then stated that he had a friend who had been an instructor at Pepperdine College that would probably handle the case for him. I asked him who the name was, and he said it was a man by the name of Simpson, who lived in Long Beach.

'Q. He asked you if he could call an attorney at that time, and you told him that he could call after your investigation was completed, is that right? A. I told him, after I was through with the investigation, he could make a call.'

Several other officers denied they ever heard defendant ask for an attorney and testified that defendant was told he did not have to say anything if he didn't want to. They also testified that no force was used against him and that his confession was freely and voluntarily made.

The applicable test as to the admissibility of a confession is whether, considering the circumstances, the confession was freely and voluntarily made without any inducement held out to the accused. (Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 3, 291 P.2d 929.)

An examination of the record discloses conflicting testimony, that of the officers denying any force or that promises were made to defendant in consideration of the confession he made, and defendant's statement that he was slapped on one occasion and struck in the stomach on several occasions. In addition, when he took the stand, defendant was examined in detail as to his confession by the deputy district attorney and in each instance he admitted the officers had not told him what to say or write in his confession.

The conflict in the testimony was thus squarely placed before the jury, whose finding was resolved against defendant's contentions, and it is binding upon this court. (People v. Mehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535, at pages 548(7), 553(11), 197 P.2d 12.)

The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 'You are instructed that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. Refusal to grant a prisoner's request for counsel constitutes a denial of fundamental rights. Whether or not the defendant asked for counsel, and if he did, whether he was or was not denied an opportunity to consult with counsel, are circumstances you may consider, among others, in determining whether the written confession was voluntary or involuntary.'

Thus the question was presented to the jury for its determination as to whether defendant's request for an attorney and the officers' conduct relative thereto resulted in a denial of defendant's fundamental rights, and the jury found against defendant's contention. In view of the evidence, we are of the opinion the jury's determination was amply supported.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to be represented by counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and deprivation of this guarantee may be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To constitute deprivation of due process, however, the denial of the right of the accused to be represented by counsel in every stage of the proceedings must have so fatally infected the regularity of his trial and conviction as to violate the fundamental aspects of fairness and result in a miscarriage of justice. (Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166; cf. Stroble v. State of California, 343 U.S. 181, at page 197, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872.)

The burden of showing unfairness and a miscarriage of justice by the denial of defendant's right to counsel in some stage in a proceeding against him rests upon the defendant. (Stroble v. State of California, supra, 343 U.S. at page 198, 72 S.Ct. at page 607.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Stroble v. State of California, supra, quotes with approval from Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, at page 281, 63 S.Ct. 236, at page 242, 87 L.Ed. 268, where it said: 'If the result of the adjudicatory process is not to be set at naught, it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.'

From an examination of the record and the statements of fact set forth above, it appears the police officers' conduct relative to defendant's request for an attorney in no way affected the voluntariness of defendant's confession. On the contrary, the record discloses ample evidence to support the jury's finding that it was freely and voluntarily made without duress or the promise of reward.

In the one instance in which defendant requested an attorney the officers' attitude thereto in no way affected the voluntariness of the confession nor did it in any way result in any unfairness to defendant at the trial. There was no miscarriage of justice.

Second: That defendant's confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and therefore was inadmissible in evidence.

This contention is likewise devoid of merit. As pointed out above, there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the confession was voluntary. There was also a conflict in the evidence as to the facts upon which the condlusion was necessarily based that the confession was free and voluntary, by the court in the first instance and finally by the jury to whom the matter was submitted on proper instructions. Since the evidence fully supports the finding of the trial court and the jury, their finding that the confession was freely and voluntarily made and not in violation of any of defendant's constitutional rights is binding upon this court. (People v. Mehaffey, supra.)

In People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal.2d 870, at page 876(4), 151 P.2d 251, at page 254, Mr. Justice Shenk thus states the rule: 'The procedural steps in the matter of receiving confessions in evidence are outlined in the decisions. At the time the confession is offered, it is incumbent on the prosecution to lay the foundation for its introduction by preliminary proof showing that it was freely and voluntarily made. (Citing authorities.) Before the confession...