Wilson v. Beville

Citation306 P.2d 789,47 Cal.2d 852
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date08 February 1957
PartiesH. J. WILSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles Henry BEVILLE et al., Defendants. The City Los Angeles,. a Municipal Coroporation, Defendant and Respondent. L. A. 23692.

Guerin & Guerin and John J. Guerin, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Peyton H. Moore, Jr., Chief Deputy City Atty., and Spencer L. Halverson, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for respondent.

CARTER, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment declaring that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land subject to the defendant city's easement for street purposes. He brought the action to quiet title to the land and for ejectment. He claims title by virtue of a city treasurer's deed issued to his predecessor in interest pursuant to a foreclosure sale following the default in payment of a street improvement bond issued under the Improvement Act of 1911 (now Sts. & Hy.Code, §§ 5000-6794).

The assessment resulting in this bond was recorded on November 23, 1927. The bond was issued on December 28, 1927, to the Municipal Bond Company. On November 25, 1927, the defendant city commenced a condemnation proceeding under the Street Opening Act of 1903 (Sts. & Hy.Code, §§ 4000-4443) in which it acquired an easement for street purposes across a part of the land upon which the improvement bond constituted a lien. Neither the owner of that lien nor any holder of the bond was joined as a party to the condemnation proceeding. Final judgment of condemnation was entered on July 23, 1961, and the record owner of the portion condemned was awarded and paid the sum of $5,376.20. The city took possession of the condenmed property on January 22, 1932, forthwith devoted it to public use as a part of a city street, and has continued to devote it to the same use.

Meanwhile, on October 19, 1938, a certificate of tresaurer's sale of the property in question was issued to one Al Schuch. The certificate was transferred to Betty Wilson, and on August 23, 1950, a treasurer's deed was issued to her. She quitclaimened to the plaintiff on April 12, 1951, and he filed this action on the following day. No portion of the assessment or bond has been paid.

The plaintiff contends that his title to the property is not subject to any city easement, but that even the property, the doctrine an easement over the property, the doctrine of inverse condemnation entitles him to compensation for at least the value of the lien at the time the easement was acquired.

The city claims that the 1927 condemnation proceeding established an easement over the property valid as against the plaintiff. It argues that the lien of the improvement bond was transferred to the award in the condemnation proceeding despite the failure to join the ienholder, and that the lienholder's remedy was to appear and assert his rights in the condemnation proceeding or to collect the amount of the bond from the person who received the award the then owner of the fee.

Where a condemnation award is placed on deposit in court the lien attaches to the award and is removed from the condemned land. However, where, as here, the award has been paid to the owner of the fee, the rights of a lienholder who has not been joined as a party to the condemnation proceeding have not been clearly defined in this state.

Generally the statutes regulating eminent domain procedure make it evident that the lienholder's interest should be protected in some manner. Thibido v. United States, 9 Cir., 187 F.2d 249, 255-257; see Code Civ.Proc., § 1244, subd. 2, § 1245.38 § 1248, subds. 1, 8, § 1252. The city did not choose to protect the lienholder by depositing the award into court as authorized by section 1252 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It did not deduct the amount of the lien from the award, as authorized by subdivision 8 of section 1248 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The interest of the lienholder in the property was a matter of record. Although the city was apparently required to make him a party to the condemnation proceeding (see Code Civ.Proc., § 1244, subd. 2; see, also, Code Civ.Proc., § 1245.3), it did not do so, but under the 1903 act only notice must be given (Sts. & Hy.Code, §§ 4209-4211). From a consideration of all of the factors involved, it appears that the failure to join the lienholder in the 1927 condemnation proceeding left his lien unimpaired. (In accord, see thibido v. United States, supra, 9th Cir., 187 F.2d 249; Municipal Securities Corp. v. Kansas City, 195 Mo.App. 464, 193 S.W. 880; State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Neb. 4, 105 P. 986; Ehlers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 118 Neb. 477, 225 N.W. 468.

Although the 1927 condemnation proceeding was not effective to perfect the city's title as against the plaintiff, the city has devoted the property to a public use since 1932. This fact precludes the plaintiff from gaining possession and thereby disrputing the public use it vests the city with an easement. Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 677, 76 P.2d 681; Hossom v. City of Long Beach, 83 Cal.App.2d 745, 189 P.2d 787; Chilberg v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.App.2d 99, 128 P.2d 693.

The plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of inverse condemnation entitles him to compensation for the taking of a part of his interest in the property is correct. Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra; 17 Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 7, pp. 585-86; 18 Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 374, pp. 95-96. However, defendant contends that plaintiff's claim for compensation is lost by his failure to file a claim with the city as required by sections 363 and 376 of the city charter. Those sections require that a written claim for any money or damages asserted to be due from the city be filed with the city clerk within six months after the occurrence from which the claim arose. No claim of any kind unless plaintiff's complaint be so considered was ever filed by plaintiff. It is unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff's claim arose in 1932 when the property was devoted to a public use, in 1950 upon the issuance of the treasurer's deed, or at some time between these two dates. The trial court found that no claim was filed by the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest, and this action was commenced more than six months after the treasurer's deed was issued, but as will be seen, it was not necessary for plaintiff ti file a claim under the charter; the charter provisions have no application to claims for compensation under inverse condemnation.

Plaintiff was not required to file a claim with the city in order to be entitled to compensation for his land taken under the power of eminent domain. The claim filing requirements of the Los Langeles Charter (L.A.Charter, §§ 363, 376) cannot apply to a claim for compensation when a taking is by eminent domain because it is not a municipal affair; it is a matter of statewide concern and may be regulated only by the state Legislature, such as, the statutes of limitation. Even if the charter may legislate on the subject the provisions are not applicable to a claim for compensation for property taken by eminent domain.

It bas been held repeatedly that where liability is imposed by statute 1 the method or regulation of the enforcement of the liability such as claim filing and limitation of actions is not a municipal affair controllable by city charter. Wilkes v. City, etc., of San Francisco, 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 112 P.2d 759; Helbach v. City of Long Beach, 50 Cal.App.2d 242, 123 P.2d 62; Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 66s, 177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225.

For illustration, it is said in the Helbach case, 50 Cal.App.2d at page 246, 123 P.2d at page 65: 'Respondent also urges, as before noted, that the erection and maintenance of the building was a purely municipal affair and that therefore the procedure, including limitation of time, for filing claims against the city arising out of its tortious acts or omissions in connection with such building is likewise exclusively of municipal concern and governed by its charter. Even if we assume respondent's premise her asserted conclusion does not follow. The opening and maintenance of public streets is typically a municipal affair * * * but liability for defective streets, including the procedure for enforcing it, is a matter of general state concern (Wilkes v. City, etc., of San Francisco, 1941, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 397, 112 P.2d 759; Douglass v. City of Los Angeles, 1935, supra, 5 Cal.2d 123, 128, 53 P.2d 353). * * * (I)f the building be a proprietary undertaking the city is liable for its torts regardless of the provisions of act 5619, supra (Deering's Gen.Laws, 1937, p. 2630; Stats.1923, p. 675) and if it be govermental in character liabiliy is imposed by that act. In either case the liability for tort, including procedure for its enforcement, is a matter of public concern.' (Emphasis added.) In the Wilkes case the court said, 44 Cal.App.2d at page 395, 112 P.2d at page 761: 'The right to recovery does not arise under charter provisions but under state law. The state has the power to prescribe the method of enforcing the claim. If the state fixes the period as ninety days within which such a claim may be filed, a municipality, even by charter provisions, may not ordain that the claim will not be recognized unless filed within a shorter period. No right of action is given by charter to seek damages against the City and County of San Francisco as the result of a defective or dangerous condition of a public highway. Such right exists only under the state law. The municipality may not curtail or abridge such right by providing that the claim shall be filed within eighty-nine days or one day. If it had the right to fix a period of sixty days it likewise has the power to change that period. The right to fix the time within which the claim may be filed...

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