Aldridge v. United States, 5255.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1931
• Docket Number: No. 5255.,5255.
• Parties: ALDRIDGE v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

60 App. DC 45, 47 F.2d 407 (1931)

ALDRIDGE v. UNITED STATES.^*

No. 5255.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued December 2, 1930.

Decided January 6, 1931.

James F. Reilly, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leo A. Rover and Walter M. Shea, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on a verdict convicting appellant, defendant below, of the crime of murder in the first degree.

It appears that early in the morning of July 6, 1929, the defendant and his brother were observed burglarizing a drug store at the northeast corner of Seventeenth and Q Streets Northwest, in the city of Washington. The police were notified, and Officer McDonald, among others, responded. This officer stopped for a few moments at the drug store and then drove his car north on Seventeenth street, where he apprehended defendant and his brother, arrested them, ordered them into his car, and drove back to the drug store. As they reached the drug store and the car stopped, a shot was heard inside of the car. Defendant opened the right front door of the car, jumped out of the machine, and ran west on Q street, holding a revolver in his hand. The brother alighted from the car and proceeded to run north on Seventeenth street. McDonald, though wounded, got out of the car, fired a shot at defendant and then shot at the brother. The brother was hit and subsequently died from his wound; defendant escaping uninjured. McDonald subsequently died from the effects of his wound.

It appears from the testimony that the officer and the two men were in the front seat of the automobile; McDonald at the left side, driving the car, defendant's brother in the center, and defendant at the right. The officer was wounded in the right side of the chest; the bullet, penetrating his body, came out through the back. Defendant's brother, when found where the officer had shot him, had a loaded revolver in his possession which had not been discharged.

Two days later defendant was arrested, and, when taken to the police station, admitted his identity, but insisted that his brother had fired the shot that killed McDonald. He told the officers where his revolver could be found. It was found at the place designated, taken to the police station, and defendant admitted that it was the revolver that he had in his possession the night that he was arrested. It contained two empty shells. Experts testified that the bullet that passed through McDonald's body and was subsequently found on the seat of the automobile had been fired from defendant's revolver. When defendant was confronted with the statement that it was impossible that his brother could have fired the shot, since there was no empty shell found in his revolver when he was killed, he replied: "Well, I am ready to take my medicine."

There was considerable other corroborating evidence which it is unnecessary to consider, since it is not contended that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict finding defendant guilty of some degree of homicide.

Counsel for defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court to allow him to inquire of the prospective jurors on their voir dire whether they entertained racial prejudice in a case wherein the defendant is a negro and the deceased a white man. We had occasion to consider this same question in the case of Crawford v. United States, 59 App. D. C. 356, 41 F.(2d) 979. We have given the matter further careful consideration in this case, and find no reason to recede from our former decision. In a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, where the colored race is accorded all the privileges and rights under the law that are afforded the white race, and especially the right to practice in the courts, serve on the jury, etc., we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to permit the question to be answered by the jurors.

It is urged by counsel for defendant that the court erred in refusing to withdraw from the consideration of the jury the question of defendant's guilt of first degree murder, on the theory that there was no evidence of premeditation or deliberation. Deliberation and premeditation may be instantaneous. Their existence is to be determined from the facts and circumstances in each case. It is a question, under a proper charge by the court, for the jury to determine. The circumstances under which the present crime was committed all tend to establish the commission of the offense with deliberation and premeditation. Defendant, still armed, was under arrest and had ridden with the officer to the point where the crime for which he was arrested had been committed. While the officer was in the act of stopping his car and engaged with the mechanism of the vehicle, defendant reached past...