Wilson v. Hart

Decision Date27 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98 C 296.,98 C 296.
Citation47 F.Supp.2d 966
PartiesRobert WILSON, pro se, Plaintiff, v. District Judge William T. HART, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Robert Wilson, plaintiff pro se.

Thomas P. Walsh, U.S. Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for defendants.

ORDER

LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, brought before the Court by Judges Richard D. Cudahy, Joel M. Flaum, William T. Hart, Michael S. Kanne, Daniel A. Manion, Richard A. Posner, and Kenneth F. Ripple ("federal judges") on June 19, 1998; Frederick Sudekum, III and Albert DeVito's Motion to Dismiss filed on October 6, 1998; and Querry & Harrow, Ltd. and T. David Ackerman's Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 4, 1998, and Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 4, 1998. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED TO DISMISS this case with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The circumstances surrounding this case begin many years ago in an Illinois state court. According to Robert Wilson ("Wilson"), his insurance company did not properly handle his claims after two of his Illinois properties were damaged. The Vine Street property was damaged in 1983, and the South Turlington Street property was damaged in 1984. And so began Wilson's new career.

In 1987, Wilson filed a state suit against his insurance company improperly denying his claim on the Vine Street property. Wilson's case was dismissed with prejudice because he failed to bring the claim within the statute of limitations. (Defs.' Ex. A) Wilson appealed the decision to the Illinois appellate level, and lost again. (Defs.' Ex. B) He petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal and was denied. (Defs.' Ex. C) He then petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and again was denied. (Defs.' Ex. D) Not to be discouraged, Wilson filed a new case in the Northern District of Illinois based on the same incident, this time alleging due process and equal protection violations, and lost. (Defs.' Ex. E) He lost again on appeal, and was denied certiorari once more. See Wilson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 94-2646 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995) (unpublished order). (Defs.' Exs. F, H, I)

In 1994, Wilson filed suit against the two attorneys who represented his insurance company in the prior cases, namely Defendants, Michael Resis and Frederick Sudekum. (Defs.' Ex. K) He claimed that the Vine Street property had been properly insured and that these Defendants had committed various torts and civil rights violations against Wilson during the prior litigation relating to the Vine Street property. The federal court dismissed this case with prejudice, (Defs.' Ex. L), and it seems Wilson did not appeal.

In 1996, Wilson filed suit against Defendants Resis, Sudekum, Albert DeVito, Richard Corrigan, T. David Ackerman, Gary Ravitz, and Querrey & Harrow, Ltd. in state court, again claiming that they had committed various torts against him during the Vine Street property litigation. (Defs.' Ex. M) The state court dismissed this case with prejudice. (Defs.' Ex. N)

According to Defendants, Wilson filed a complaint in state court relating to the South Turlington Street property against Sudekum, DeVito, and the insurance company claiming that they used the courts to deny Wilson his lawful right of payment. The state court also dismissed this case with prejudice. (See Defs.' Ex. P)

Wilson filed the instant claim against several federal district and appellate judges who ruled against him in his first federal suit against his insurance company as well as the Defendants from the federal and state cases. His allegations against the federal judges consist of abuse of power, fraud, conspiracy, lies, and breach of judicial oath. Wilson's claims against the other Defendants seems to be a compilation of misconduct, perjury, conspiracy, violation of Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, abuse of power, fraud, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the violation of federal laws. Wilson requests a significant sum of money from each Defendant. Regarding the judges, he insists that the Court overturn the other courts' prior rulings. Having withdrawn his motion for appointment of counsel, Wilson proceeds before the Court pro se.

DISCUSSION

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint should state "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a). All of the facts and inferences within the complaint should be treated as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir.1994); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir.1996). A complaint should not be dismissed "if the plaintiff could prevail `under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Luckett v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 53 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). However, plaintiffs "may not avoid dismissal ... simply by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the bases of their claims." Perkins v. Silverstein 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir.1991). The Court "will not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs which are not contained within the complaint." G.L. Indus. of Mich., Inc. v. Forstmann-Little, 800 F.Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.Ind.1991) (citing Coates v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1977)).

The Federal Judges

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just from assessment of damages. Id. at 10, 112 S.Ct. 286. Immunity is overcome in two instances: (1) a judge is not immune for nonjudicial actions, and (2) a judge is not immune for judicial action taken in the absence of all jurisdiction. Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). To determine whether a judge's act is "judicial", the court looks at "the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Wilson's complaint claims that the federal judges' decisions against him were improper. A judge's decision in a case before him or her is considered a judicial action. Therefore, the alleged actions by the federal judges in this case were judicial.

If the matter upon which a judge acts is clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which the judge presides, the act is done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1441 (6th Cir.1997); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir.1990); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc). To explain the difference between acting in the absence of jurisdiction and acting in excess of jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit has noted that

if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills an estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his actions; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a non-existent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.

Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 722 (7th Cir.1981) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1099).

Wilson does not allege that the federal judges acted in absence of jurisdiction. Rather, he claims that his decisions were affected by their alleged abuse of power, fraud, and conspiracy, among other things. Judges will not be deprived of immunity because their actions were in error, were done maliciously, or were in excess of their authority. John, 897 F.2d at 1391 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099); see, e.g., Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078 (finding that conspiracy involving a presiding judge to predetermine a case's outcome would not pierce the judge's immunity if "the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's subject matter jurisdiction"). Judicial immunity "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (citation omitted); accord Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286. Because Wilson does not show that the federal judges' actions were either nonjudicial or occurred in the absence of jurisdiction, the Court finds that judicial immunity applies to Wilson's claims for damages. Therefore, the Court dismisses Wilson's claims for damages against the federal judges.

Wilson's complaint does not clearly request declaratory relief from the federal judges. The Court will address the issue, as Wilson is proceeding pro se. The doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply to claims seeking such preventative relief. Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984)). Consequently, judges may be sued in an action seeking to enjoin them from pursuing a course of unlawful conduct. Id. However, the Court may not grant declaratory relief where no actionable live case or controversy exists. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 966 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that the declaratory judgment statute requires an actual controversy).

To succeed in a federal claim for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Whitacre
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois
    • 5 d4 Agosto d4 1999
    ...As a rule, federal courts do not enjoin conduct which has been discontinued and has no real prospect of repetition. Wilson v. Hart, 47 F.Supp.2d 966, 970 (N.D.Ill. 1999). Accordingly, ADM's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VIII of its Amended Complaint is V. WHITACRE'S COUNTERCLAIMS In ......
  • Reed v. Illinois
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 9 d1 Maio d1 2016
    ...and hypothetical and, therefore, insufficient to support Article III standing. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102; Wilson v. Hart, 47 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (dismissing as moot declaratory relief claims against federal judges where the complained-of court proceedings had concluded); ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT