Prevard v. Fauver

• Decision Date: 28 April 1999
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 91-1217.
• Parties: Mark PREVARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William H. FAUVER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

47 F.Supp.2d 539

Mark PREVARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William H. FAUVER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 91-1217.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

April 28, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Carl Poplar, Poplar and Eastlack, Turnersville, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Former Attorney General Deborah T. Poritz, Deputy Attorney General Howard J. McCoach, Deputy Attorney General William P. Flahive, N.J. Dept. of Law and Public Safety, Div. of Law, Trenton, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION

WALLS, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendants William H. Fauver, et al. for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). For the reasons below, the motion is granted.

Factual Background

Before September 1, 1979, in the state courts of New Jersey, the plaintiffs had been convicted of sexual crimes, such as sodomy or incest, under N.J.S.A. 2A:143-1, et seq., N.J.S.A. 2A:143-2 or N.J.S.A. 2A:114-2. The conduct of each of the plaintiffs was determined in pre-sentence evaluations to be characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior. The statutes under which the plaintiffs were convicted were later repealed by the Code of Criminal Justice (the "Code"). All of the sex offenses committed by the above plaintiffs are now contained in various provisions of the Criminal Code in either N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1 et seq. or N.J.S.A. 2C:24-1. et seq., which became effective on September 1, 1979.

Under both the former penal statute, N.J.S.A. 2A, and later the Code, N.J.S.A. 2C, any person convicted of sex offenses whose conduct was determined to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior is sentenced to a program of specialized treatment. Compare N.J.S.A. 2A:164-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3. However, all persons, such as the present plaintiffs, sentenced as repetitive and compulsive sex offenders pursuant to the former 2A:164-3 received indeterminate terms of confinement in an Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center ("ADTC") and are not permitted to have their sentences reduced by custodial reduction credits. Offenders sentenced under the present 2C:47-3 receive determinate sentences and are allowed to earn custodial reduction credits.

The plaintiffs argue that inmates sentenced under N.J.S.A. 2A:143 ("Title 2A inmates") should be entitled to work or commutation credits similar to those given to inmates sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 ("Title 2C inmates"). They claim that denial of this benefit violates the Fifth, Eighth, Fourteenth Amendments and the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution, as well as the New Jersey Constitution and the Sex Offender and Parole Acts (N.J.S.A. 2A:164-3, et. seq. and N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45). The defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

This is a companion case to one filed by Title 2C inmates in Groves v. Fauver, Civil Action No. 91-796 (Honorable William G. Bassler), which raised the same issues except for that about work or commutation credits and was settled after motion practice. In Groves all of the claims were dismissed by the settlement agreement except the claim that Title 2A inmates are entitled to work or commutation credits similar to those afforded to Title 2C inmates. Two of the plaintiffs in the present case, Manigold and Williams, are presently confined in the ADTC while the remaining two, Prevard and Gunn, have been released on parole after the initiation of this suit. Plaintiff Gunn has withdrawn from this lawsuit.

Legal Standard

The Court reviews a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, 815 F.Supp. 154, 157 (E.D.Pa.1993). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court is required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir.1994). Under Rule 12(c), judgement will only be granted if it is clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir.1988). The question is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations that will entitle him to relief, not whether he will ultimately prevail. See Hishon v. King and Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept legal or unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977); Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993). Moreover, the claimant must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claims or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

Analysis

The plaintiffs have submitted a brief in opposition to "the defendant's motion for summary judgment" and responded to the defendant's motion as if it were a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. However, the defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); the Court will treat these opposing actions as 12(b)(6) motions.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Equal Protection clause mandates that all persons similarly situated be treated the same. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). However, the constitutional principles of equal protection do not require that all persons be treated identically. See Trantino v. Dept. of Corrections, 168 N.J.Super. 220, 226, 402 A.2d 947 (App.Div.1979). They require only that any differences in treatment be justified by an appropriate state interest, and the State need only show a rational basis for a classification where the classification is not suspect. Id. State laws are generally entitled to a presumption of validity against attack under the Equal Protection Clause. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979).

To bring a successful claim for violation of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the allegedly offensive categorization invidiously discriminates against the disfavored group. See Kranson v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir., 1985); Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 1300, 79 L.Ed.2d 700 (1984). In the absence of invidious discrimination, a court is not free under the Equal Protection Clause to substitute its judgment for the will of the people of a State as expressed in laws passed by their popularly elected legislature. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 1745, 60 L.Ed.2d 269, 274 (1979); Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 272, 97 S.Ct. 1047, 51 L.Ed.2d 313 (1977).

The Supreme Court has formulated a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." Id. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. In other words, such a regulation will stand so long as it passes a "rational basis" test.

For parole consideration, repetitive and compulsive sex offenders sentenced to ADTC are treated differently from other New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC") inmates. They must pass two boards of review to be eligible for parole: the Special Classification Review Board ("SCRB") and the State Parole Board ("SPB"). Once the SCRB determines that an inmate is eligible for parole consideration, that person goes before the SPB, which makes a final decision whether to grant parole.

1. Work and Commutation Credits

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants improperly withheld work and commutation credits from them as Title 2A inmates. The defendants counter by saying that this contention fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted because they are in compliance with state law N.J.S.A. 2A164-10, which is constitutional. N.J.S.A. 2A:164-10 directs that "[n]o statute relating to remission of sentence by way of commutation time for good behavior and for work performed shall apply to any such person committed pursuant to section 2A:164-6 of this title." This type of statute has been found to be constitutional and not in violation of the equal protection clause. Compare State v. Wingler, 25 N.J. 161, 176, 135 A.2d 468 (1957). In addition, New Jersey courts have found that Title 2C did not modify Title 2A sentences by granting commutation credits. See, e.g., id.; Savad v. Dept. of Corrections, 178 N.J.Super. 386, 391, 429 A.2d 381 (App.Div.) ("[t]he enactment and taking effect of the Code did not, in itself, reduce or otherwise affect pre-Code sentences"), certif. denied 87 N.J. 389, 434 A.2d 1071 (1981); State v. Smith, 190 N.J.Super. 21, 25, 461 A.2d 1177 (App.Div. 1982).

The defendants insist that Title 2A and Title 2C inmates should not be treated the same because of the different sentences each group receives. Title 2A inmates are given an indeterminate sentence, under which they are eligible for parole consideration without regard to time served. Title 2C inmates, on the other hand, are given determinate sentences subject to a possible period of...