47 N.W. 228 (Mich. 1890), Fort St. Union Depot Co. v. Morton

• Citation: 47 N.W. 228,83 Mich. 265
• Date: 21 November 1890
• Docket Number: .
• Parties: FORT STREET UNION DEPOT CO. v. MORTON et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 228

47 N.W. 228 (Mich. 1890)

83 Mich. 265

FORT STREET UNION DEPOT CO.

v.

MORTON et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 21, 1890

Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county.

Page 229

p>Page [83 Mich. 266] Dickinson, Thurber & Stevenson, ( Don M. Dickinson, of counsel,) for appellants.

F. A. Baker, for appellee.

MORSE, J.

This is a proceeding taken to condemn lands to the public use. The petitioner is a union depot company, organized under the union depot act of 1881. The property in question in this case is a part of lands and premises claimed by the petitioner to be required for its depot and station grounds. In the court below, a jury rendered a verdict that it was necessary to take the property for the public use, and that the respondents were entitled, as a just compensation therefor, to the sum of $86,000. The respondents appeal to this court. The grounds of such appeal, as summarized by their counsel, are as follows: (1) The union depot act of June 9, 1881, in so far as it confers the power of eminent domain, is unconstitutional and void, for these reasons: ( a) The proposed use of lands by a corporation which is independent of the railroad laws of the state, and thus is discharged from the obligations imposed by law upon railroad transportation, is not a public use. ( b) The act does not confer upon the public at large any right to make use of the proposed passenger depot, and freight warehouse, on any terms. Much less are the terms for such use to the public defined, so as to be certain, beyond doubt, and without condition. ( c) Even if the terms to railroad companies were fixed and certain, railroad companies are not the public contemplated by the constitution. The use, and the terms for the use, must be for the people at large. ( d) The purpose of the act is not stated in its title. [83 Mich. 267] ( e) The oath for the jury prescribed by the statute does not cover their constitutional duty. (2) The act does not contemplate more than one union depot in each city or village, and this corporation is not within the clear purposes of the act requiring such companies to provide for all companies entering the city desiring such accommodations. (3) The testimony in the case clearly shows that there is no necessity for taking this property for the public use, and there is no legal evidence to the contrary."

The main argument against the constitutionality of the act conferring the power of eminent domain upon these companies (See Pub. Laws 1881, p. 320; How. St. p. 888) is based upon the proposition that they must acquire such power entirely from the act itself; that the union depot company is not a railroad company; it is not a common carrier; it is a new artificial person deriving all its rights and powers and finding absolutely all its obligations in this, its organic act. Therefore, it is argued it is clearly independent of, and not affected by, the body of the railroad laws and amendments embraced in chapters 91 and 92, How. St., which confer rights and privileges upon railroad companies, and also provide certain and clearly-defined reciprocal duties to the people, the imposition of which duties by law is the criterion which makes the use for railroad purposes a public one. It may be admitted for the purposes of this case that so far the contention of counsel is correct, and that we must look to the act itself to support the claim of the company to the right to acquire lands by condemnation for public use. But, going further, the counsel also claim that in this act nothing can be found conferring upon the public at large any rights in the contemplated passenger depots and freight-houses; that the people at large-the common public-are given by the statute no fixed and definite [83 Mich. 268] rights in these depots; and that there is nothing to prevent the companies organized under it from charging what they please for depot services to the public at large. It is said that the provisions of the statute apply only to dealings between the depot companies and the railroad companies who may use the property of the former companies; that this company, for instance, "may shut its doors as against the approaching passenger unless he pays its...