Belknap v. Ball

• Decision Date: 24 December 1890
• Citation: 47 N.W. 674,83 Mich. 583
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: BELKNAP v. BALL.

47 N.W. 674

83 Mich. 583

BELKNAP v. BALL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 24, 1890

Error from circuit court, Kent county; WILLIAM E. GROVE, Judge.

Taggart, Wolcott & Ganson and Butterfield & Keeney, for appellant.

Blair, Kingsley & Kleinhans, for appellee.

GRANT J.

This is an action on the case for libel. Plaintiff was a candidate for election to the office of representative in congress. The first count in the declaration, after the usual allegations as to the character of plaintiff and his reputation among his neighbors, alleges that the defendant falsely, wickedly, and maliciously did compose, print, and publish, and cause to be composed, printed, and published in the Daily Democrat, a daily newspaper having large circulation in the district from which plaintiff was a candidate, and in other parts of the state, and also in the Weekly Democrat, the following words "I don't propose to go into debate on the tariff differrences on wool, quinine, and all the things, because I ain't built that way. Charles E. Belknap." That said words were printed and published in a coarse and blotted imitation of the hand-writing of the plaintiff with certain of said words wrongly spelled, and with an imitation of the genuine signature of the plaintiff below the words, thereby meaning that the plaintiff had written said words. And that they were written in the uncouth, blotted and illy-spelled form represented in the publication, and that they were a fac simile of the words written and signed by the plaintiff. The second count alleges that at a public meeting held in the city of Grand Rapids plaintiff made a speech. The defamatory matter complained of is that the defendant published in said paper a report of this speech, in which he said: "Mr. Belknap spoke first. He assured his neighbors that he was not there as a candidate begging for votes; that he would refrain from discussing the tariff on wool, quinine, etc., because, as he said, he wasn't built that way." The innuendo is that defendant meant by this language that plaintiff was too ignorant and imbecile to discuss said question, or to express in a decent way his intention not to discuss it. The defendant demurred, and as causes of demurrer says: "(1) That the declaration does not allege that in said publication there was anything touching or affecting the moral character or integrity of the plaintiff; but that said publications are complained of only in that they are calculated to convey the impression that plaintiff was a stupid, ignorant, and illiterate man, and too ignorant to discuss the tariff question. (2) That no reflection or suspicion is alleged in the declaration to have been caused by the defendant upon the moral character, integrity, probity, and uprightness of the plaintiff. (3) That defendant was justified in publishing the articles complained of, because the plaintiff was a candidate for public office, and, in the absence of anything touching the moral character, integrity, probity, and uprightness of the plaintiff, the matter stated in the declaration, and the innuendoes there drawn, do not set forth the cause of action." The demurrer was sustained by the court below. The demurrer admits the truth of all material facts alleged in the declaration and which are well pleaded. It is proper to consider, first, what these admitted facts are. They are- First, that the defendant published the statement; second, that it was false and malicious, and done with the intention of injuring the plaintiff; third, that defendant published the statement set forth in the first count in such a manner as to naturally induce the belief on the part of the reader that plaintiff actually wrote and subscribed the letter therein contained, and that in the second count the plaintiff actually used the words therein ascribed to him, and that they were published with the malicious intent to injure, and to induce the belief among the people that plaintiff was too ignorant to discuss the question of the tariff. The gist of the argument on the part of the defendant is that no moral obliquity, unsoundness of mind, impairment of natural faculties, mental or physical, is charged against the plaintiff; that neither his moral, social, or religious education is attacked, but only his political and academical education; that nothing was published which if entirely true or false and believed would prevent honest members of his own party from voting for him, nor constitute a reason or bar to his holding the office if elected; that the alleged defamatory matter was within the domain of justifiable criticism, and is privileged, and therefore actionable malice will not be inferred, nor can it be predicated in law upon such criticisms or allegations.

I am not prepared to yield assent to the statement that all honest members of either political party would vote for a confessed ignoramus to represent them in congress. The statement bears its own refutation on its face, for it is apparent that these publications are made for the express purpose of preventing presumably honest members of the candidate's own political party, as well as others, from voting for him. Counsel omit in their statement one very important element, viz., intelligence. They would hardly be willing to assert that all honest intelligent men would vote for a candidate of their party for an important office who has confessed such ignorance as to show unfitness, although ignorance be no legal disqualification. If defendant's contention be correct, then one may publish of a candidate that he cannot read or write, or that he has confessed that he cannot. No one would seriously contend that such a publication would not be injurious and libelous, and that it would not deprive the candidate of many votes. To hold otherwise would be an insult to the intelligence of our people. Yet no moral turpitude or crime or legal disqualification is charged, and therefore no libel is uttered. But why stop there if disqualification is to be made the test? Conviction of crime is not by the constitution of the United States made a disqualification for the office of member of congress. The only constitutional requirements are that the member shall be 25 years old, 7 years a citizen, and an inhabitant of the state where he is chosen. Aside from these the house of representatives is the judge of the qualifications of its members. There are many crimes for the conviction of which that body would not consider a member elect disqualified; yet to publish of him, when a candidate that he is guilty of such crime is admitted to be libelous, if not true. Public journals are in the performance of a high duty when they truthfully place such charge before the public. To illustrate, that one has been a gambler does not...