In re Stanton, M-124-82.

Citation470 A.2d 281
Decision Date30 November 1983
Docket NumberNo. M-124-82.,M-124-82.
PartiesIn re John J. STANTON, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Columbia District

Before NEBEKER, FERREN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This matter is before us for our consideration of the Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (Board).

The Board has found one instance of respondent's "neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him" in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and two acts of respondent's "intentional failure to seek a client's lawful objectives" in violation of DR 7-101(A)(1).1 The Board recommends suspension of respondent for sixty (60) days. We accept the Board's findings of fact as being supported by substantial evidence of record, and adopt the Board's recommended suspension of respondent for sixty (60) days.2

Accordingly, it is ordered by the court that respondent, John J. Stanton, be and he hereby is suspended for sixty (60) days from the practice of law for the reasons set forth in the appended Report and Recommendation of the Board. Respondent's sixty (60) day suspension is to be served concurrently with his suspension of a year and a day for similar disciplinary rule violations entered this day in In re John J. Stanton, 470 A.2d 272 (D.C.1983).

This order of suspension shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this opinion. D.C.Bar Rule XI § 19(3).

So ordered.

BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Bar Docket Nos. 180-79, 468-79, and 258-80

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN J. STANTON

Bar No. 168997

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Two separate reports concerning two separate petitions against the same respondent have been brought before this Board within a relatively short period of time. As has been our practice in other cases, we have consolidated the two cases in one Report and Recommendation to the Court of Appeals, and we recommend to the court a single sanction encompassing all of the conduct found to be in violation of the Code on Professional Responsibility.

I. THE BENJAMIN CASE.

Docket Nos. 180-79 and 468-79 are before the Board on Professional Responsibility on the report of Hearing Committee No. 2. The Hearing Committee was confronted by a petition that concerned three separate charges arising out of respondent's conduct of the defense of Peggy M. Benjamin against criminal charges. For convenience, the three matters can be identified as the "bond review" matter, the "government plea offer" dispute, and the issue concerning the quality of respondent's communications with his client.

On the bond review matter, the Hearing Committee concluded that respondent had "intentionally fail[ed] to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law" in violation of DR 7-101(A)(1).1 In connection with the violation found on the bond review matter, the Committee recommended an informal admonition as the appropriate sanction.

In connection with the government plea offer matter, the Hearing Committee concluded that Bar Counsel had failed to make out a violation of DR 7-101(A)(1) (intentional failure to pursue the client's lawful objectives) in connection with respondent's failure to assist his client in entering her plea of guilty. The Committee recommended that the charges based on the government plea bargain matter be dismissed.

Finally, the Hearing Committee recommended that we find that Bar Counsel had failed to make out a case of neglect on his charge that respondent had failed to communicate adequately with his client and had failed adequately to advise her. Finding no violation, the Hearing Committee recommended dismissal.2

This Board agrees with the Committee's finding that a violation was made out in connection with the bond review matter but disagrees with the Committee's conclusion that no violation was proved in connection with the government plea offer matter.

A. Ms. Benjamin's Criminal Cases.

Ms. Benjamin had a number of criminal cases pending against her at roughly the same time. The procedural history of the relevant cases are summarized in detail in the report and recommendation of the Hearing Committee, and we do repeat that history here. By way of brief summary, Ms. Benjamin had two criminal cases pending against her in the Superior Court at the same time. The first, which the Hearing Committee labeled the "underwear case," was based on a charge of attempted larceny of assorted underclothing from Hecht's department store. Respondent was appointed to represent Ms. Benjamin in the underwear case. The second case, which the Hearing Committee labeled the "crabmeat case," was also a charge of attempted larceny. Ms. Benjamin was represented by other counsel, particularly Mr. Bright, in the crabmeat case.

It was uncontested in the record before the Hearing Committee that at the time of Ms. Benjamin's arraignment on the underwear case, her bond was set at $1,000 with a 10% payment. Not having the requisite $100 to secure her release, Ms. Benjamin was incarcerated. It is also uncontested that Ms. Benjamin sent respondent a letter requesting him to file a bond review motion for her. Her request was unequivocal.

Respondent did not answer Ms. Benjamin's written request. A few days later Ms. Benjamin telephoned respondent from the District of Columbia Jail and renewed her request to him to file a bond review motion.

Respondent admits that after the letter and the telephone conversation outlined above, he did not prepare or file a bond review motion or make any other effort to obtain Ms. Benjamin's release from the District of Columbia Jail by helping her to secure the necessary $100. Consequent to respondent's inactivity, Ms. Benjamin remained in the District of Columbia Jail for seventeen days until her son, who had been out of town, returned to Washington and posted the requisite $100.

After Ms. Benjamin's release, respondent received a plea offer from the United States Attorney. Her two sets of lawyers disagreed about the advisability of her accepting the government's plea offer. The lawyers representing Ms. Benjamin on the crabmeat case concluded that acceptance of the government's plea offer was in the best interests of Ms. Benjamin. Respondent, on the other hand, concluded that the plea offer was not in Ms. Benjamin's best interests and he so recommended to her.

Respondent concedes that he had an adequate opportunity to urge his views upon Ms. Benjamin and that she was competent to make the decision whether to plead guilty. After consideration of the competing advice of her two sets of lawyers, Ms. Benjamin concluded that she wished to accept the government's plea offer. Accordingly, Ms. Benjamin's other lawyers arranged for a hearing before Judge Neilson on October 15, 1979, at which time Ms. Benjamin was to plead guilty in both the underwear and crabmeat cases and to be sentenced.

At the hearing, respondent volunteered to the Court that he had advised Ms. Benjamin that the plea arrangement was "improvident and unwise" and respondent asked Judge Neilson to take this fact into account in the Rule 11 proceeding that he was then conducting on Ms. Benjamin's attempts to plead guilty. Ms. Benjamin's plea was accepted over respondent's objection, and she was sentenced.

As noted above, Bar Counsel brought a petition alleging three areas of misconduct: (1) in connection with the respondent's failure or refusal to file a bond review motion, Bar Counsel charged him with neglect and with intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his client; (2) in connection with respondent's failure or refusal to assist Ms. Benjamin in accepting the government's plea bargain, Bar Counsel charged violations of the same two Disciplinary Rules; and (3) Bar Counsel charged respondent with failure to conduct meaningful communication and to provide assistance to his client amounting to a violation of the Disciplinary Rule prohibiting neglect.

B. The Hearing Committee's Conduct of the Proceedings Below.

Respondent has briefed and argued several points concerning the conduct of the proceedings below. His arguments are not well taken.

1. Respondent's Charge That Bar Counsel Misled the Contact Member.

First, respondent brings a welter of charges the net effect of which is that Bar Counsel hoodwinked a contact member into approving an informal admonition by presenting false and incomplete evidence to the contact member. Respondent's argument is put to rest by the Hearing Committee's finding of a disciplinary violation and by the disposition that we make of this case. Whatever evidence Bar Counsel presented to the contact member, there was more than probable cause, there was in fact clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated one or more provisions of the Disciplinary Code. The requirement that a contact member review and approve petitions and informal admonitions is meant to act as an additional protection for respondents so that they are not faced with wholly unsubstantiated charges. Our review of the record convinces us there was more than adequate probable cause to go forward on this case.

There is no review of the probable cause determination provided for in our system any more than there is a review of the probable cause determination readily available to a defendant in a criminal case where the full panoply of due process rights applies. If this Board is to perform its functions of fairly and speedily determining when violations of the Disciplinary Code have occurred and of protecting the public from those who violate the Code, our proceedings cannot be allowed to descend into a hodgepodge of interlocutory reviews. The essence of fairness in our proceedings is that the matter is brought as promptly as possible before a hearing committee which hears the matter in a fair and even-handed way.

2. Respondent's Motion to...

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19 cases
  • Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 96-7041
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • December 3, 1997
    ...concurrent suspensions of a year and a day, In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 272 (D.C.1983) ("Stanton I"), and of 60 days, In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C.1983) ("Stanton II"). The details of the incidents leading to the suspensions are set out in the reports of the D.C. Board on Professional Respo......
  • MATTER OF BANKS, 89-377.
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    • Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • July 6, 1990
    ...Thompson, supra, 478 A.2d 1064 (censure appropriate where disciplinary history consisted of one prior informal admonishment); In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C.1983) (60-day suspension for three instances of willful refusal to pursue client's lawful objectives in two separate cases). We find......
  • IN RE STANTON, No. 03-BG-767.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • October 28, 2004
    ...Senior Judge.1 PER CURIAM: In 1983, we suspended petitioner John Stanton from practicing law in the District of Columbia. See In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 272 (D.C.1983) (Stanton I); In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C.1983) (Stanton II). Before us now is petitioner's fifth request for reinstatemen......
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    • Court of Appeals of Columbia District
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