Welsh v. Branstad

Decision Date15 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-571,90-571
Citation470 N.W.2d 644
PartiesSenator Joseph J. WELSH; Senator Bill Hutchins; Senator Thomas Mann, Jr.; Representative Thomas J. Jochum; Representative Bob Arnould; and Representative Donald D. Avenson, Appellees, v. Terry E. BRANSTAD, Governor of the State of Iowa in his Official Capacity, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Robert A. Van Vooren and Maria Mihalakis Waterman of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, for appellant.

Brent R. Appel and Thomas W. Andrews of Dickinson, Throckmorton, Parker, Mannheimer & Raife, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered en banc.

CARTER, Justice.

The Governor of Iowa has appealed from a judgment which invalidated the exercise of the item vetoes of portions of three appropriation bills enacted by the General Assembly. These item vetoes affected portions of 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 307, § 6(10); ch. 308, § 1(8); and ch. 319, § 19. In the discussion which follows, we will refer to these three bills as S.F. 363, § 6(10); S.F. 520, § 1(8); and H.F. 774, § 19, respectively. The appellees are persons who are duly elected and acting members of the Seventy-third General Assembly, which enacted the legislation from which this controversy developed. They commenced this action in the district court challenging the legality of the item vetoes and seeking appropriate declaratory relief.

The district court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment as to all three item veto challenges. The court entered declaratory judgments finding that all three item vetoes exceeded the Governor's authority under article III, section 16 of the Iowa Constitution, as amended in 1968, and declaring the legislation to have become law in the form enacted by the General Assembly. 1 After considering the arguments which have been presented by the parties to the appeal, we affirm the district court's order invalidating the item vetoes of S.F. 363, section 6(10) and H.F. 774, section 19. 2 We reverse that portion of the district court's order invalidating the item veto of S.F. 520, section 1(8).

I. Finality of Judgment for Purposes of Appeal.

As we have indicated earlier in this opinion, the Governor filed a counterclaim in this action challenging the validity of the vetoed portions of S.F. 520 and H.F. 774 under the separation of powers clause of article III, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. Because these claims were severed for separate determination following the adjudication of appellees' item veto challenge, the action is not yet final with respect to all issues and all parties. Ordinarily this situation negates the required finality of judgment to allow an appeal as of right under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 1(a). Reuter v. City of Oskaloosa, 253 Iowa 768, 772-73, 113 N.W.2d 716, 719 (1962). Notwithstanding this lack of finality, we may treat a notice of appeal as an application for permissive appeal under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 1(c). Banco Mortgage Co. v. Steil, 351 N.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Iowa 1984). Given the importance of the issues presented to the operation of state government and the already lengthy dela

y since the challenged item vetoes took place, we will allow the appeal to proceed.

II. The Legislation Which Was Vetoed.

The three pieces of legislation which were the subjects of the challenged item vetoes were totally unrelated. We briefly describe the portions of those acts which are the subject of the present controversy.

A. S.F. 363, section 6(10). The act identified as S.F. 363 was a bill making supplemental appropriations, effective immediately upon enactment, to a lengthy list of state agencies and departments for the remainder of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1989. Among the agencies for whose operations these funds were appropriated was the department of human services. Subsections 5, 6, and 7 of section 6 of S.F. 363 appropriated money for maintenance projects and capital improvements at mental health and juvenile facilities controlled by that agency.

The legislature attempted to shelter any unspent appropriations made in subsections 5, 6, and 7 of section 6 from the automatic reversion statute. Automatic reversion was a process mandated by Iowa Code section 8.33 (1987), which provided that, "[o]n September 30, or as otherwise provided in an appropriation Act, following the close of each fiscal year, all unencumbered or unobligated balances of appropriations made for that fiscal term revert to the state treasury." To avoid having any unspent portion of these particular appropriations revert to the treasury on September 30, 1989, the legislature provided as follows in subsection 10 of section 6:

The provisions of section 8.33 do not apply to the funds appropriated in subsections 5, 6, and 7. The unobligated and unencumbered funds remaining on March 30, 1990, from the funds appropriated in subsections 5, 6, and 7, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1988, shall revert to the general fund of the state on March 30, 1990.

1989 Iowa Acts ch. 307, § 6(10). The Governor item vetoed subsection 10 in its entirety.

B. H.F. 774, section 19. The act designated as H.F. 774 was a massive appropriations bill relating to the funding of numerous departments, agencies, and commissions, including the board of regents institutions. An appropriation for faculty salaries at the University of Iowa is contained in Division IV(2) of the act. This legislation, as enacted by the legislature, provided, in relevant part, as follows:

a. General university, including lakeside laboratory

(1) For salaries, support, maintenance, equipment, miscellaneous purposes, and for not more than the following full-time equivalent positions:

$ 149,732,881

FTEs 4,345.69

From moneys appropriated in this subparagraph, $900,000 shall be used to improve undergraduate education at the state university of Iowa....

....

(2) Agricultural health and safety pilot programs:

FTEs 1.28

b. Faculty salary increases

For increases in faculty salaries for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1989, and ending June 30, 1990, that are in addition to the total faculty salaries paid during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1988;

$ 3,311,000

1989 Iowa Acts ch. 319, § 19 (emphasis added). The Governor vetoed that portion of the bill which we have italicized.

In Division IV of section 19 of H.F. 774, subparagraphs (3)(b) and (4)(b) contain appropriations for faculty salary increases at Iowa State University and the University of Northern Iowa. These appropriations, like the one relating to the University of Iowa, specify "faculty salary increases ... that are in addition to the total faculty salaries paid during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1988." 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 319, § 19 (emphasis added). The Governor also vetoed the italicized language in these two appropriations.

C. S.F. 520, section 1(8). The act designated as S.F. 520 contained a series of appropriations to the department of economic development for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1989, and ending June 30, 1990. These appropriations related to salaries, tourism promotion programs, national marketing programs, and export trade activities. The appropriation for export trade activities was contained in subsection 8 of section 1 of S.F. 520. This legislation, as enacted by the legislature, provided as follows:

Export trade activities

For international trade activities including a program to encourage and increase participation in trade shows and trade missions by providing financial assistance to businesses for a percentage of their costs of participating in trade shows and trade missions, by providing the lease/sublease of showcase space in existing world trade centers, by providing temporary office space for foreign buyers, international prospects, and potential reverse investors, and by providing other promotional and assistance activities, including salaries and support for not more than the following full-time equivalent positions:

$ 400,000

FTEs 0.25 As a condition, limitation, and qualification, any official Iowa trade delegation led by the governor which receives financial or other support from the appropriation in this subsection shall be represented by a bipartisan delegation of the executive council or their designees. Notwithstanding section 8.39, funds appropriated by this subsection shall not be subject to transfer.

1989 Iowa Acts ch. 308, § 1(8) (emphasis added). The Governor item vetoed that portion of the bill which we have italicized.

III. Propriety of Summary Judgment Procedure.

The Governor challenges the summary judgment procedure utilized by the district court in resolving the appellees' item veto challenges. In this argument it is urged that, whether the excised portion of the bills may be characterized as "separate appropriation items" or "unrelated riders," and thus subject to item veto, is a question of fact. It is contended that summary judgment was improper because different inferences and conclusions concerning these characterizations could be drawn from the assorted affidavits filed in resistance to the motion. 3

In contending that material factual issues had to be resolved in the litigation, the Governor relies on language contained in Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1985), which also involved an item veto challenge. In that case, we alluded to the general legal principles which apply in summary judgment procedure and observed:

Plaintiffs did little to carry their burden to establish there was no genuine issue of material fact....

....

Defendant's affidavits obviously were designed to show there was a question of fact to be resolved as to whether veto of the section 12 language could in any way alter the purposes for which funds appropriated in section 4(6) might be spent.

Id. at 188. Notwithstanding these comments, we determined in Colton that summary judgment procedure was appropriate to consider the substantive issue raised because of certain stipulations by the parties. Id.

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7 cases
  • Varnum v. Brien
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 3 Abril 2009
    ...Unlike adjudicative facts, legislative or constitutional facts "may be presented either formally or informally." Welsh v. Branstad, 470 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Iowa 1991). There is no formalized set of rules governing a court's ability to consider legislative or constitutional facts. See Iowa R. E......
  • Rants v. Vilsack
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    • 16 Junio 2004
    ...court issued its ruling adopting the Governor's proposed order and determining the item vetoes were constitutional. See Welsh v. Branstad, 470 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa 1991) (discussing the propriety of summary judgment procedure in the context of an item veto challenge). The Legislature appea......
  • Afscme Iowa Council 61 v. State
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 2019
    ...either formally or informally" and consist of "social, economic, political, or scientific facts." Id. (first quoting Welsh v. Branstad , 470 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Iowa 1991) ). The plaintiffs ask that if we find House File 291 to be constitutional, we reevaluate our rational basis standard. The ......
  • AFSCME Iowa Council 61 v. State
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 2019
    ...either formally or informally" and consist of "social, economic, political, or scientific facts." Id. (first quoting Welsh v. Branstad, 470 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Iowa 1991)). The plaintiffs ask that if we find House File 291 to be constitutional, we reevaluate our rational basis standard. The pl......
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