National Association For the Advancement of Colored People v. Hampton County Election Commission
Decision Date | 27 February 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 83-1015,83-1015 |
Citation | 105 S.Ct. 1128,84 L.Ed.2d 124,470 U.S. 166 |
Parties | NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, etc., et al., Appellants, v. HAMPTON COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, etc., et al |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that covered States or political subdivisions may not implement any election practices different from those in force on November 1, 1964, without first obtaining approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, from the Attorney General. As of November 1, 1964, the public schools of Hampton County, South Carolina, a covered jurisdiction, were governed by an appointed County Board of Education and an elected Superintendent of Education. The county consists of two School Districts, one where the vast majority of white students live, and the other predominantly black. Each District was governed by a Board of Trustees, who were appointed by the County Board of Education. In 1982, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted Act No. 547, providing that the members of the County Board of Education were to be elected at large rather than appointed. The first election was to be held simultaneously with the general election in November 1982, and prospective candidates were required to file with appellee Election Commission at least 45 days before the election. Act No. 547 was submitted to the Attorney General for approval under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and he informed the State that he had no objection to the change. But in the meantime, before the Attorney General had approved Act No. 547, Act No. 549 was enacted to abolish the County Board of Education and Superintendent and to devolve their duties upon the District Boards of Trustees, which were to be elected separately. The first trustee election was also scheduled to be held with the November general election, and candidates were required to file between August 16 and 31. Act No. 549 was also submitted to the Attorney General for clearance under § 5, and he initially interposed an objection. Nevertheless, the Election Commission, contemplating a reconsideration, continued to accept candidate filings under Act No. 549, and at the same time began accepting filings under Act No. 547. Since the Attorney General had not yet responded to the State's request for reconsideration of his objection to Act No. 549 by the date of the November general election, elections for the County Board of Education were held on that date pursuant to Act No. 547, and no elections were held pursuant to Act No. 549. Thereafter the Attorney General withdrew his objection to Act No. 549, thereby rendering null and void Act No. 547 and the November elections held pursuant thereto. The South Carolina Attorney General then informed the Election Commission that Act No. 549 was in effect and that an election pursuant thereto should be held. Accordingly, the Commission set March 15, 1983, as election day. Appellants, two civil rights organizations and several residents of Hampton County, filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the election as illegal under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The court denied relief, holding that no violation of § 5 had occurred, since, although Act No. 549 itself was a change under the Voting Rights Act, the scheduling of the election and the filing period were simply "ministerial acts necessary to accomplish the statute's purpose and thus did not require preclearance." The court further held that even if these acts were "changes," they had now been precleared along with the remaining provisions of Act No. 549.
Held: The use of an August filing period in conjunction with a March election, and the setting of the March election itself, were changes that should have been submitted to the Attorney General under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Pp. 174-183.
(a) By opening the filing period for School District Trustees before preclearance and scheduling the election for a date four months later than that approved by the Attorney General, the county effectively altered the filing deadline from a date approximately two months before the election to one that was almost six months before the election. These changes cannot fairly be charcterized as "ministerial" in light of the sweeping objectives of the Voting Rights Act. They possibly prevented relative latecomers from entering the race, and in addition a March election is likely to draw significantly fewer voters than an election held simultaneously with a November general election. The inquiry here is limited to whether the challenged changes have the potential for discrimination. These changes did have such a potential and therefore should have been precleared under § 5. Pp. 174-181.
(b) The changes cannot be said to have been implicitly approved when the Attorney General withdrew his objection to Act No. 549. Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57 L.Ed.2d 693, distinguished. Nor can the Attorney General be said to have validated the changes, retroactively or otherwise, because they were never before him. Pp. 181-182.
Reversed and remanded.
Armand Derfner, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
David A. Strauss, Washington, D.C., for United States as amicus curiae supporting appellants, by special order of Court.
Treva G. Ashworth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, S.C., for appellees.
This appeal challenges a three-judge District Court's construction and application of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. That section provides that certain jurisdictions, including the one in which this case arose, may not implement any election practices different from those in force on November 1, 1964, without first obtaining approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, from the Attorney General.1 The statute further provides that once a proposed change has been submitted to the Attorney General, he has 60 days in which to object. If an objection is interposed, the submitting authority may request reconsideration. 28 CFR § 51.44 (1984). Such a request triggers another 60-day period for the Attorney General to decide whether to continue or withdraw his objection. § 51.47. The District Court held that § 5 did not require the changes in election practices involved here to be cleared by the Attorney General prior to their implementation. We noted probable jurisdiction, 467 U.S. 1250, 104 S.Ct. 3531, 82 L.Ed.2d 837 (1984), and now reverse that judgment.
As of November 1, 1964, the Hampton County, South Carolina, public schools were governed by appointed officials and an elected Superintendent of Education. The county comprises two school districts, School District No. 1, where the vast majority of white students live, and School District No. 2, which is predominantly black.2 Each District was governed by a separate six-member Board of Trustees. These trustees were appointed by a six-member County Board of Education, which in turn was appointed by the county legislative delegation.
On February 18, 1982, apparently in an attempt to facilitate consolidation of these two School Districts,3 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted Act No. 547. This statute provided that, beginning in 1983, the six members of the County Board of Education were to be elected at large rather than appointed. The first election for the new Board was to be held simultaneously with the general election in November 1982, and prospective candidates were required to file with the Election Commission at least 45 days before the election.4 Pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the State submitted Act No. 547 for the approval of the Attorney General, who received it on February 27.5 On April 28, the Attorney General informed the State that he had no objection to the change in question.6
On April 9, however, before the Attorney General had approved Act No. 547, the Governor of South Carolina signed Act No. 549, which was designed to supersede Act No. 547. Act No. 549 abolished the County Board of Education and the County Superintendent, devolving their duties upon the District Boards of Trustees, which were to be elected separately by each District. Like Act No. 547, Act No. 549 scheduled the first trustee election to coincide with the November 1982 general election. Candidates were required to file between August 16 and August 31. Implementation of the Act was made contingent upon approval in a referendum to be held in May 1982.7
The State did not submit Act No. 549 to the Attorney General for clearance until June 16, 1982, 22 days after it was approved in the referendum and 68 days after it had been enacted.8 As of August 16—the opening date of the filing period under Act No. 549 no response had yet been received from the Attorney General. Nevertheless, the County Election Commission began accepting filings for elections to be held under Act No. 549. On August 23, the Attorney General interposed an objection. He informed the State that it had not sustained its burden of showing that the proposal to eliminate the County Board of Education did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The Attorney General noted that "the county board has been particularly responsive to the interests and needs of the black community in Hampton County and consistently has appointed bi-racial representation on the local boards of trustees for both School District 1 and School District 2." 9
Because the State was contemplating requesting the Attorney General to reconsider this objection, the County Election Commission continued to accept filings under Act No. 549 through the end of the designated filing period, August 31. On that date, the State officially requested reconsideration.10 At the same time, the Election Commission began accepting filings under Act No. 547, in case the...
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