471 F.Supp. 453 (N.D.Ohio 1979), C73-439, United States v. City of Parma, Ohio
|Citation:||471 F.Supp. 453|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PARMA, OHIO, Defendant.|
|Case Date:||June 13, 1979|
|Court:||United States District Courts, 6th Circuit, Northern District of Ohio|
Frank E. Schwelb, Michael L. Barrett, Housing & Credit Section Civil Rights Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Avery S. Friedman, Housing Task Force, Cleveland, Ohio, for amicus curiae.
Andrew Boyko, Sol., City of Parma, Parma, Ohio, Robert R. Soltis, Sp. Counsel, Parma, Ohio, for defendant.
BATTISTI, Chief Judge.
On September 18, 1975, defendant City of Parma moved for summary judgment in its favor. Since 1975 a series of counter, reply, and supplemental briefs with affidavits have been submitted. The last set of briefs was ordered on January 23, 1979. Upon careful consideration of the myriad documents before the Court, the motion for summary judgment is denied and the case shall be set for a pre-trial conference.
On April 27, 1973, the United States brought this action against the City of Parma alleging that the City had engaged in a pattern and practice of housing discrimination in violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3611 Et seq. Plaintiff prayed for an order enjoining defendant from engaging in any discriminatory housing practices and requiring defendant to eliminate all obstacles to equal housing opportunity. The plaintiff's complaint was sustained against a motion to dismiss on September 15, 1973. United States v. City of Parma, 374 F.Supp. 730 (N.D.Ohio 1974).
The pending summary judgment motion and briefs by defendant, though painstakingly loquacious and for the most part irrelevant, boil down to a singular proposition which, itself, defeats the defendant's motion because it involves a bona fide factual dispute. At the heart of the muck and mire of defendant's rhetoric is the bold contention that the building permit for the proposed Parmatown Woods development was denied solely on the basis that it failed to comply with the city's building code. The defendant apparently believes that proof of the veracity of this statement alone would be sufficient to warrant judgment in its favor. The defendant contends that all other factual matters presented by plaintiffs are immaterial to this proceeding and, therefore, would not preclude a summary judgment in its favor.
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