Liparota v. United States

• Citation: 85 L.Ed.2d 434,105 S.Ct. 2084,471 U.S. 419
• Decision Date: 13 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-5108,84-5108
• Parties: Frank LIPAROTA, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
• Court: United States Supreme Court

471 U.S. 419

105 S.Ct. 2084

85 L.Ed.2d 434

Frank LIPAROTA, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 84-5108.

Argued March 19, 1985.

Decided May 13, 1985.

Syllabus

The federal statute governing food stamp fraud provides in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations" shall be guilty of a criminal offense. Petitioner was indicted for violation of § 2024(b)(1). At a jury trial in Federal District Court, the Government proved that petitioner on three occasions had purchased food stamps from an undercover Department of Agriculture agent for substantially less than their face value. The court refused petitioner's proposed jury instruction that the Government must prove that petitioner knowingly did an act that the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law. Rather, over petitioner's objection, the court instructed the jury that the Government had to prove that petitioner acquired and possessed the food stamps in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations and that he knowingly and willfully acquired the stamps. Petitioner was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Absent any indication of a contrary purpose in the statute's language or legislative history, the Government in a prosecution for violation of § 2024(b)(1) must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations. Pp. 423-434.

(a) Criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a generally disfavored status. The failure of Congress explicitly and unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is required does not signal a departure from this background assumption of our criminal law. Moreover, to interpret the statute to dispense with mens rea would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. In addition, requiring mens rea in this case is in keeping with the established principle that ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. Pp. 425-428.

(b) The fact that § 2024(c), which is directed primarily at stores authorized to accept food stamps from program participants, differs in wording and structure from § 2024(b)(1) and provides that "[w]hoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for payment or redemption . . . knowing the same to have been received, transferred, or used in any manner in violation of [the statute] or the regulations," fails to show a congressional purpose not to require proof of the defendant's knowledge of illegality in a § 2024(b)(1) prosecution. Nor has it been shown that requiring knowledge of illegality in a § 2024(c), but not a § 2024(b)(1), prosecution is supported by such obvious and compelling policy reasons that it should be assumed that Congress intended to make such a distinction. Pp. 428-430.

(c) United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53, does not support an interpretation of § 2024(b)(1) dispensing with the requirement that the Government prove the defendant's knowledge of illegality. Nor is the § 2024(b)(1) offense a "public welfare" offense that depends on no mental element but consists only of forbidden acts or omissions. Pp. 431-433.

735 F.2d 1044 (CA 7 1984), reversed.

William Thomas Huyck, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

Charles A. Rothfeld, Washington, D.C., for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The federal statute governing food stamp fraud provides that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations" is subject to a fine and imprisonment. 78 Stat. 708, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1).¹ The question presented is whether in a prosecution under this provision the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations.

I

Petitioner Frank Liparota was the co-owner with his brother of Moon's Sandwich Shop in Chicago, Illinois. He was indicted for acquiring and possessing food stamps in violation of § 2024(b)(1). The Department of Agriculture had not authorized petitioner's restaurant to accept food stamps. App. 6-7.² At trial, the Government proved that petitioner on three occasions purchased food stamps from an undercover Department of Agriculture agent for substantially less than their face value. On the first occasion, the agent informed petitioner that she had $195 worth of food stamps to sell. The agent then accepted petitioner's offer of $150 and consummated the transaction in a back room of the restaurant with petitioner's brother. A similar transaction occurred one week later, in which the agent sold $500 worth of coupons for $350. Approximately one month later, peti- tioner bought $500 worth of food stamps from the agent for $300.

In submitting the case to the jury, the District Court rejected petitioner's proposed "specific intent" instruction, which would have instructed the jury that the Government must prove that "the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law." Id., at 34.³ Concluding that "[t]his is not a specific intent crime" but rather a "knowledge case," id., at 31, the District Court instead instructed the jury as follows:

"When the word 'knowingly' is used in these instructions, it means that the Defendant realized what he was doing, and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. Knowledge may be proved by defendant's conduct and by all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case." Id., at 33.

The District Court also instructed that the Government had to prove that "the Defendant acquired and possessed food stamp coupons for cash in a manner not authorized by federal statute or regulations" and that "the Defendant knowingly and wilfully acquired the food stamps." 3 Tr. 251. Petitioner objected that this instruction required the jury to find merely that he knew that he was acquiring or possessing food stamps; he argued that the statute should be construed instead to reach only "people who knew that they were acting unlawfully." App. 31. The judge did not alter or supplement his instructions, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that "specific intent" is required in a prosecution under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1). The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's arguments. 735 F.2d 1044 (1984). Because this decision conflicted with recent decisions of three other Courts of Appeals,⁴ we granted certiorari. 469 U.S. 930, 105 S.Ct. 322, 83 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984). We reverse.

II

The controversy between the parties concerns the mental state, if any, that the Government must show in proving that petitioner acted "in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations." The Government argues that petitioner violated the statute if he knew that he acquired or possessed food stamps and if in fact that acquisition or possession was in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations. According to the Government, no mens rea, or "evil-meaning mind," Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), is necessary for conviction. Petitioner claims that the Government's interpretation, by dispensing with mens rea, dispenses with the only morally blameworthy element in the definition of the crime. To avoid this allegedly untoward result, he claims that an individual violates the statute if he knows that he has acquired or possessed food stamps and if he also knows that he has done so in an unauthorized manner.⁵ Our task is to determine which meaning Congress intended.

The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812).⁶ With respect to the element at issue in this case, however, Congress has not explicitly spelled out the mental state required. Although Congress certainly intended by use of the word "knowingly" to require some mental state with respect to some element of the crime defined in § 2024(b)(1), the interpretations proffered by both parties accord with congressional intent to this extent. Beyond this, the words themselves provide little guidance. Either interpretation would accord with ordinary usage.⁷ The legislative history of the statute contains noth- ing that would clarify the congressional purpose on this point.⁸

Absent indication of contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute, we believe that § 2024(b)(1) requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations.⁹ "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." Morissette v. United States, supra, 342 U.S., at 250, 72 S.Ct., at 243. Thus, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2874, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978), we noted that "[c]ertainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement" and that criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a "generally disfavored status." Similarly, in this case, the failure of Congress explicitly and unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is required does not signal a...