Russell v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-435,84-435 |
| Parties | Robert RUSSELL, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Title 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) makes it a crime to maliciously damage or destroy, or attempt to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, "any building . . . used . . . in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Petitioner, who was earning rental income from a two-unit apartment building and treated it as business property for tax purposes, was convicted for violating § 844(i) after he unsuccessfully attempted to set fire to the building, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected his contention that the building was not commercial or business property, and therefore was not capable of being the subject of an offense under § 844(i).
Held: Section 844(i) applies to petitioner's apartment building. The language of the statute expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause, and the legislative history indicates that Congress at least intended to protect all "business property." The rental of real estate is unquestionably an activity that affects commerce for purposes of the statute, and the congressional power to regulate the class of activities that constitute the rental market for real estate includes the power to regulate individual activity within that class, such as the local rental of an apartment unit. Pp. 859-862.
738 F.2d 825, affirmed.
Julius Lucius Echeles, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Christopher J. Wright, Washington, D.C., for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) applies to a two-unit apartment building that is used as rental property.
Petitioner owns an apartment building located at 4530 South Union, Chicago, Illinois. He earned rental income from it and treated it as business property for tax purposes. In early 1983, he made an unsuccessful attempt to set fire to the building 1 and was consequently indicted for violating § 844(i). Following a bench trial, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The District Court 2 and the Court of Appeals 3 both rejected his contention that the building was not commercial or business property, and therefore was not capable of being the subject of an offense under § 844(i).
Section 844(i) uses broad language to define the offense. It provides:
"Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both. . . ."
The reference to "any building . . . used . . . in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce" expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause.4
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to exercise its full power to protect "business property." 5 Moreover, after considering whether the bill as originally introduced would cover bombings of police stations or churches,6 the bill was revised to eliminate the words "for business purposes" from the description of covered property.7 Even after that change, however, the final Report on the bill emphasized the "very broad" coverage of "substantially all business property." 8 In the floor debates on the final bill, although it was recognized that the coverage of the bill was extremely broad, the Committee Chairman, Representative Celler, expressed the opinion that "the mere bombing of a private home even under this bill would not be covered because of the question whether the Congress would have the authority under the Constitution." 9 In sum, the legislative history suggests that Congress at least intended to protect all business property, as well as some additional property that might not fit that description, but perhaps not every private home.
By its terms, however, the statute only applies to property that is "used" in an "activity" that affects commerce. The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity. We need not rely on the connection between the market for residential units and "the interstate movement of people," 10 to recognize that the local rental of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties. The congressional power to regulate the class of activities that constitute the rental market for real estate includes the power to regulate individual activity within that class.11
Petitioner was renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire. The property was therefore being used in an activity affecting commerce within the meaning of § 844(i).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
1 Petitioner hired Ralph Branch, a convicted felon, to start a fire in the building by using a natural gas line in the basement. Branch attempted to start a fire by lighting a potato-chip bag and a piece of wood, but was unsuccessful in torching the building. 1 Tr. 35-39. Petitioner asked Branch to make a second attempt; however, Branch reported the events to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and consented to tape-record a conversation with petitioner. After the conversation, petitioner was arrested. The fire was never set. Id., at 41-50.
4 See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1967, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), in which the Court stated:
5 Section 844(i) was passed as part of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 84 Stat. 922, 952. The section originated because of the need "to curb the use, transportation, and possession of explosives." Hearings on H.R. 17154, H.R. 16699, H.R. 18573 and Related Proposals before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1970) (hereinafter Hearings). After hearings before a House Subcommittee, Title XI emerged from two bills, H.R. 18573 and H.R. 16699, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., that Representative McCullough introduced in the House of Representatives and that were referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 116 Cong.Rec. 35198 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCullough). H.R. 16699 stated, in pertinent part:
"(f) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used for business purposes by a person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both. . . ." Hearings, at 30 (emphasis added).
During the hearings there were several discussions and statements on the reach of subsection (f) of H.R. 16699. Will R. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, stated early in the hearings:
6 Shortly after...
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