472 U.S. 400 (1985), 83-1545, Western Air Lines v. Criswell

Docket Nº:No. 83-1545
Citation:472 U.S. 400, 105 S.Ct. 2743, 86 L.Ed.2d 321, 53 U.S.L.W. 4766
Party Name:Western Air Lines v. Criswell
Case Date:June 17, 1985
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 400

472 U.S. 400 (1985)

105 S.Ct. 2743, 86 L.Ed.2d 321, 53 U.S.L.W. 4766

Western Air Lines

v.

Criswell

No. 83-1545

United States Supreme Court

June 17, 1985

Argued January 14, 1985

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) generally prohibits mandatory retirement before age 70, but § 4(f)(1) of the Act provides an exception "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." Petitioner airline company requires that its flight engineers, who are members of the cockpit crews of petitioners' aircraft but do not operate flight controls unless both the pilot and the copilot become incapacitated, retire at age 60. A Federal Aviation Administration regulation prohibits any person from serving as a pilot or copilot after reaching his 60th birthday. Certain of the respondents, who include flight engineers forced to retire at age 60 and pilots who, upon reaching 60, were denied reassignment as flight engineers, brought suit in Federal District Court against petitioner, contending that the age 60 retirement requirement for flight engineers violated the ADEA. Petitioner defended, in part, on the theory that the requirement is a BFOQ "reasonably necessary" to the safe operation of the airline. The physiological and psychological capabilities of persons over age 60, and the ability to detect disease or a precipitous decline in such capabilities on the basis of individual medical examinations, were the subject of conflicting expert testimony presented by the parties. The jury instructions included statements that the "BFOQ defense is available only if it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation or essence [105 S.Ct. 2745] of [petitioner's] business"; "the essence of [petitioner's] business is the safe transportation of [its] passengers"; and petitioner could establish a BFOQ by proving both that

it was highly impractical for [petitioner] to deal with each [flight engineer] over age 60 on an individualized basis to determine his particular ability to perform his job safely

and that some flight engineers

over age 60 possess traits of a physiological, psychological or other nature which preclude safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other than knowing their age.

The District Court entered judgment based on the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner's contention that the BFOQ instruction was insufficiently deferential to petitioner's legitimate concern for the safety of its passengers.

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Held:

1. The ADEA's restrictive language, its legislative history, and the consistent interpretation of the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the statute establish that the BFOQ exception was meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of age discrimination contained in the ADEA. Pp. 409-412.

2. The relevant considerations for resolving a BFOQ defense to an age-based qualification purportedly justified by safety interests are whether the job qualification is "reasonably necessary" to the overriding interest in public safety, and whether the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the safety-related job qualification validated in the first inquiry. The latter showing may be made by the employer's establishing either (a) that it had reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all persons over the age qualification would be unable to perform safely the duties of the job, or (b) that it is highly impractical to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis. Pp. 412-417.

3. The jury here was properly instructed on the elements of the BFOQ defense under the above standard, and the instructions were sufficiently protective of public safety. Pp. 417-423.

(a) Petitioner's contention that the jury should have been instructed to defer to petitioner's selection of job qualifications for flight engineers "that are reasonable in light of the safety risks" is at odds with Congress' decision, in adopting the ADEA, to subject such decisions to a test of objective justification in a court of law. The BFOQ standard adopted in the statute is one of "reasonable necessity," not reasonableness. The public interest in safety is adequately reflected in instructions that track the statute's language. Pp. 418-420.

(b) The instructions were not defective for failing to inform the jury that an airline must conduct its operations "with the highest possible degree of safety." Viewing the record as a whole, the jury's attention was adequately focused on the importance of safety to the operation of petitioner's business. Pp. 420-421.

(c) There is no merit to petitioner's contention that the jury should have been instructed under the standard that the ADEA only requires that the employer establish "a rational basis in fact" for believing that identification of those persons lacking suitable qualifications cannot be made on an individualized basis. Such standard conveys a meaning that is significantly different from that conveyed by the statutory phrase "reasonably necessary," and is inconsistent with the preference for individual evaluation expressed in the language and legislative history of the ADEA. Nor can such standard be justified on the ground that an employer must be allowed to resolve the controversy in a conservative

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manner when qualified experts disagree as to whether persons over a certain age can be dealt with on an individual basis. Such argument incorrectly assumes that all expert opinion is entitled to equal weight, and virtually ignores the function of the trier of fact in evaluating conflicting testimony. Pp. 421-423.

709 F.2d 544, affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except POWELL, J., who took no part in the decision of the case.

STEVENS, J., lead opinion

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner, Western Air Lines, Inc., requires that its flight engineers retire at age 60. Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.

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§§ 621-634, generally prohibits mandatory retirement before age 70, the Act provides an exception "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business."1 A jury concluded that Western's mandatory retirement rule did not qualify as a BFOQ, even though it purportedly was adopted for safety reasons. The question here is whether the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the BFOQ defense.2

I

In its commercial airline operations, Western operates a variety of aircraft, including the Boeing 727 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. These aircraft require three crew members in the cockpit: a captain, a first officer, and a flight engineer.

The "captain" is the pilot, and controls the aircraft. He is responsible for all phases of its operation. The "first officer" is the copilot, and assists the captain. The "flight engineer" usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel. He does not operate the flight controls unless the captain and the first officer become incapacitated.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 114 (1985).

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A regulation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prohibits any person from serving as a pilot or first officer on a commercial flight "if that person has reached his 60th birthday." 14 CFR § 121.383(c) (1985). The FAA has justified the retention of mandatory retirement for pilots on the theory that "incapacitating medical events" and "adverse psychological, emotional, and physical changes" occur as a consequence of aging.

The inability to detect or predict with precision an individual's risk of sudden or subtle incapacitation, in the face of known age-related risks, counsels against relaxation of the rule.

49 Fed.Reg. 14695 (1984). See also 24 Fed.Reg. 9776 (1959).

At the same time, the FAA has refused to establish a mandatory retirement age for flight engineers.

While a flight engineer has important duties which contribute to the safe operation of the airplane, he or she may not assume the responsibilities of the pilot in command.

49 Fed.Reg. at 14694. Moreover, available statistics establish that flight engineers have rarely been a contributing cause or factor in commercial aircraft "accidents" or "incidents." Ibid.

In 1978, respondents Criswell and Starley were captains operating DC-10s for [105 S.Ct. 2747] Western. Both men celebrated their 60th birthdays in July, 1978. Under the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Western and the union, cockpit crew members could obtain open positions by bidding in order of seniority.3 In order to avoid mandatory retirement

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under the FAA's under-age-60 rule for pilots, Criswell and Starley applied for reassignment as flight engineers. Western denied both requests, ostensibly on the ground that both employees were members of the company's retirement plan, which required all crew members to retire at age 60.4 For the same reason, respondent Ron, a career flight engineer, was also retired in 1978 after his 60th birthday.

Mandatory retirement provisions similar to those contained in Western's pension plan had previously been upheld under the ADEA. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). As originally enacted in 1967, the Act provided an exception to its general proscription of age discrimination for any actions undertaken

to observe the terms of a . . . bona fide employee benefit plan...

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