Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.

Decision Date19 October 1984
Docket Number59350,SACKETT-CHICAG,Nos. 59341,INC,s. 59341
Citation105 Ill.2d 143,473 N.E.2d 1280,85 Ill. Dec. 475
Parties, 85 Ill.Dec. 475, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2807, 53 USLW 2225, 102 Lab.Cas. P 55,492, 1 IER Cases 889 Terry MIDGETT, et al., Appellees, v., et al., Appellants. Jose Isabel GONZALEZ et al., Appellants, v. PRESTRESS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Benjamin P. Hyink and Lawrence M. Liebman, of Drugas, Malone, Morgan & Hyink, Chicago, for appellants Sackett-Chicago, Inc., et al.

Nicholas T. Kitsos, of Nicholas T. Kitsos & Associates, Chicago, for appellees Midgett, et al.

Emmanuel F. Guyon, Streator, for appellants Gonzalez, et al.

Julie Badel, of McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, for appellee Prestress Engineering Corp.

WARD, Justice:

These consolidated appeals concern the question of claimed retaliatory discharges of employees. The plaintiff in cause No. 59341, Terry Midgett, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County alleging that he was unjustly discharged by his employer, Sackett-Chicago, in retaliation for his filing a claim with the Industrial Commission under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). Jose Gonzalez and John Repyak, plaintiffs in cause No. 59350, filed separate complaints in the circuit court of Livingston County alleging that their employer, Prestress Engineering, discharged them in retaliation for their filing workers' compensation claims under the Act. In all three cases the trial courts granted the employers' motions to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court in the fourth district consolidated the Gonzalez and Repyak appeals and in a Rule 23 order (87 Ill.2d R. 23) affirmed the trial courts' dismissal of each complaint. (Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1983), 118 Ill.App.3d 1167, 83 Ill.Dec. 537, 470 N.E.2d 663.) The appellate court in the first district, however, reversed the trial court in Midgett, holding that a cause of action was stated. (Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago (1983), 118 Ill.App.3d 7, 73 Ill.Dec. 843, 454 N.E.2d 1092.) We allowed a petition of Gonzalez and Repyak for leave to appeal from the fourth district judgment in Gonzalez (cause No. 59350) and allowed the petition of the defendant Sackett-Chicago for leave to appeal from the first district judgment in Midgett (cause No. 59341), under our Rule 315 (87 Ill.2d R. 315). The appeals were consolidated for review.

In cause No. 59341 Terry Midgett, who was injured on January 31, 1979, in the course of his employment with Sackett-Chicago, filed a workers' compensation claim with the Industrial Commission. The claim was still pending when Midgett was discharged from his employment by Sackett in January 1980. Sackett reached a settlement of the claim with Midgett in August 1980. On December 31, 1980, Midgett, claiming a retaliatory discharge, filed an action in tort in his own name and on behalf of his wife and minor children, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Sackett. Sackett moved to dismiss, stating that Midgett was a union member covered by a collective-bargaining agreement with specific grievance provisions for the arbitration of disputes, under which an arbitrator would determine if a discharge from employment was for "just cause." Sackett argued that Midgett, who had not filed a grievance, was limited to contract remedies under the agreement and had no cause of action in tort. Midgett filed cross-motions that in part alleged that the union and Sackett had prevented Midgett from filing a grievance for his discharge. The trial court dismissed Midgett's complaint.

In cause No. 59350 Gonzalez, in August 1981, filed a workers' compensation claim after suffering an injury while employed by Prestress Engineering. On August 23, 1982, an Industrial Commission arbitrator denied compensation on the ground that plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Gonzalez was discharged on September 20, 1982, and he later filed his tort claim for retaliatory discharge against Prestress.

Plaintiff Repyak was also injured at defendant Prestress' plant and in July 1981 was awarded certain benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. His employment by Prestress was terminated October 6, 1982, and he, too, filed a retaliatory-discharge action against Prestress. Repyak alleged in count II of his complaint that he and his wife, Elsie Repyak, were denied pension benefits because of his discharge approximately one year before his pension vested. Both employees were union members and were covered by a collective-bargaining agreement between the local and Prestress, with grievance procedures requiring "just cause" for an employee's discharge. Neither Gonzalez nor Repyak filed a grievance against the employer. The motions of Prestress to dismiss the complaints were granted.

The appellate court in the fourth district affirmed the Gonzalez and Repyak dismissals (118 Ill.App.3d 1167, 83 Ill.Dec. 537, 470 N.E.2d 663), reasoning that, since the plaintiffs were union members protected by the collective-bargaining agreement and not employees at will, they could not bring a cause of action for retaliatory discharge as described in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353. Instead they were required to pursue and exhaust their grievance remedies under the agreement. The appellate court in the first district, in reversing the dismissal of Midgett's complaint (118 Ill.App.3d 7, 73 Ill.Dec. 843, 454 N.E.2d 1092), held that the tort of retaliatory discharge extended to union employees covered by such a collective-bargaining agreement in order to promote the strong public policy to favor protection of employees who exercise their rights under the Act, whether the employees are members of a union or not.

In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, this court held there was a remedy in tort for employees who were discharged in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims. Otherwise employers could coerce employees to forgo their rights under the Act by threatening to terminate, or by actually discharging, employees who claimed compensation for industrial injuries. This remedy implements the public policy underlying the Act of providing employees an effective and equitable means to seek compensation for injuries sustained in the course of their employment without fear or risk of losing their jobs. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876, an employee was terminated for informing police of suspected criminal activities of his co-workers. In holding that the tort of retaliatory discharge was applicable we stated:

"The foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy, and there is a clear public policy favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses.

* * *

* * *

All that is required [to bring a cause of action] is that the employer discharge the employee in retaliation for the employee's activities, and that the discharge be in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy." 85 Ill.2d 124, 133-34, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876.

The defendants here, however, argue that the action for retaliatory discharge was created to protect only "at-will" employees, such as those involved in Kelsay and Palmateer, who would otherwise be without a remedy for a vengeful discharge. The plaintiffs here are not "at-will" employees but are union members, protected by collective-bargaining agreements which provide specific grievance procedures to ensure discharge from employment only for "just cause." Since the plaintiffs here have a remedy through the union agreement, the defendants argue that the rationale in Kelsay is not involved and that the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints was proper. The defendants cite other decisions of the appellate court that support their argument: Mouser v. Granite City Steel Division of National Steel Corp. (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 834, 77 Ill.Dec. 256, 460 N.E.2d 115; Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 396, 70 Ill.Dec. 329, 449 N.E.2d 203; Deatrick v. Funk Seeds International (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 998, 65 Ill.Dec. 534, 441 N.E.2d 669; Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 402, 40 Ill.Dec. 864, 407 N.E.2d 95.

Emphasizing that the employees in Kelsay and Palmateer were at-will employees, they cite, too, Lamb v. Briggs Manufacturing (7th Cir.1983), 700 F.2d 1092, which held that union employees under collective-bargaining agreements could not maintain an action for retaliatory discharge. We consider, however, that in order to provide a complete remedy it is necessary that the victim of a retaliatory discharge be given an action in tort, independent of any contract remedy the employee may have based on the collective-bargaining agreement. In Kelsay, an essential factor in providing the action for retaliatory discharge was a recognition of the importance of permitting the allowance of punitive damages against the offending employer. This court stated:

"In the absence of the deterrent effect of punitive damages there would be little to dissuade an employer from engaging in the practice of discharging an employee for filing a workmen's compensation claim * * * The imposition on the employer of the small additional obligation to pay a wrongfully discharged employee compensation would do little to discourage the practice of retaliatory discharge, which mocks the public policy of this State * * * In the absence of other effective means of deterrence, punitive damages must be permitted * * *." (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 186-87, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353.)

Applying this reasoning here, there is no reason to afford a tort remedy to at-will employees but to limit union...

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