United States v. Northside Realty Associates, Inc.
Citation | 474 F.2d 1164 |
Decision Date | 14 March 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-2151.,72-2151. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTHSIDE REALTY ASSOCIATES, INC., and Ed A. Isakson, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Harold L. Russell and Lloyd Sutter, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellants.
Thomas M. Keeling, Atty., Housing Section, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., Frank E. Schwelb and Harold H. Moore, Civil Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from an order enjoining appellants, Northside Realty Associates, Inc. and its Executive Vice President, Ed A. Isakson, from violating the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Although we are unable to ascertain the precise legal rationale for the District Court's decision, the Court apparently based its decision on constitutionally impermissible grounds. We therefore remand for fresh findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This action was brought by the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department pursuant to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., alleging that appellants had engaged in a policy and practice of racial discrimination against Blacks with respect to the purchase and sale of homes in the Metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia area. The government sought injunctive relief, claiming that appellants' actions constituted a pattern or practice of resistance to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and had denied groups of persons rights granted by the Act raising an issue of general public importance. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613.1
After a three day non-jury trial, the District Court made the following pertinent factual findings:
After making the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court held:
The Court then enjoined appellants from further discriminatory conduct and ordered them to take affirmative action to prevent future discrimination.3
Appellants attack the District Court's order on a number of grounds:
We find that appellants' first two contentions are without merit but that his third and fourth points require that we remand to the District Court for further proceedings.
Appellants urge that the District Court's finding of two post-Act violations by Mr. Isakson is insufficient to establish an issue of general public importance and that injunctive relief is therefore not authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 3613.4 This contention is meritless. The question of what constitutes an issue of general public importance is, absent specific statutory standards, a question most appropriately answered by the executive branch. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 5 Cir. 1973, 474 F.2d 115. See United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 5 Cir. 1969, 406 F.2d 1086, 1090; Boyd v. United States, E.D.N.Y.1972, 345 F. Supp. 790, 794. Just as in his determination whether to prosecute a criminal case, the Attorney General must have wide discretion to determine whether an issue of public importance is raised. "Once the Attorney General alleged that he had reasonable cause to believe that a violation of . . . the Fair Housing Act denied rights to a group of persons and that this denial raised an issue of general public importance, he had standing to commence an action in District Court and to obtain injunctive relief upon a finding of a violation of the Act." United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., supra, 474 F.2d at p. 125 n. 14 (citations omitted).
Northside Realty argues that the District Court's findings of one pre-Act violation and two post-Act violations by the individual appellant, Ed Isakson, are insufficient to impute liability to the corporate appellant, Northside Realty. Northside urges that the District Court's finding of corporate liability does not comport with this Circuit's decision in Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 307 F.2d 120, because (1) the evidence fails to establish that Isakson was acting within the scope of his employment when the violations occurred, since by stipulation Isakson is not normally a real estate salesperson, and (2) Isakson was not shown to have been acting with the purpose of benefiting the corporate appellant when he violated the Act. In light of the fact that Ed Isakson (1) is the Executive Vice President of Northside Realty, (2) is the broker whose license inures to the benefit of the corporation and enables it to engage in the business of selling real estate, and (3) directly supervises one sales office of Northside Realty and is in charge of hiring or selecting the sales managers for the other Northside offices, we do not think it clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that appellant Isakson acted within the scope of his duties when he spoke to customers at the office that he supervised and when he discussed sales policy with other people in the real estate business. Nor do we think the District Court was clearly erroneous in finding that these activities were conducted with the intention of benefiting the corporation for which Isakson served as executive vice president. See Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, supra.
42 U.S.C. § 3613 authorizes the District Court to grant injunctive relief pursuant to a complaint by the Attorney General if the court finds (1) an individual pattern or practice of acts violating the Fair Housing Act, see United States v. Reddoch, 5 Cir. 1972, 467 F.2d 897; United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 5 Cir. 1971, 437 F.2d 221; or (2) a group pattern or practice of violating the Act, see United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 5 Cir. 1973, 474 F.2d 115; or (3) that an act, or acts violative of the Fair Housing Act denied a group of persons rights protected by the Act, see United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., supra.
In considering the Attorney General's request for injunctive relief in the instant case, the District Court stated the issue in this manner:
"The question before this Court is whether the government . . . has met its . . . burden of proving that Northside Realty and Ed Isakson have engaged in a discriminatory `pattern or practice\' of...
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