Commonwealth v. Carter

Citation474 Mass. 624,52 N.E.3d 1054
Decision Date01 July 2016
Docket NumberSJC–12043.
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Michelle CARTER.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Dana Alan Curhan, Boston (Joseph P. Cataldo, Franklin, with him) for the defendant.

Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney (Katie Cook Rayburn, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.

Eva G. Jellison & David J. Nathanson, Boston, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.

CORDY

, J.

On February 6, 2015, the defendant, Michelle Carter, was indicted as a youthful offender under G.L. c. 119, § 54

, on a charge of involuntary manslaughter after she, at the age of seventeen, encouraged Conrad Roy (the victim), then eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. To indict a juvenile as a youthful offender, the grand jury must hear evidence establishing probable cause that (1) the juvenile is between the ages of fourteen and eighteen at the time of the underlying offense; (2) the underlying offense, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in State prison; and (3) the underlying offense involves the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm. G.L. c. 119, § 54

. The defendant moved in the Juvenile Court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to present the grand jury with sufficient evidence of involuntary manslaughter and that the defendant's conduct did not involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm. The motion was denied.

The principal question we consider in this case is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the return of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant's conduct did not extend beyond words. We conclude that, on the evidence presented to the grand jury, the verbal conduct at issue was sufficient and, because a conviction of involuntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in State prison and inherently involves the infliction of serious bodily harm, the grand jury properly returned an indictment under the youthful offender statute. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Juvenile Court.1

1. Background. The grand jury heard evidence from four witnesses over the course of three days. That evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 885, 906 N.E.2d 343 (2009)

, included the following:

On the afternoon of July 13, 2014, an officer with the Fairhaven police department located the deceased in his truck, parked in a store parking lot. The medical examiner concluded that the victim had died after inhaling carbon monoxide that was produced by a gasoline powered water pump located in the truck. The manner of death was suicide.

The victim had been receiving treatment for mental health issues since 2011. In 2013, the victim attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on acetaminophen

. A friend saved his life by contacting emergency services.

During the course of the investigation into the victim's suicide, a police review of his recent electronic communications caused them to further explore his relationship with the defendant. The victim and the defendant met in 2011 and had been dating at various times during that period, including at the time of the victim's death. Because they did not live in the same town, the majority of their contact took place through the exchange of voluminous text messages and cellular telephone calls.2 The grand jury heard testimony and were presented with transcripts concerning the content of those text messages in the minutes, days, weeks, and months leading up to the defendant's suicide. The messages revealed that the defendant was aware of the victim's history of mental illness, and of his previous suicide attempt, and that much of the communication between the defendant and the victim focused on suicide. Specifically, the defendant encouraged the victim to kill himself,3 instructed him as to when and how he should kill himself,4 assuaged his concerns over killing himself,5 and chastised him when he delayed doing so.6 The theme of those text messages can be summed up in the phrase used by the defendant four times between July 11 and July 12, 2014 (the day on which the victim committed suicide): “You just [have] to do it.”

Cellular telephone records that were presented to the grand jury revealed that the victim and defendant also had two cellular telephone conversations at the time during which police believe that the victim was in his truck committing suicide.7 The content of those cellular telephone conversations is only available as reported by the defendant to her friend, Samantha Boardman. After the victim's death, the defendant sent a text message to Boardman explaining that, at one point during the suicide, the victim got out of his truck because he was “scared,” and the defendant commanded him to get back in.8

It was apparent that the defendant understood the repercussions of her role in the victim's death. Prior to his suicide, the defendant sought (apparently unsuccessfully) to have the victim delete the text messages between the two, and after learning that the police were looking through the victim's cellular telephone, the defendant sent the following text message to Boardman: “Sam, [the police] read my messages with him I'm done. His family will hate me and I can go to jail.” During the investigation, and after cross-referencing the text messages in the defendant's cellular telephone and those in the victim's cellular telephone, the police discovered that the defendant had erased certain text messages between her and the victim. The defendant also lied to police about the content of her conversations with the victim. Finally, the defendant acknowledged in a text message to Boardman that she could have stopped the victim from committing suicide: “I helped ease him into it and told him it was okay, I was talking to him on the phone when he did it I coud have easily stopped him or called the police but I didn't.”

Based on the foregoing evidence, the Commonwealth successfully sought to indict the defendant for involuntary manslaughter, as a youthful offender, asserting that the defendant's wanton or reckless conduct was the cause of the victim's death. After a judge of the Juvenile Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant filed a petition for relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3

. On February 1, 2016, a single justice of this court reserved and reported the case to the full court.

2. Discussion. “Ordinarily, a court will not inquire into the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury.’ Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 39, 11 N.E.3d 1060 (2014)

, quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 592, 368 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). However, in Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (1982), we recognized a limited exception for when the grand jury “fail[ ] to hear any evidence of criminal activity by the defendant.” “At the very least, the grand jury must hear enough evidence to establish the identity of the accused and to support a finding of probable cause to arrest the accused for the offense charged” (footnote omitted).

Rex, supra at 40, 11 N.E.3d 1060

. “Probable cause requires sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed ...; this standard requires considerably less than that which is required to warrant a finding of guilt” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 447, 766 N.E.2d 50 (2002).

a. Involuntary manslaughter.9 Involuntary manslaughter can be proved under two theories, either (1) wanton or reckless conduct

or (2) wanton or reckless failure to act. Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 832, 926 N.E.2d 206 (2010)

. The indictment was returned on the basis of the defendant's wanton or reckless conduct.10

Wanton or reckless conduct is “intentional conduct ... involv[ing] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.” Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 496, 969 N.E.2d 672 (2012)

, quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944). Whether conduct is wanton or reckless is

“determined based either on the defendant's specific knowledge or on what a reasonable person should have known in the circumstances.... If based on the objective measure of recklessness, the defendant's actions constitute wanton or reckless conduct ... if an ordinary normal [person] under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.... If based on the subjective measure, i.e., the defendant's own knowledge, grave danger to others must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm” (quotations and citations omitted).
Pugh, supra at 496–497, 969 N.E.2d 672

.

b. Sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury.11 The

Commonwealth bore the burden of presenting the grand jury with sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that the defendant's conduct (1) was intentional;12 (2) was wanton or reckless; and (3) caused the victim's death. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. at 832, 926 N.E.2d 206

.

The defendant argues that, because she neither was physically present when the victim killed himself nor provided the victim with the instrument with which he killed himself, she did not cause his death by wanton or reckless conduct.13 She maintains that verbally encouraging someone to commit suicide, no matter how forcefully, cannot constitute wanton or reckless conduct. Effectively, the argument is that verbal conduct can never overcome a person's willpower to live, and therefore cannot be the cause of a suicide. We disagree.

We have...

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  • Commonwealth v. Dawson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 24 Agosto 2022
    ...fact-specific. The circumstances of the situation dictate whether the conduct is or is not wanton or reckless." Commonwealth v. Carter, 474 Mass. 624, 634, 52 N.E.3d 1054 (2016). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 840-841, 162 N.E.3d 1192 (2021) (charge of wanton or reckless i......
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