Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing
| Decision Date | 12 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1273,84-1273 |
| Citation | 474 U.S. 214,88 L.Ed.2d 523,106 S.Ct. 507 |
| Parties | REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Petitioner, v. Scott E. EWING |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Respondent was enrolled in a 6-year program of study at the University of Michigan known as "Inteflex." An undergraduate degree and a medical degree are awarded upon successful completion of the program. To qualify for the final two years of the program a student must pass an examination known as "NBME Part I." Respondent was dismissed from the University when he failed this examination with the lowest score recorded in the history of the Inteflex program. After unsuccessfully seeking, from University authorities, readmission to the program and an opportunity to retake the examination, respondent brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging a right to retake the examination on the ground, inter alia, that he had a property interest in the Inteflex program and that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious in violation of his "substantive due process rights" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. While determining that respondent had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued enrollment in the Inteflex program, the District Court found no violation of his due process rights. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Even if respondent's assumed property interest gave rise to a substantive right under the Due Process Clause to continue enrollment free from arbitrary state action, the facts of record disclose no such action. The record unmistakably demonstrates that the decision to dismiss respondent was made conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of his entire academic career at the University, including his singularly low score on the NBME Part I examination. The narrow avenue for judicial review of the substance of academic decisions precludes any conclusion that such decision was such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment. Pp. 222-228.
742 F.2d 913 (CA6 1984), reversed and remanded.
Roderick K. Daane, Ann Arbor, Mich., for petitioner.
Michael M. Conway, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Respondent Scott Ewing was dismissed from the University of Michigan after failing an important written examination. The question presented is whether the University's action deprived Ewing of property without due process of law because its refusal to allow him to retake the examination was an arbitrary departure from the University's past practice. The Court of Appeals held that his constitutional rights were violated. We disagree.
In the fall of 1975 Ewing enrolled in a special 6-year program of study, known as "Inteflex," offered jointly by the undergraduate college and the Medical School.1 An undergraduate degree and a medical degree are awarded upon successful completion of the program. In order to qualify for the final two years of the Inteflex program, which consist of clinical training at hospitals affiliated with the University, the student must successfully complete four years of study including both premedical courses and courses in the basic medical sciences. The student must also pass the "NBME Part I"—a 2-day written test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners.
In the spring of 1981, after overcoming certain academic and personal difficulties, Ewing successfully completed the courses prescribed for the first four years of the Inteflex program and thereby qualified to take the NBME Part I. Ewing failed five of the seven subjects on that examination, receiving a total score of 235 when the passing score was 345. (A score of 380 is required for state licensure and the national mean is 500.) Ewing received the lowest score recorded by an Inteflex student in the brief history of that program.
On July 24, 1981, the Promotion and Review Board individually reviewed the status of several students in the Inteflex program. After considering Ewing's record in some detail, the nine members of the Board in attendance voted unanimously to drop him from registration in the program.
In response to a written request from Ewing, the Board reconvened a week later to reconsider its decision. Ewing appeared personally and explained why he believed that his score on the test did not fairly reflect his academic progress or potential.2 After reconsidering the matter, the nine voting members present unanimously reaffirmed the prior action to drop Ewing from registration in the program.
In August, Ewing appealed the Board's decision to the Executive Committee of the Medical School. After giving Ewing an opportunity to be heard in person, the Executive Committee unanimously approved a motion to deny his appeal for a leave of absence status that would enable him to retake Part I of the NBME examination. In the following year, Ewing reappeared before the Executive Committee on two separate occasions, each time unsuccessfully seeking readmission to the Medical School. On August 19, 1982, he commenced this litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
Ewing's complaint against the Regents of the University of Michigan asserted a right to retake the NBME Part I test on three separate theories, two predicated on state law and one based on federal law.3 As a matter of state law, he alleged that the University's action constituted a breach of contract and was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. As a matter of federal law, Ewing alleged that he had a property interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program and that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, violating his "substantive due process rights" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and entitling him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The District Court held a 4-day bench trial at which it took evidence on the University's claim that Ewing's dismissal was justified as well as on Ewing's allegation that other University of Michigan medical students who had failed the NBME Part I had routinely been given a second opportunity to take the test. The District Court described Ewing's unfortunate academic history in some detail. Its findings, set forth in the margin,4 reveal that Ewing "encountered imme- diate difficulty in handling the work," Ewing v. Board of Regents, 559 F.Supp. 791, 793 (1983), and that his difficulties—in the form of marginally passing grades and a number of incompletes and makeup examinations, many experienced while Ewing was on a reduced course load—persisted throughout the 6-year period in which he was enrolled in the Inteflex program.
Ewing discounted the importance of his own academic record by offering evidence that other students with even more academic deficiencies were uniformly allowed to retake the NBME Part I. See App. 107-111. The statistical evidence indicated that of the 32 standard students in the Medical School who failed Part I of the NBME since its inception, all 32 were permitted to retake the test, 10 were allowed to take the test a third time, and 1 a fourth time. Seven students in the Inteflex program were allowed to retake the test, and one student was allowed to retake it twice. Ewing is the only student who, having failed the test, was not permitted to retake it. Dr. Robert Reed, a former Director of the Inteflex program and a member of the Promotion and Review Board, stated that students were "routinely" given a second chance. 559 F.Supp., at 794. Accord, App. 8, 30, 39-40, 68, 73, 163. Ewing argued that a promotional pamphlet released by the Medical School approximately a week before the examination had codified this practice. The pamphlet, entitled "On Becoming a Doctor," stated:
The District Court concluded that the evidence did not support either Ewing's contract claim or his promissory es- toppel claim under governing Michigan law. There was "no sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants bound themselves either expressly or by a course of conduct to give Ewing a second chance to take Part I of the NBME examination." 559 F.Supp., at 800. With reference to the pamphlet "On Becoming a Doctor," the District Court held that "even if [Ewing] had learned of the pamphlet's contents before he took the examination, and I find that he did not, I would not conclude that this amounted either to an unqualified promise to him or gave him a contract right to retake the examination." Ibid.
With regard to Ewing's federal claim, the District Court determined that Ewing had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program and that a state university's academic decisions concerning the qualifications of a medical student are "subject to substantive due process review" in federal court. Id., at 798. The District Court, however, found no violation of Ewing's due process rights. The trial record, it emphasized, was devoid of any indication that the University's decision was "based on bad faith, ill will or other impermissible ulterior motives"; to the contrary, the "evidence demonstrate[d] that the decision to dismiss plaintiff was reached in a fair and impartial manner, and only after careful and deliberate consideration." Id., at 799. To "leave no conjecture" as to his decision, the District Judge expressly found that "the evidence demonstrate[d] no arbitrary or capricious action since [the Regents] had good reason to...
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