Wainwright v. Greenfield

• Decision Date: 14 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-1480,84-1480
• Parties: Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Petitioner v. David Wayne GREENFIELD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

474 U.S. 284

106 S.Ct. 634

88 L.Ed.2d 623

Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Petitioner

v David Wayne GREENFIELD.

No. 84-1480.

Argued Nov. 13, 1985.

Decided Jan. 14, 1986.

Syllabus

On three occasions shortly after his arrest in Florida for sexual battery, respondent was given Miranda warnings, and in each instance he exercised his right to remain silent and stated that he wished to speak with an attorney before answering any questions. Respondent later pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and in the closing arguments in the Florida trial court, the prosecutor, over defense counsel's objection, reviewed police officer testimony as to the occasions on which respondent had exercised his right to remain silent, and suggested that respondent's repeated refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney demonstrated a degree of comprehension that was inconsistent with his claim of insanity. Respondent's subsequent conviction was affirmed by the Florida Court of Appeal, which held that the general rule precluding prosecutorial comment as to a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent did not apply to a case in which an insanity plea was filed. Respondent then unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the reasoning of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, respondent was entitled to a new trial.

Held: The prosecutor's use of respondent's postarrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of sanity violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 289-295.

(a) In Doyle, supra, it was held that the prosecutor's impeachment of the defendants' exculpatory testimony by asking them on cross-examination why they had not explained their conduct at the time of their arrest was fundamentally unfair and therefore violated the Due Process Clause. The source of the unfairness was the implicit assurance contained in Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty. Pp. 289-291.

(b) There is no merit to the argument that Doyle does not control this case because proof of sanity is significantly different from proof of the commission of the underlying offense. The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony. It is equally unfair to breach that promise by using silence to overcome a defendant's plea of insanity. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748, distinguished. Pp. 292-293.

(c) The argument that Doyle should not control this case because a suspect's comprehension of Miranda warnings, as evidenced by his silence, is far more probative of sanity than of commission of the underlying offense, is also unpersuasive. Such argument fails to meet the problem of fundamental unfairness that flows from the State's breach of its implied assurances. Pp. 293-294.

(d) A State's legitimate interest in proving that the defendant's behavior appeared to be rational at the time of his arrest can be served by carefully framed questions that avoid any mention of the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult counsel. Pp. 294-295.

741 F.2d 329 (CA11 1984), affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 296.

Ann Garrison Paschall, Tampa, Fla., for petitioner.

James D. Whittemore, Tampa, Fla., for respondent.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of sexual battery. At his trial in the Circuit Court for Sarasota County, Florida, the prosecutor argued that respondent's silence after receiving Miranda warnings was evidence of his sanity. The question presented is whether such use of a defendant's silence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).

I

The battery occurred in woods near a beach in the vicinity of Sarasota, Florida. After respondent released his victim, she drove directly to the police station to report the incident. Based on her description, Officer Pilifant identified respondent on the beach and placed him under arrest about two hours after the assault occurred. After handcuffing him, the officer gave respondent the warnings required by our decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Specifically, Officer Pilifant stated:

"You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? Having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to us now?" App. 73.

Respondent replied by stating that he understood his rights and that he wanted to talk to an attorney before making any statement. The Miranda warnings were repeated by Officer Pilifant while driving to the police station and reiterated by Detective Jolley after they arrived at the station. Each time that respondent was asked "if he wished to give up the right to remain silent," he declined, stating that he wanted to talk to an attorney. App. 77.

Under Florida law, when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and when his evidence is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his sanity, the State has the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.¹ In his case in chief, the prosecutor introduced the testimony of Officer Pilifant and Detective Jolley. They described the occasions on which respondent had exercised his right to remain silent and had expressed a desire to consult counsel before answering any questions. Both officers repeated the several colloquies with respondent. In his defense, respondent did not testify, but two psychiatrists expressed the opinion that he was a paranoid schizophrenic who had been unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense. In rebuttal, the prosecutor relied on a third psychiatrist who expressed a contrary opinion.

In his closing argument, over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor reviewed the testimony of Officer Pilifant and Detective Jolley and suggested that respondent's repeated refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney demonstrated a degree of comprehension that was inconsistent with his claim of insanity.² The jury found respondent guilty and the judge sentenced him to life imprisonment.

By a 2-to-1 vote, the Florida Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the conviction. Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (1976). After noting that "prosecutorial comment relating to a defendant's insistence on his right to remain silent generally constitutes reversible error," id., at 1022, the majority held that the general rule did not apply to a case in which an insanity plea had been filed. The dissenting judge suggested that the application of the general rule would not have prejudiced the prosecution because the "questions and answers could have been couched in such a manner as to permit the officer to convey to the jury the fact that the appellant carried on a perfectly rational conversation without specifically stating that he chose to avail himself of his right to remain silent." Id., at 1023.

The Florida Supreme Court granted respondent's petition for certiorari and summarily remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331 (1978), a case in which it had held that improper comment on a defendant's silence was constitutional error reviewable on appeal if an adequate contemporaneous objection was made either at the time the evidence was introduced or at the time of the prosecutor's comment. Greenfield v. State, 364 So.2d 885 (1978). On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal adhered to its earlier decision.

Having exhausted his state remedies, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court. The petition was referred to a Magistrate. The State argued that the silence issue was barred because respondent's counsel had failed to make an adequate objection. The Magistrate concluded that federal review of the claim was not foreclosed because counsel had objected to the prosecutor's closing argument and because the Florida Court of Appeal had rejected the claim on its merits. The Magistrate, however, agreed with the Florida courts' disposition of the merits and recommended that the habeas corpus petition be denied. The District Court accepted that recommendation.³

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 741 F.2d 329 (1984). Disagreeing with two other Federal Courts of Appeals⁴—but not with the position taken by the Florida Supreme Court in a case decided after this respondent had exhausted his state remedies, see State v. Burwick, 442 So.2d 944 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931, 104 S.Ct. 1719, 80 L.Ed.2d 191 (1984)—the Court of Appeals held that under the reasoning of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), respondent was entitled to a new trial. We agree.

II

In Doyle, the defendants had taken the witness stand and offered an exculpatory explanation for their participation in what the State's evidence had portrayed as a routine...