475 F.Supp.2d 1118 (M.D.Ala. 2007), C. A. 2 88cv1170, R.C. ex rel. the Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Walley

• Citation: 475 F.Supp.2d 1118
• Date: 16 January 2007
• Docket Number: C. A. 2 88cv1170
• Parties: R.C. ex rel. the Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Walley
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Page 1118

475 F.Supp.2d 1118 (M.D.Ala. 2007)

R.C. by his next friend, THE ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY, PROGRAM, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.

Page WALLEY, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Defendant.

Civil Action 2:88cv1170-ID.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Jan. 16, 2007

Page 1119

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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Ashley Lomers, Barbara A. Lawrence, James A. Tucker, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, Douglas Richard Miller Nazarian, Patrick J. Reynolds, Ralph S. Tyler, Hogan & Hartson LLP, Baltimore, MD, Ira A. Burnim, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Troy Robin King, Attorney General's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

Lisa Marie Mardis, Birmingham, AL, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, Senior District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1122

II. JURISDICTION ........................................................ 1123

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................. 1123

A. The Standard for Termination of the Consent Decree ............. 1123

1. Generally ................................................ 1123

2. The Terms of the Consent Decree and its Termination Clause 1124

a. Implementation of the "System of Care" ................ 1124

b. Termination Clause .................................... 1124

c. The Requirements of the Consent Decree ................ 1125

3. Substantial Compliance ................................... 1126

B. Evidentiary Hearing ............................................ 1128

C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ........................ 1129

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ................................... 1129

A. Brief Summary of R.C. I ........................................ 1129

B. Orders and Pleadings Filed after R.C. I ........................ 1130

C. The Court Monitor's 2006 On"Site Sustainability Reviews ........ 1132

V. DISCUSSION .......................................................... 1134

A. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the First Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree ..................... 1134

B. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the Second Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree ..................... 1136

1. Preliminary Findings Concerning the 2006 On"Site Sustainability Reviews and the Parties' Positions as to What the Reviews Mean in terms of Substantial Compliance 1137

2. Ratings: Overall Child Status and Overall Performance .... 1138

3. Core Purpose One ......................................... 1139

4. Core Purpose Four ........................................ 1142

5. Core Purpose Two: Service Delivery and Competent Staff ... 1145

a. Service Delivery ...................................... 1145

b. Competent Staff ....................................... 1146

i. DHR's Demonstrated Compliance with the Court's Order on Developing a Licensed Child Welfare Social Worker Workforce ...................... 1146

ii. Stakeholders' Reports .......................... 1147

iii. Training ....................................... 1148

6. Core Purpose Two: Appropriate Caseloads .................. 1148

a. Staffing Allocations and the Child Welfare Staffing Committee ........................................... 1150

b. DHR's Compliance with the Monitoring and Reporting Sections of Court's 1998 Order ...................... 1154

c. The Court Monitor's Measurements for Ascertaining Substantial Compliance with the Court's 1998 Order and Examination of the Evidence from the 2006 On"Site Sustainability Reviews .............................. 1154

i. Counties' Average R.C. Workloads ............... 1155

ii. Counties' Seven"Month Track Record ............. 1156

iii. Data Pertaining to Percentages of Staff "Over Standards" ................................... 1157

Findings Regarding Exception Reports ........... 1161

Findings Regarding Staff Turnover .............. 1162

Findings Regarding DHR's Good Faith ............ 1163

d. The Court's Overall Findings of Substantial Compliance Concerning Core Purpose Two's Goal of Compliant Caseloads ........................................... 1164

7. Core Purpose Three ....................................... 1165

a. Positions of the Parties and the Court Monitor ........ 1166

b. Timely Completion of ISPs ............................. 1166

c. Serviceable ISPs ...................................... 1167

d. The 2006 On"Site Sustainability Reviews ............... 1168

e. Findings .............................................. 1169

8. Core Purpose Five ........................................ 1170

9. The 2006 On"Site Sustainability Reviews: The Three Counties Which the Court Monitor Deemed Were Not in Substantial Compliance with the Consent Decree ......... 1177

a. The Arguments of the Parties .......................... 1177

b. DHR Has Detected Problems ............................. 1178

10. Other Noteworthy Evidence ................................ 1180

11. The End of Federal Judicial Supervision Does Not Mean the End of Oversight: DHR's Quality Assurance System and Other Supervision Mechanisms ........................... 1182

VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 1183

VII. ORDER ............................................................... 1185

Page 1122

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the court on the second motion for order terminating Consent Decree (Doc. No. 761), filed by the Honorable Page Walley, Ph.D., who by virtue of his position as the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") is the defendant in this long-running litigation involving institutional reform of DHR's child welfare system. ¹ The first motion for order terminating Consent Decree was denied by the court in a memorandum opinion and order entered on May 13, 2005. See R.C. v. Walley ("R.C.I"), 390 F.Supp.2d 1030 (M.D.Ala.2005). In R.C.I, the court found that "Defendant ha[d] not submitted evidence sufficient to sustain his burden of demonstrating that DHR 'is' and 'will remain' in substantial compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan as required for termination of said Decree." Id. at 1033.

As grounds for his second motion, Defendant asserts that he has submitted an adequate evidentiary record to support termination of the Consent Decree, which has governed in this case since 1991, and that this evidence addresses and cures the deficiencies outlined by the court in R.C.I. Conversely, Plaintiffs, who opposed the first motion and likewise oppose the instant "second" motion, argue that there is no evidentiary basis for termination of the Consent Decree and that continued judicial oversight is necessary to bring Defendant in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree.

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that DHR successfully has reformed its child welfare system by developing a system of care which substantially complies with the requirements of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan and that judicial oversight is no longer necessary to avoid return to the depraved conditions that led to the commencement of this lawsuit in 1988 and to the court's intervention. ² The

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court finds that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating DHR's substantial compliance under the Consent Decree's two-pronged termination clause and that, accordingly, Defendant's motion is due to be granted. ³

II. JURISDICTION

The Consent Decree bestows upon the court shared authority with the court monitor to determine compliance with the Consent Decree, but sole authority to terminate the Consent Decree upon motion of Defendant. (Consent Decree pp 86, 91, 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)), as amended by 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511); R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034. A court also maintains inherent jurisdiction over its decrees. See Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir.1994); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir.1985) ("Consent decrees are subject to continuing supervision and enforcement by the court."). The court, thus, acts within its jurisdiction in ruling on the present motion to terminate the Consent Decree.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. The Standard for Termination of the Consent Decree

1. Generally

The court begins with the principles, duly emphasized by Defendant, that Consent Decrees "are not intended to operate in perpetuity," Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), and that "[r]eturning governmental entities to the control of local authorities 'at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability to our governmental system.' " Jordan v. Wilson, 951 F.Supp. 1571, 1580 (M.D.Ala.1996) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992)); see also Reynolds v. McInnes, 338 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir.2003) ("Federal court oversight of an interference in the operations of a state government department or agency 'should be as narrow and short-lived' as fulfilling the duty to eradicate [the violation] allows.") (quoting Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1574-75 (11th Cir.1994)) (brackets added). The court concurs wholeheartedly with the foregoing principles, and, as the court stated in R.C.I, it "is more anxious than Defendant to return this case to the State[.]" 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059. At the same time, however, while the goal of achieving state and local autonomy of non-federal public...