475 U.S. 469 (1986), 84-1160, Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati

Docket Nº:No. 84-1160
Citation:475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452
Party Name:Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati
Case Date:March 25, 1986
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 469

475 U.S. 469 (1986)

106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452

Pembauer

v.

City of Cincinnati

No. 84-1160

United States Supreme Court

March 25, 1986

Argued December 2, 1985

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Petitioner, a physician and the proprietor of a clinic in Cincinnati, Ohio, that provided medical services primarily to welfare recipients, was indicted by a grand jury for fraudulently accepting payments from state welfare agencies. During the grand jury investigation, subpoenas were issued for the appearance of two of petitioner's employees. When the employees failed to appear, the Assistant County Prosecutor obtained capiases for their detention. But when two County Deputy Sheriffs attempted to serve the capiases at petitioner's clinic, he barred the door and refused to let them enter the part of the clinic where the employees presumably were located. Thereafter, Cincinnati police officers, whom petitioner had called, appeared and told petitioner to allow the Deputy Sheriffs to enter. Petitioner continued to refuse. The Deputy Sheriffs then called their superior, who told them to call the County Prosecutor's Office and to follow his instructions. The Deputy Sheriffs spoke to the Assistant Prosecutor assigned to the case. He in turn conferred with the County Prosecutor, who told him to instruct the Deputy Sheriffs to "go in and get" the employees. The Assistant Prosecutor relayed these instructions to the Deputy Sheriffs. After the Deputy Sheriffs tried unsuccessfully to force the door, city police officers obtained an axe and chopped down the door. The Deputy Sheriffs then entered and searched the clinic, but were unable to locate the employees sought. Although petitioner was acquitted of the fraud charges, he was indicted and convicted for obstructing police in the performance of an authorized act. His conviction was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court. Petitioner then filed a damages action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the county, among other defendants, alleging that the county had violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court dismissed the claim against the county on the ground that the individual officers were not acting pursuant to the kind of "official policy" that is the predicate for municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner had failed to prove the existence of a county policy because he had shown nothing more than that, on "this one occasion," the Prosecutor and the Sheriff decided to force entry into petitioner's clinic.

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Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 746 F.2d 337, reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-C, concluding that:

1. The "official policy" requirement of Monell was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of the municipality's employees, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to actions for which the municipality is actually responsible. Monell held that recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, "of the municipality," i.e., acts that the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered. With this understanding, it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. If the decision to adopt a particular course of action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly. Pp. 477-481.

2. It was error to dismiss petitioner's claim against the county. Ohio law authorizes the County Sheriff to obtain instructions from the County Prosecutor. The Sheriff followed the practice of delegating certain decisions to the Prosecutor where appropriate. In this case, the Deputy Sheriffs received instructions from the Sheriff's Office to follow the orders of the County Prosecutor, who made a considered decision based on his understanding of the law and commanded the Deputy Sheriffs to enter petitioner's clinic. That decision directly caused a violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. In ordering the Deputy Sheriffs to enter petitioner's clinic to serve the capiases on the employees, the County Prosecutor was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county, and the county may therefore be held liable under § 1983. Pp. 484-485.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded in Part II-B that not every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability. The fact that a particular official has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion unless the official is also responsible, under state law, for establishing final governmental policy respecting such activity. Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where -- and only where -- a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pp. 481-484.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-C, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and

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O'CONNOR (except for Part II-C), JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 485. STEVENS, J., post, p. 487, and O'CONNOR, J., post, p. 491, filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 492.

BRENNAN, J., lead opinion

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-B.

In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court concluded that municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is limited to deprivations of federally protected rights caused by action taken "pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature. . . ." Id. at 691. The question presented is whether, and in what circumstances, a decision by municipal policymakers on a single occasion may satisfy this requirement.

I

Bertold Pembaur is a licensed Ohio physician and the sole proprietor of the Rockdale Medical Center, located in the city of Cincinnati in Hamilton County. Most of Pembaur's patients are welfare recipients who rely on government assistance to pay for medical care. During the spring of 1977, Simon Leis, the Hamilton County Prosecutor, began investigating charges that Pembaur fraudulently had accepted payments from state welfare agencies for services not actually provided to patients. A grand jury was convened, and the case was assigned to Assistant Prosecutor William Whalen.

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In April, the grand jury charged Pembaur in a six-count indictment.

During the investigation, the grand jury issued subpoenas for the appearance of two of Pembaur's employees. When these employees failed to appear as directed, the Prosecutor obtained capiases for their arrest and detention from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County.1

On May 19, 1977, two Hamilton County Deputy Sheriffs attempted to serve the capiases at Pembaur's clinic. Although the reception area is open to the public, the rest of the clinic may be entered only through a door next to the receptionist's window. Upon arriving, the Deputy Sheriffs identified themselves to the receptionist and sought to pass through this door, which was apparently open. The receptionist blocked their way and asked them to wait for the doctor. When Pembaur appeared a moment later, he and the receptionist closed the door, which automatically locked from the inside, and wedged a piece of wood between it and the wall. Returning to the receptionist's window, the Deputy Sheriffs identified themselves to Pembaur, showed him the capiases, and explained why they were there. Pembaur refused to let them enter, claiming that the police had no legal authority to be there and requesting that they leave. He told them that he had called the Cincinnati police, the local media, and his lawyer. The Deputy Sheriffs decided not to take further action until the Cincinnati police arrived.

Shortly thereafter, several Cincinnati police officers appeared. The Deputy Sheriffs explained the situation to them and asked that they speak to Pembaur. The Cincinnati police told Pembaur that the papers were lawful and that he should allow the Deputy Sheriffs to enter. When Pembaur refused, the Cincinnati police called for a superior officer. When he too failed to persuade Pembaur to open the door,

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the Deputy Sheriffs decided to call their supervisor [106 S.Ct. 1295] for further instructions. Their supervisor told them to call Assistant Prosecutor Whalen and to follow his instructions. The Deputy Sheriffs then telephoned Whalen and informed him of the situation. Whalen conferred with County Prosecutor Leis, who told Whalen to instruct the Deputy Sheriffs to "go in and get [the witnesses]." Whalen in turn passed these instructions along to the Deputy Sheriffs.

After a final attempt to persuade Pembaur voluntarily to allow them to enter, the Deputy Sheriffs tried unsuccessfully to force the door. City police officers, who had been advised of the County Prosecutor's instructions to "go in and get" the witnesses, obtained an axe and chopped down the door. The Deputy Sheriffs then entered and...

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