Plummer v. Center Psychiatrists, Ltd.
Decision Date | 13 September 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 952306,952306 |
Citation | 476 S.E.2d 172,252 Va. 233 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | Katrina Q. PLUMMER v. CENTER PSYCHIATRISTS, LTD. Record |
William F. Burnside, Virginia Beach, for appellant.
Robert W. Hardy (Lawrence A. Dunn, Knight, Dudley, Clarke & Dolph, on brief), Norfolk, for appellee.
Present: All the Justices.
The sole issue we consider in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by holding, as a matter of law, that a psychologist who had sexual intercourse with a patient was acting outside the scope of his employment, thus rendering the doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable.
Because this case was decided on demurrer, we will state the facts "in accordance with well-established principles that a demurrer admits the truth of all material facts that are properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and facts which may be fairly and justly inferred from alleged facts." Cox Cable Hampton Roads v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991).
Dr. Roque Gerald, a licensed clinical psychologist, was employed by the defendant, Center Psychiatrists, Ltd. Gerald provided therapy and counseling services to the plaintiff, Katrina Q. Plummer, who was suffering from depression. Gerald was "cognizant of [the] [p]laintiff's psychological and emotional history, which included her prior attempts at suicide," and he knew "that she was suffering from suicide ideation, and depression."
On February 8, 1989, while the plaintiff was receiving counseling from Gerald at the defendant's place of business, Gerald committed "an act of sexual intercourse upon [p]laintiff [which] constituted an assault and battery upon her since, Dr. Roque Gerald, through his education, experience and knowledge of [p]laintiff overcame her will so that she was unable to act with volition."
The plaintiff filed her motion for judgment against the defendant seeking to recover, inter alia, damages caused by the assault and battery. The plaintiff alleged that Gerald was an employee, agent, and servant of the defendant and that he was acting within the scope of his employment when he engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
The defendant filed a demurrer to the plaintiff's motion for judgment asserting, among other things, that as a matter of law, it cannot be liable to the plaintiff because Gerald was not acting in the course of his employment when he committed the act of sexual intercourse and, therefore, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable. The trial court granted the defendant's demurrer. We awarded the plaintiff an appeal.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claim for assault and battery against the defendant because she pled sufficient facts in her motion for judgment which, if proven at trial, would create a jury issue on the question whether Gerald was acting within the course of his employment when he committed an act of sexual intercourse upon her. The defendant argues that, as a matter of law, Gerald was not acting within the scope of his employment, but "solely for his own personal interests." We disagree with the defendant.
Initially, we observe that pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious acts of its employee if the employee was performing his employer's business and acting within the scope of his employment when the tortious acts were committed. Kensington Associates v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987); McNeill v. Spindler, 191 Va 685, 694, 62 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1950). Additionally, "[w]hen an employer-employee relationship has been established, 'the burden is on the [employer] to prove that the [employee] was not acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the act complained of, and ... if the evidence leaves the question in doubt it becomes an issue to be determined by the jury.' " Kensington Associates, 234 Va. [252 Va. 236] at 432-33, 362 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., 211 Va. 645, 653-54, 179 S.E.2d 497, 504 (1971)).
We recently discussed the principles which are dispositive of this dispute in Commercial Business Systems v. BellSouth, 249 Va. 39, 453 S.E.2d 261 (1995). BellSouth awarded Commercial Business Systems a contract to repair certain equipment manufactured by Digital Equipment Corporation. William Jordan, a BellSouth employee, had negotiated and administered the contract with Commercial Business Systems.
In Commercial Business Systems, we noted that "[i]n determining whether an agent's tortious act is imputed to the principal, the doctrine's primary focus is on whether the activity that gave rise to the tortious act was within or without the agent's scope of employment." Id. at 44, 453 S.E.2d at 265. We also stated the test that we believe is applicable here:
Id. at 45, 453 S.E.2d at 266 (quoting Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 305-06, 49 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1948)).
Applying this test in Commercial Business Systems, we observed:
Commercial Business Systems, 249 Va. at 46, 453 S.E.2d at 266.
We are of opinion that, here, the facts alleged in the motion for judgment are sufficient to support the plaintiff's legal conclusion that Gerald acted within the scope of his employment when he committed the wrongful acts against the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff's allegations, Gerald's act was committed while he was performing his duties as a psychologist in the execution of the services for which he was employed, in this instance, counseling and therapy. Additionally, Gerald's education, experience, and knowledge of the plaintiff, who was depressed and had suicidal ideations, enabled him "[to overcome] her will so that she was unable to act with volition." Furthermore, at this stage of the proceedings, there simply are not sufficient facts which would permit us to hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant has met its burden of showing that its employee was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Broaddus, supra, 211 Va. at 653-54, 179 S.E.2d at 504.
The defendant asserts that our recent decision in Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996), supports his contention that Gerald's acts, as a matter of law, were outside the scope of his employment. We disagree.
In Tomlin, the plaintiffs filed their motion for judgment against Patsye D. McKenzie, a licensed clinical social worker, and her employer, a professional corporation owned solely by McKenzie. The motion for judgment alleged that McKenzie provided family therapy to the plaintiffs pursuant to an order of referral by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Chesapeake. The motion for judgment further alleged that in the course of providing that therapy, McKenzie and her employer intentionally and maliciously committed certain acts constituting malpractice and defamation.
The defendants filed a plea in bar, seeking dismissal of the action on the basis that McKenzie...
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