City of DeSoto v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 12 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC 94746,SC 94746
• Citation: 476 S.W.3d 282
• Parties: City of DeSoto, a Political Subdivision of the State of Missouri, and James Acres, Appellants, v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor of the State of Missouri, and Chris Koster, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

476 S.W.3d 282

City of DeSoto, a Political Subdivision of the State of Missouri, and James Acres, Appellants,

v.Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor of the State of Missouri, and Chris Koster, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Respondents.

No. SC 94746

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc .

Opinion issued January 12, 2016

DeSoto and its resident were represented by James M. Kreitler of the Wegmann Law Firm in Hillsboro.

The State was represented by Solicitor General James R. Layton of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Laura Denvir Stith, Judge

The City of De Soto and De Soto resident James Acres (collectively "De Soto") appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the governor and attorney general on De Soto's suit seeking a declaratory judgment that section 321.322.4¹ violates the prohibition against special laws contained in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution.

This case comes within the scope of this Court's holding in Jefferson Cnty. Fire Protection Districts Ass'n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 870–71 (Mo. banc 2006), that a law is presumptively a special law in violation of article III, section 40 if, as here: (1) only a single political subdivision falls within its criteria even though (2) there are other political subdivisions of comparable size, and (3) the population range is so narrow that the only apparent reason for the narrow range is to target a particular political subdivision and to exclude all the others. This Court rejects the State's suggestion that this Court should consider the limiting effects of each of the six listed criteria set out in section 321.322.4 (two of which are population-based and four of which are based on other factors) individually, so that if any other city reasonably will come within each criterion, separately considered, then the statute would not be a special law, even though no other city reasonably will come within all six criteria considered together. As the six statutory criteria are applied as a whole in determining whether section 321.322.4 applies to a particular city, this Court considers them as a whole in determining whether the six criteria, as a practical matter, are drawn so narrowly that they will not apply to another city and "the only apparent reason for the narrow range is to target a particular political subdivision and exclude all others." Id. at 871. In examining all six criteria together, this Court concludes that section 321.322.4 is a special law in violation of article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution.²

Because section 321.322.4 under this test is a special law, the State was required to provide a substantial justification for enacting it rather than a general law. The State offered no such evidence, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the State. Moreover, because both parties concede that the identical issues govern the motion for summary judgment filed by De Soto and agree as to all facts on which judgment was sought by both parties, no purpose would be served by remand for reconsideration of De Soto's motion for summary judgment. This Court reverses the trial court's judgment and enters judgment in favor of De Soto.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Section 321.322 describes how a city is to make post-annexation payments to a fire protection district after the city annexes part of the fire protection district. Section 321.322.1 sets out the payment method for cities generally. Section 321.322.4, added in 2013, excludes from the procedures set out in subsection 1 any city that meets six specific criteria, stating in relevant part:

The provisions of [section 321.322.1] shall not apply where the annexing city or town operates a city fire department, is any city of the third classification with more than six thousand but fewer than seven thousand inhabitants and located in any county with a charter form of government and with more than two hundred thousand but fewer than three hundred fifty thousand inhabitants, and is entirely surrounded by a single fire protection district.

De Soto brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that section 321.322.4 violates Missouri's constitutional prohibition of local or special laws. The record shows that De Soto operates a city fire department; De Soto is a third-class city with an estimated population of 6,421 located in Jefferson County; Jefferson County is a charter county and has a population of 218,733; and De Soto is completely surrounded by a single fire protection district, the De Soto Rural Fire Protection District. De Soto, therefore, meets all six criteria set out in the exclusion contained in section 321.322.4.

De Soto argues that these six criteria are so narrowly drawn that the law's only apparent purpose is to target the City of De Soto and that, as a practical matter, no other city or town will fall within the exclusion. Although census data show that many Missouri cities are of comparable size to De Soto, the record indicates that no other Missouri city meets the six criteria set out in section 321.322.4. On this basis, De Soto filed a motion for summary judgment.

The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the criteria in the statute are open-ended because they are all subject to change through population growth or political decisions. The trial court granted the State's motion and overruled De Soto's, finding that the criteria were open-ended because "other political subdivisions ... could be included [under section 321.322.4] based on political decisions made ... by the people of particular Missouri cities and counties." De Soto appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The propriety of summary judgment is solely an issue of law. City of St. Louis v. State, 382 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Mo. banc 2012). Appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) . "When considering appeals from summary judgments, this Court will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." Id. Under Rule 84.14 an appellate court may reverse the judgment of the trial court and "give such judgment as the court ought to give." Rule 84.14.

III. SECTION 321.322.4 IS FACIALLY A SPECIAL LAW

A. History of Special Laws Prohibition

The Missouri Constitution prohibits the legislature from passing "any local or special law ... where a general law can be made applicable, and whether a general law could have been made applicable is a judicial question to be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject." MO. CONST . art. III, § 40. A comparable constitutional ban on special or local legislation has been a part of the Missouri Constitution since the first such ban was adopted by Missouri voters in 1875. Jefferson Cnty., 205 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Mo. banc 2006).

Although recent cases use the terms "local law" and "special law" almost interchangeably, historically these terms referred to different but related types of non-general laws. "Local law" traditionally was the term used to describe a law "which relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 939 (6th ed. 1990). By contrast, a "special law" referred to a law "relating to particular persons or things; one made for individual cases or for particular places or districts; one operating upon a selected class, rather than upon the public generally." Id. at 1397–98. A special law was also sometimes called a "private law," that is, a law relating to a particular individual, association or corporation, rather than a particular locale. Id. at 1398, 1196.

Black's second definition for local laws is for all practical purposes, however, the same as that for special laws, for both definitions state that they refer to laws that relate to "certain persons or things of a class ... instead of all of the class." Id. at 939, 1397. It may not be not surprising, therefore, that, over time, the two terms came to be used interchangeably, so that the framers of Missouri's 1875 and 1945 Constitutions chose to limit local and special laws together in the same section of the Missouri Constitution ("No local or special law may be adopted ...") when drafting what is now article III, section 40.³ Many cases, including this Court's most recent two opinions addressing article III, section 40, have effectively merged the terms, referring to both local and special laws simply as "special laws." See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty., 205 S.W.3d at 870 and City of St. Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914. For consistency, in this opinion this Court also will refer to this law as a "special" law although it has aspects of what historically would have been considered a local law as well.

B. Section 321.322.4 is a Special Law

The most often applied test for determining whether a law qualifies as a special law is whether the law is based on open-ended or closed-ended characteristics. City of St. Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914, citing, Jefferson Cnty., 205 S.W.3d at 866. A law based on closed-ended (non-changing) characteristics, such as historical or physical facts, geography or constitutional status, is facially special because others cannot come into the group nor can its members leave the group.Tillis v. City of Branson, 945 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. banc 1997). If a law is facially special, the party defending the facially special law must demonstrate a substantial justification for the failure to adopt a general law instead. Id.

A law based on open-ended characteristics is not facially special and ordinarily is presumed to be constitutional. O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. banc 1993). Normally, population classifications are open-ended in that others may fall into the classification and members of the classification may leave it. Tillis, 945 S.W.2d at 449. When population classifications are...