Johnson v. Knorr

Decision Date14 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-5029.,No. 05-5139.,05-5029.,05-5139.
Citation477 F.3d 75
PartiesGamal JOHNSON, Appellant in No. 05-5029 v. Parole Agent David KNORR, Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna.; Parole Agent William Jones Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna.; Commonwealth of Penna. Dept. of Probation & Parole; Police Officer John Doe Individually & as a Police Officer for The City of Philadelphia; Police Officer Richard Roe Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia; City of Philadelphia. Gamal Johnson v. Parole Agent David M. Knorr, Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna.; Parole Agent William Jones, Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth Of Penna.; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Probation and Parole; Police Officer John Doe, Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia; Police Officer Richard Roe, Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia; City of Philadelphia. David Knorr, Appellant in No. 05-5139.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General, John G. Knorr, III (argued), Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Litigation Sector, Patrick J. McMonagle, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Department of Justice, Harrisburg, PA, Attorneys for Appellant in No. 05-5139 and Appellee in No. 05-5029.

Mia Carpiniello, City of Philadelphia, Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for City of Philadelphia.

Before SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before the court on an appeal and cross-appeal from a district court order entered on October 31, 2005, in which the court granted summary judgment in favor of David Knorr, an agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("the Board"), in this action that a parolee subject to the Board's supervision, Gamal Johnson, brought against him. See Johnson v. Knorr, Civ. No. 01-3418, 2005 WL 3021080 (E.D. Pa. Oct 31, 2005). The incident giving rise to this case occurred on September 6, 2000, when there was an altercation in the Board's Philadelphia office between Johnson and Knorr.1 At that time Board agents arrested Johnson in the office following which they took him to a district police station in Philadelphia for processing. On the basis of information that Knorr supplied to him, the investigating detective, Ronald Dove, with the approval of a Philadelphia assistant district attorney, filed a complaint against Johnson charging him with simple assault, aggravated assault, making terroristic threats, and reckless endangerment, all arising out of the altercation at the Board's office.

Subsequently, however, a state court dismissed the charges following which Johnson initiated civil proceedings arising from the incident in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law against Knorr and certain other defendants who no longer are parties to this litigation. Initially Johnson charged Knorr under section 1983 with violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under state law on theories of false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery, though not with malicious prosecution under either federal or state law. The defendants removed the case to the district court which ultimately granted Knorr summary judgment dismissing Johnson's claims, holding, inter alia, that the agents had probable cause to arrest Johnson for making terroristic threats though it did not make a probable cause finding on their other bases for Johnson's arrest. On Johnson's appeal, though we upheld the dismissal of Johnson's original claims and expressly upheld the finding with respect to probable cause for Johnson's arrest for making terroristic threats, we nevertheless reversed the order of the district court to the extent that we remanded the case to the district court to allow Johnson to assert claims for malicious prosecution. See Johnson v. Knorr, 130 Fed.Appx. 552 (3d Cir.2005).

On the remand Johnson amended his complaint to advance claims for malicious prosecution under section 1983 predicated on the Fourth Amendment and under state law. Subsequently, Knorr again moved for summary judgment. In the disposition of that motion the district court, after noting that on the first appeal we upheld its finding that Knorr had probable cause to believe that Johnson had committed the crime of making terrorists threats, dismissed Johnson's malicious prosecution claim under section 1983 as the finding of probable cause barred the malicious prosecution claims for prosecution of all the criminal charges. The court, however, after rejecting Knorr's sovereign immunity defense to the state law claims, remanded those claims to the common pleas court as it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Johnson then appealed and Knorr cross-appealed as he challenged the district court's action in rejecting his sovereign immunity defense to the state law claims even though it was remanding those claims to the state court. Thus, Knorr's appeal raises a procedural and jurisdictional rather than a substantive issue.

The principal issue on these appeals is whether the finding that the agents had probable cause to arrest Johnson on a charge of making terroristic threats without findings that they also had probable cause for his arrest on the other charges made against him defeats Johnson's cause of action for malicious prosecution on the remaining charges. In this regard Johnson argues that the district court improperly applied Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir.2005), to hold that "once an officer has probable cause to arrest for one offense, all possible malicious prosecution claims related to that arrest must also fail." Appellant-cross appellee's br. at 28. Because we believe that Johnson is correct, we will reverse the order of the district court on Johnson's appeal and will remand the case to the district court so that he may proceed on his malicious prosecution claims in the district court. Accordingly, we will direct the district court to vacate its order remanding Johnson's state law claims to the state court. Therefore, for the reasons we will set forth below, Knorr's cross-appeal is moot and we will dismiss it.

II. FACT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Inasmuch as the district court resolved this case by granting Knorr's motion for summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to Johnson, though we do not doubt that Knorr's version of the events is different. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir.1998).2 On September 6, 2000, Johnson, when on parole supervision transferred from Virginia to Pennsylvania, arrived at the waiting room at the office of the Board of Probation and Parole in Philadelphia to meet with his parole officer. At that time there were approximately 15 other parolees in the waiting room. While Johnson was in the waiting room, he heard another parolee who Johnson believed was having a seizure fall to the floor. At that point Johnson and at least two other parolees went to where the parolee had fallen to assist him. The fallen parolee was bleeding from his head and foaming from his mouth, and his eyes were rolled back in his head.

Approximately ten to 20 seconds later, Johnson observed Knorr and another agent standing in the doorway of the waiting room. Johnson implored Knorr to render aid to the fallen parolee, but Knorr did not do so. Instead, Knorr approached Johnson, and cursed at him and pushed him. There was then a verbal altercation between Knorr and Johnson, and, when Knorr motioned toward Johnson, Johnson told Knorr "not to put his hands on [Johnson] again ... [and that] he better call some other people out of the back or something," app. at 231, language that Knorr "[t]ook . . . as a direct threat." Id. at 268. Knorr then ordered Johnson to leave the waiting room and pushed Johnson into the door, which swung open and struck another agent, William Jones. When several agents attempted to apprehend Johnson physically, he resisted. The agents eventually subdued Johnson, and handcuffed and arrested him in the office. Johnson remained in a detention room at the office for approximately one hour before the agents transported him to the district police station. As we have indicated, Detective Dove filed a complaint against Johnson charging him with simple assault, aggravated assault, making terroristic threats, and reckless endangerment, Jones being the victim of the alleged assault. Johnson remained in a cell at the police station for approximately two days until he was able to "make bail."3 App. at 17, 392. Following a preliminary hearing on October 18, 2000, a state court dismissed the charges against Johnson.

On May 29, 2001, Johnson filed a civil complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against Knorr, Jones, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the City of Philadelphia (collectively "defendants"), and two unnamed Philadelphia police officers whom Johnson never has identified and who thus have not been served with process or participated in this case.4 Johnson alleged, inter alia, that he had been unlawfully searched and seized, arrested, and imprisoned, and that the defendants violated his due process rights as protected under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under state law. Johnson asserted his claims against Knorr and Jones both individually and in their official capacities. The named defendants removed the case to the district court.

On the defendants' motions the district...

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