Menden Vazquez v. Tribunal General De Justicia

• Decision Date: 09 February 2007
• Docket Number: Civil No. 01-1958 (JP).
• Citation: 477 F.Supp.2d 406
• Parties: James MENDEZ VAZQUEZ, Plaintiff v. TRIBUNAL GENERAL DE JUSTICIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

477 F.Supp.2d 406

James MENDEZ VAZQUEZ, Plaintiff v. TRIBUNAL GENERAL DE JUSTICIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 01-1958 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 9, 2007.

James Méndez-Vázquez, Caguas, PR, pro se.

Ana M. Margarida-Julia, Esq., Maria Eugenia Villares-Seneriz, Esq., Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

The Court has before it Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (No.98), and Plaintiff James Mendez Vazquez's response thereto (No. 109). Plaintiff is suing his employer Tribunal General de Justicia and several of its employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") over alleged discriminatory practices stemming from Plaintiffs application for reasonable accommodations with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on account of his legal blindness and back problems, the latter developing from workrelated tasks. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, that there is no personal liability under the ADA, and that Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia is immune from claims under Titles I and II of the ADA.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (No.98).

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff James Mendez-Vazquez ("Plaintiff' or "Mendez") has worked for Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia since 1992. Plaintiff alleges that he is legally blind due to his albinism. He alleges that he was first discriminated against by Defendants in January of 1993 when he used too much wax when cleaning a floor. When he told his supervisor that this overuse was due to his poor vision, the supervisor allegedly replied that had he known about Plaintiffs limited vision, he would not have hired him. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant employees of Tribunal General de Justicia have been discriminating against him since early on in his employment, and have failed to provide him with reasonable accommodations. He claims he hurt his back in 1993 while moving some heavy benches, which he was made to do by himself. He also claims that when he tried to administratively assert his rights by contacting the EEOC, he was met with reprisals from his employer. Such reprisals included increased duties and docking him for missed time, marking excused absences as "unexcused," and receiving a written admonishment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have called him the "weakest link," and an "opportunist." Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Juan Ruiz-Aponte asked Plaintiff not to use a handicap parking space, despite Plaintiffs pass from the Department of Transportation and Public Works. Plaintiff also alleges he was denied a half-day vacation for Christmas shopping though other employees received one. The parties signed a "Reasonable Accommodation Agreement" in 1995, and Plaintiff alleges that his duties today exceed those delineated in the Agreement. Plaintiff wants relief in the form of having two negative citations removed from his record, and also wants Defendant to abide by the terms of the 1995 Agreement.

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution effectively bars Plaintiffs claims. Defendants argue that Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia is immune from suit under Titles I and II of the ADA. Defendants also argue that there is no individual cause of action under the ADA, and therefore that Plaintiffs ADA claims against Defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.

The Court issued a Partial Judgment in June 2004 (No. 18) dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia for monetary damages without costs or attorneys fees. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs claims for prospective injunctive relief.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. "The trial court must accept all of the nonmovant's wellpleaded factual averments as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor." Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 226 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988)). The motion should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d at 226.

III. ANALYSIS

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "Discrimination" includes:

not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an Otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue burden on the operation of the business of such covered entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(5)(A). This mandate extends to all job aspects, including job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title II of the ADA provides:

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefit of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title V of the ADA provides:

No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Title V further states:

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.

42 U.S.C. § 12203(b).

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars any actions under the ADA against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Alternatively, Defendants argue that Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia is immune from claims under Titles I and II of the ADA, and that personal liability cannot attach under the ADA. Defendants' arguments will be examined in turn.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment renders the states immune from any suit in law or equity. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004). In evaluating Defendants' immunity claim, it is first necessary to determine if Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia is an arm of the state for purposes of sharing immunity. The Court must then determine whether Congress abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by resolving two predicate questions: "first, whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Id. (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)).

The First Circuit reformulated its "arm of the state" analysis in Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. and the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.2003). Among the factors that must be considered in determining whether Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia is an arm of the state are how the entity is characterized under state law, the level of control exercised by the state, the entity's relationship to the public treasury (both the relative size of its government appropriation and whether the government is legally liable for the entity's debts), and whether the entity performs a state function. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan, ping Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935 (1st Cir.1993).

The Court does not enter into extensive analysis here because Defendant Tribunal General de Justicia, which translates to Court of First Instance, is Puerto Rico's equivalent of a state court. See generally P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 4 § 22 (2002). Neither party contests whether the Tribunal General de Justicia is an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, the Court will continue its analysis viewing Tribunal General de Justicia as an arm of the state and therefore protected by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, to the extent that said immunity has not been abrogated by Congress. The Court next examines whether Congress has abrogated said immunity under Titles I, II, and V of the ADA.

1. Title I of the ADA

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. In Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, the Supreme Court concluded that Title I of the ADA was not a valid exercise of Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on unconstitutional disability discrimination in public employment. 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). The Court...