Bowen v. Commissioner of Social Sec.
| Decision Date | 09 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-5622.,06-5622. |
| Citation | 478 F.3d 742 |
| Parties | David BOWEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Leonard J. Stayton, Inez, Kentucky, for Appellant. William Hogan, Social Security Administration, Office of General Counsel, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Leonard J. Stayton, Inez, Kentucky, for Appellant. Haila Kleinman, Dennis R. Williams, Mary Ann Sloan, Roy Satterwhite, Natalie Jemison, Douglas Wilson, Social Security Administration, Office of General Counsel, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
Before GILMAN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; TARNOW, District Judge.*
In April of 2002, David Bowen applied for disability insurance benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA). He claimed that he had become disabled due to both physical and mental conditions that rendered him incapable of working. During two hearings held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), both Bowen and the Commissioner presented medical evidence related to Bowen's conditions. The ALJ ultimately concluded that Bowen was not entitled to disability benefits because he retained a sufficient residual functional capacity (RFC) to work. In so concluding, the ALJ credited the medical evidence that Bowen was, at most, only moderately limited in his functional capabilities, and rejected without discussion the severe functional limitations that Bowen's treating psychologist ascribed to him.
After the SSA's Appeals Council denied Bowen's request for review, he filed suit in federal district court. The district court ruled in favor of the Commissioner. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the judgment of the district court with instructions to REMAND the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bowen is presently 50 years old, has an eighth-grade education, and is married with two children. He worked for 21 years at a mining operation in Kentucky as a buggy operator and a prep-plant operator. In April of 1998, Bowen suffered a work-related injury to his back, aggravating a previous injury from 1996. Initially, he was able to continue working, but he claims that the injury worsened to the point where he had to cease work in September of 1998. He has not worked since that time and has experienced symptoms of depression.
Bowen filed his present application for disability insurance benefits in April of 2002, asserting that both physical and psychological conditions preclude him from working. On appeal, Bowen challenges only that portion of the ALJ's decision addressing his psychological condition. We will therefore limit our discussion to the facts relevant to that determination.
Bowen was first admitted to the Mountain Comprehensive Care Center (MCCC) in eastern Kentucky in July of 1999. He was referred to the mental-health unit for symptoms that included depression. Since that time, he has been evaluated by a number of psychologists and psychiatrists. These health professionals all diagnosed Bowen with some form of depression. Their particular diagnoses, however, varied significantly regarding the extent of Bowen's depression, his residual mental capabilities, the possibility that he suffered from other psychological impairments, and the possibility of his malingering.
The record on appeal includes the opinions of eight psychologists and psychiatrists: Dr. Jane Brake, Dr. Richard Cohen, Dr. James Dumas, Dr. Wayne Edwards, Dr. Robert Granacher, Dr. Dorothy Holean, Dr. Eric Johnson, and Dr. Lea Perritt. In addition, the ALJ identified Bowen's written treatment records from MCCC as a medical source. These records consist of notes taken during Bowen's periodic outpatient visits to MCCC and the results of his annual status examinations. The vast majority of these notes and examination records are signed by both Dr. Holean and a "Chris Caudill, B.S./M.H.A.," the latter not being further identified by the parties. As the Commissioner notes, Dr. Holean was Bowen's treating psychologist at MCCC. The record contains treatment notes signed jointly by Dr. Holean and Caudill beginning in July of 2000 and continuing through the end of the relevant record in 2003.
Bowen was also treated by Dr. Dumas, a psychiatrist at MCCC. The other medical sources listed above either examined Bowen or reviewed his records on behalf of the SSA pursuant to his disability claims. Most relevant to this appeal are the opinions of Drs. Dumas and Holean, who treated Bowen, and those of Drs. Brake and Cohen, who reviewed Bowen's records on behalf of the SSA. Their opinions form the basis of Bowen's principal claim of error.
Dr. Holean submitted an assessment in April of 2003 that found Bowen to possess a "poor" RFC regarding his ability to deal with stress, maintain attention or concentration, behave in an emotionally stable manner, and perform other essential workplace activities. After reviewing Bowen's record on behalf of the SSA in December of 2003, Dr. Cohen submitted an RFC assessment that appeared to agree with this bleak evaluation of Bowen's generally "poor" RFC. Elsewhere on his evaluation, however, Dr. Cohen noted—paradoxically and without further explanation—that "there are no marked functional limitations." Dr. Cohen added that Bowen exhibited evidence of malingering on portions of his psychological testing. Drs. Edwards and Johnson both echoed these concerns of possible malingering.
In sharp contrast to the severe assessments of Drs. Cohen and Holean, Dr. Brake submitted an RFC assessment in November of 2002 that found Bowen's depression to only "moderately" limit his functional capabilities. Dr. Brake reviewed Bowen's medical records on behalf of the SSA and assessed him to be either "not significantly limited" or only "moderately limited" in all 20 categories included on the RFC chart that she completed. She further opined that Bowen was able to understand and recall material, maintain the mental effort needed to complete tasks, function in an object-focused setting, and handle routine situations.
Bowen's treating psychiatrist at MCCC, Dr. Dumas, submitted an evaluation of Bowen in April of 2003, but he did not assess Bowen's RFC specifically. Instead, Dr. Dumas's narrative psychiatric evaluation diagnosed Bowen with depression and an adjustment disorder. He concluded that Bowen's depression was "being fairly well-treated." Dr. Dumas also determined that Bowen "appears to have responded well to his current medication," his "cognition appears to be intact," his "judgment and insight appear to be reasonable," and his "mood was much improved."
Despite finding that Bowen's condition was "fairly well-treated," Dr. Dumas increased Bowen's dosage of Prozac for a trial period. Dr. Dumas also assigned Bowen a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 60, indicating moderate impairment. See Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed.Appx. 496, 503 (6th Cir. 2006) () (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
As noted above, the record consists of multiple other medical opinions that generally fall in line with either Dr. Brake's assessment or with that of Drs. Cohen and Holean. Because this appeal primarily raises a procedural issue, however, we will omit any detailed discussion of the remaining expert opinions.
The present litigation stems from Bowen's second application to the Commissioner for disability benefits. His first application claimed that he became disabled in September of 1998 due to back problems, right-leg pain, high blood pressure, nerves, depression, foot problems, and arthritis. An ALJ issued an unfavorable decision regarding that application, which was upheld by both the Appeals Council and the district court.
Following the final denial of his first application, Bowen filed his second application in April of 2002, asserting that his continued affliction with substantially the same conditions rendered him totally disabled. Because the SSA had already issued a final decision on his first application, the ALJ concluded that res judicata barred Bowen from claiming benefits for the period between September of 1998 and November of 1999, when the Appeals Council affirmed the denial of his first application. The ALJ thus considered Bowen's present application for benefits to cover only the period from November of 1999 through the date that his disability insurance coverage expired in December of 2003.
After a hearing, the ALJ denied Bowen's second application for benefits. The Appeals Council declined Bowen's request for review in April of 2005, which rendered the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Bowen subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The district court affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to Bowen, and this timely appeal followed.
This court will uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.1984). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Heston v. Comm`r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).
Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA...
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Case Index
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