State v. Land, 56380

Decision Date10 April 1972
Docket NumberNo. 2,No. 56380,56380,2
Citation478 S.W.2d 290
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard Lynn LAND, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Charles B. Blackmar, St. Louis, for respondent.

Charles M. Deeba, St. Louis, for appellant.

MORGAN, Presiding Judge.

Defendant, as a second offender, was tried to a jury and found guilty of first degree robbery. The court assessed punishment at seven years confinement.

As appellant, defendant now alleges that he was denied a fair trial and submits six points to sustain his argument. However, it is only necessary that we reach one of such contentions, i.e., that the trial court erred in forcing appellant to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to remove a prospective juror who should have been disqualified for cause. We believe appellant's position had merit and should have been sustained.

During voir dire, it was brought out that a venireman named Bachesta had been a participant, as a victim, in two armed robberies. In one he had been 'tied up,' and in the other he had been 'robbed at gunpoint.' The last two questions directed to Bachesta by the state, and his answers, were:

'(Prosecutor): Mr. Bachesta, we are going to be talking about two women who run a confectionery--a grocery store. And the testimony will be to the effect that they were robbed with a gun. Would the similarity of the incident bother you?

Mr. Bachesta: I would say I have been thinking of that, but I do have in the back of my mind . . ..

(Prosecutor): What I am driving at, can you take the evidence and the law and make up your mind only on those two things?

Mr. Bachesta: Yes.'

Defense counsel tried to bring out what Bachesta had 'in the back of (his) mind,' and although he failed specifically to accomplish this, it is of interest that Bachesta, when questioned further, immediately went into his status as a store manager at the time the 'robbery happened.' Thereafter, defense counsel fully explored the details of Bachesta's prior experiences and the interrogation concluded with the following dialogue:

'MR. DALE: Having been a victim like this, you feel you can still be fair?

MR. BACHESTA: Yes.

MR. DALE: And your practice with your personnel and instructing them and knowing they are vulnerable, you still feel you can be honest? I am concerned that you might lean a little toward the State.

MR. BACHESTA: No, in all frankness, I think I might be.

MR. DALE: Surely. If your Honor please, I move that this juror be stricken for cause.

THE COURT: Well, this is engaging in speculation. Could you be guided by the evidence and the instructions in this case?

MR. BACHESTA: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't think he has.

MR. DALE: He has indicated he might lean toward the State.

THE COURT: Subconsciously he might. That is quite a bit of speculation. So I don't think the man is disqualified.

MR. DALE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Overruled.'

The issue to be resolved does not call for consideration of any novel question of law but only the proper application of longstanding principles to the precise factual situation presented. Such principles have been the subject of an untold number of cases.

The trial of conflicting causes before a fair and impartial jury is essential to justice. This fact has been the fundamental truth underlying our system of jurisprudence. To create such a jury, it is a basic necessity that prospective members thereof be unbiased and unprejudiced. 'Securing such a jury, however, is not a matter of absolutes and the right to a fair trial is deemed satisfied where the jury panel has been properly tested on voir dire and is otherwise legally constituted. Fundamentally, of course, whether a juror is fair and impartial lies peculiarly in the mind and heart of the individual juror. Whatever lurking prejudice he might have in a particular instance may well be exposed only through psychological analysis. Suffice it to say that such a personalized approach is not within the province of the courts and the practical administration of justice.' Smith v. Nickels, Mo.App., 390 S.W.2d 578. Such limitations, however, must not deter a court in its efforts nor detract from its ultimate objective of seeking a fair jury. The difficulty of the task has driven some to suggest that the objective has been met if the questionable venireman fails, otherwise, to be one of the twelve selected. Perhaps justice could be served just as well with such an approach; but, 'It is the settled law of this state that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a full panel of qualified jurors before he is required to make his peremptory challenges; . . .' State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600, 46 S.W. 733, 735 (1898), and we need not change our course at this time. State v. Hirsack, Mo., 465 S.W.2d 543.

With a cross-section of society appearing as veniremen, an area is...

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44 cases
  • State v. Singletary
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • May 23, 1979
    ...Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 227 S.E.2d 734 (Sup.Ct.1976); State v. West, W.Va., 200 S.E.2d 859 (Sup.Ct.1973); State v. Land, 478 S.W.2d 290 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1972). A view requiring a showing of actual prejudice in a case such as this misapprehends the functional role of peremptory chall......
  • State v. Johns, 64731
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • October 9, 1984
    ...of this nature are "important insofar as they might have prejudiced the prospective juror against the appellant." State v. Land, 478 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo.1972). They do not however, necessarily render a venireman unqualified to sit as a juror. "The question of whether or not the experience c......
  • State v. Pride, 39137
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • May 9, 1978
    ...who should have been stricken for cause, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, e. g., State v. Land,478 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo.1972), citing State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600, 46 S.W. 733, 735 (1898); State v. Hirsack, 465 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo.1971). Our supreme court ......
  • State v. Vinson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 20, 1990
    ...and that her husband's experience would not prevent her from considering objectively the evidence in this case. Vinson cites State v. Land, 478 S.W.2d 290 (Mo.1972), and State v. Kayser, 637 S.W.2d 836 (Mo.App.1982), for the proposition that the trial court cannot base its ruling on the ven......
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