479 F.2d 1061 (2nd Cir. 1973), 796, United States v. Goldstein
|Docket Nº:||796, 73-1165.|
|Citation:||479 F.2d 1061|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Albert GOLDSTEIN et al., Appellees.|
|Case Date:||May 25, 1973|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|
Argued April 19, 1973.
Michael B. Pollack, Atty., Dept. of Justice (Dennis E. Dillon, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Robert A. Morse, U. S. Atty., E. D. N. Y., L. Kevin Sheridan, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellant.
Thomas J. O'Brien, New York City (Kostelanetz & Ritholz, James M. La Rossa, Joseph E. Brill, New York City, on the brief), for appellees Goldstein, Caesar, Jacobson and Geller.
Jerome Lewis, New York City (H. Elliot Wales, New York City, on the brief), for appellee Wisch.
Before CLARK, Associate Justice, [*] and WATERMAN and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.
FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:
The United States seeks to appeal from a pre-trial order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Jack B. Weinstein, J., dismissing an indictment against appellees on the ground that a mistrial declared in a prior trial on the same indictment was unwarranted, and that reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. Under the recently amended Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (1972-73 Supp.), the Government may appeal from an
order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
We thus must answer two questions. First, does the language of section 3731 prevent an appeal by the Government? And second, was Judge Weinstein correct in holding that the double jeopardy clause barred a second trial? For reasons which follow, we conclude that an appeal does lie to this court from the order below, and, further, that the indictment was erroneously dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further appropriate proceedings.
On January 7, 1972, appellees were indicted in the Eastern District of New York, on 20 counts charging various violations of federal internal revenue laws, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206, and conspiracy to violate those provisions. 1 Trial commenced on September 5, 1972, before Judge Orrin G. Judd. Jury deliberation began on the morning of October 5. 2 The jury was excused for the evening after failing to reach a verdict with respect
to any defendant on any count. That evening, Judge Judd had a brief exchange with Juror No. 2 (Mrs. Rappaport), which he related to counsel after jury deliberation had recommenced the following morning. As he explained it, she had asked to see him "on a personal matter." The judge had observed her "sniffling" and "quite ill at ease during the day" and he "started commiserating with her on her illness." She replied that she was "all right" but just felt "incapable."
At 11:30 A.M. on this second-and last-day of deliberation, the jury requested and received a re-reading of the charge. At 3:10, the jury sent a note to the judge stating it was
apparently not able to reach a unanimous verdict on any count except number 20. Please advise.
In discussion with counsel, the judge indicated that he intended to tell the jury to deliberate "another couple of hours," but doubted that he would ask them to come back on Tuesday. 3 Defense counsel first objected to
your Honor saying that they should be returned for deliberation for a couple of more hours because it may well be that what that amounts to is an incarceration against their will
and then pointed out with respect to requiring the jury's return on Tuesday:
There would be Friday night, all day Saturday, all day Sunday, all day Monday. So there would be three full days and four nights of separation during which it would be impossible to avoid pollution of the jury . . . .
Judge Judd then called the jury back into the courtroom and told them that he would ask them "to go back and to consider further and tell me whether further deliberation would be useful," although he pointed out that he did not intend to have them stay "late tonight" or return on the following Tuesday. He then gave what the Government accurately describes as a modified "Allen charge." Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the jury was in "deadlock, which apparently is a hopeless one." The motion was denied.
At approximately 5 o'clock, the jury foreman sent a second note, which said:
[A]fter reviewing most of the testimony and raising what arguments and persuasion we could bring to bear, Mrs. Rappaport has insisted that under no circumstances can she vote guilty on any of the Counts.
Judge Judd thereupon stated his view that this meant "a disagreement on seventeen counts" and resolved to "bring the Jury in and see." The jury was brought in; they announced a verdict of not guilty on count 20, involving only appellee Goldstein, and were polled at the Government's request. The judge then asked: "And it's clear that you are in disagreement on the rest of the counts?", to which the foreman replied "I am afraid so." The judge then continued:
I appreciate the time you have put in, the effort that's been made. I might have given a more coercive charge, but I thought it was improper. I think we should respect the conscience of anybody on the Jury.
I would like to keep you for five or ten minutes just to give you a little picture of things behind the scenes. You are entitled to wonder about what happened at all these side bars, and this has been only an income tax case. But it has been an important case for everybody.
You have heard some of the best defense counsel in this City for the last five weeks. The Government attorney is not an ordinary assistant U.S. Attorney. . . .
The judge then went on to disclose, among other things, that the government attorney was from the Organized Crime section of the Justice Department, that defendant Goldstein's tax returns
disclosed income from gambling, and that certain defendants had threatened a witness prior to the trial. Counsel took vigorous exception to these comments-a concern which we share-and moved to dismiss the indictment. The motion was denied.
The case was set for retrial before Judge Weinstein, but prior to trial, defendants moved to dismiss the indictment principally on the ground of double jeopardy. The judge granted the motion; while his order of January 8, 1973 dismissing the indictment contained no express findings, the bases for the order were carefully stated during the course of the hearing held on the motion. We set these out extensively:
. . . I am particularly impressed with the transcript of October 6, 1972 [the second day of jury deliberation described above] at 5:00 o'clock P.M.
The Court said there is "still disagreement on all but one count." There is no indication that disagreement was fixed or that there could not be some agreement had there been further consultation. There were 18 counts undisposed of at that time. Many of them involved a number of defendants and all of them involved at least two defendants.
The Jury was then polled on Count 20 and the defendant in that count was found not guilty. There's no inquiry made by the Court as to whether the Jury wished to consult further with each other. There is no indication that they disagreed with respect to each defendant on each count. In fact, it is not clear that they had considered in any detail each defendant as to each count.
Immediately after the Jury was polled, the Judge began to address the Jury and there would be nothing from which their counsel could determine the nature of the remarks that would be made up until line 15 of page 6 of the transcript. Then reference is made to the organized crime section of the Department of Justice. Thereafter very quickly there is reference to highly prejudicial material which undoubtedly had taken counsel by surprise and it would be only at that point I would think that the normal practice was not going to be followed, that inquiry was not going to be made to the Jury with respect to whether they might possibly reach an agreement given more time or whether they might possibly reach an agreement on any of the counts as to any of the defendants.
* * *
I must reluctantly conclude that the Court acted without proper consultation with the attorneys and without proper consultation with the Jury and that the case was improperly taken from the Jury at this point without the consent of the defendants and before it had been determined that no agreement could be reached.
Under the circumstances, therefore I reluctantly find that defendants should be placed in double jeopardy if they were to be tried . . . .
From the subsequent order dismissing the indictment, the Government appeals. 4
At the outset, appellees claim that the Government cannot appeal from Judge Weinstein's order dismissing the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.
The 1970 amendments to the Criminal Appeals Act, enacted as Title III,§ 14 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, P.L. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880, 1890, 91st Cong., 2d sess., U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, p. 5804, were designed to eliminate much of the tortuous statutory construction, e. g., United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 90 S.Ct. 2117, 26 L.Ed.2d 608 (1970), and United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1959) (en banc), to which federal courts had been put in interpreting the coverage of the predecessor act. See S.Rep. No. 91-1296, 91st Cong., 2d sess., at 2 (1970). But a principal purpose of the amendments was to broaden considerably those situations in which the Government could appeal. Id. 5 While the predecessor act was to be strictly construed against the Government's right to appeal, e. g., United States v. Sisson, supra, 399 U.S. at 291, 90 S.Ct. 2117,...
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