Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Companies, 84-1026

• Citation: 88 Ill.Dec. 968,479 N.E.2d 988,134 Ill.App.3d 134
• Decision Date: 28 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1026,84-1026
• Parties: , 88 Ill.Dec. 968 NANDORF, INC., a Washington corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES, and National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, corporations, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 988

479 N.E.2d 988

134 Ill.App.3d 134, 88 Ill.Dec. 968

NANDORF, INC., a Washington corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES, and National Fire Insurance Company

of Hartford, corporations, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1026.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, First Division.

May 28, 1985.

Di Monte & Lizak, Chicago (Chester A. Lizak, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago (Joshua G. Vincent, Chicago, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

O'CONNOR, Justice:

Plaintiff, Nandorf, Inc. (Nandorf), appeals from the trial court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment action against its insurer, defendant CNA Insurance Companies (CNA). The complaint sought reimbursement of attorney fees incurred by Nandorf in monitoring the defense provided by attorneys retained by CNA in a civil action brought against Nandorf by third parties. CNA provided the defense but reserved its rights to deny coverage for punitive damages. Nandorf now contends that the defense provided by CNA pursuant to its reservation of rights created a conflict of interest which entitled Nandorf to retain independent counsel to be paid for by the insurer CNA. We agree.

This controversy arose out of a complaint filed on May 5, 1983, by Delores Scott and others against Unique Thrift Shop, a retail shop owned and operated by Nandorf. (Scott v. Unique Thrift Shop, Inc., cause No. 82 L 8942.) Each of the plaintiffs in the Scott action sought $5,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages based on allegations that employees of Unique Thrift Shop "seized the person" of the plaintiffs, set "upon them with their hands and began to yell at them, shoved them around from place to place within the store premises * * * and imprisoned and incarcerated said plaintiffs for many hours against their will and consent." Pursuant to a comprehensive liability insurance policy in effect between Nandorf and CNA, Nandorf tendered the defense of the Scott action to CNA who then retained the law firm of Baker & McKenzie.

On June 9, 1983, CNA notified Nandorf that any award of punitive damages would be Nandorf's responsibility since, in CNA's opinion, "it is against the public policy of the State of Illinois to provide insurance coverage for punitive damages." Nandorf then retained the law firm of Di Monte & Lizak (independent counsel) to monitor the defense provided by Baker & McKenzie and to evaluate CNA's position concerning their duty to indemnify Nandorf for punitive damages. Nandorf's counsel requested CNA to waive its reservation of rights and informed CNA of their intention to control the defense of the Scott action if CNA refused to do so. CNA declined to alter its position regarding punitive damages and refused to relinquish control of the litigation.

When CNA also refused to reimburse Nandorf for the expenses incurred in retaining independent counsel, Nandorf filed the present declaratory judgment action on November 15, 1983. On December 8, 1983, CNA settled the Scott action and compromised all claims for damages. The trial court in the declaratory judgment action subsequently granted CNA's motion to dismiss, finding that: (1) CNA's letter of June 9, 1983, was tantamount to a reservation of rights; (2) Nandorf was provided with a proper defense; (3) CNA's defense of Nandorf under a reservation of rights did not create a conflict of interest; and (4) Nandorf was not entitled to independent counsel paid for by CNA.

Nandorf now contends that a conflict of interest existed which entitled it to retain independent counsel paid for by CNA. Nandorf also contends that CNA's election to defend subject to its reservation of rights constituted a breach of its duty to defend. In view of our disposition of the case, we need not and do not decide the latter issue.

In Illinois an insurer is obligated to defend an action against an insured when the complaint in that action sets forth allegations which bring the claim potentially within the coverage of the insurance policy. (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill.2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24.) The insurer's duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay, and the insurer may be obligated to defend against claims and causes of action which are not in fact covered by the policy. (Conway v. Country Casualty Insurance Co. (1982), 92 Ill.2d 388, 394, 65 Ill.Dec. 934, 442 N.E.2d 245.) In cases where there is potential coverage so that the insurer has a duty to defend, but the insurer believes that it has a valid policy defense, it must usually either (1) defend the tort action under a reservation of rights; or (2) secure a declaratory judgment as to its rights and obligations before trial of the original tort action. (Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill.2d 132, 159, 23 Ill.Dec. 541, 384 N.E.2d 335; Reis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1978), 69 Ill.App.3d 777, 782-83, 25 Ill.Dec. 824, 387 N.E.2d 700, appeal denied, 79 Ill.2d 617.) Where a duty to defend exists, but the insurer refuses to defend and fails to take either course of action, it may be barred from disputing questions of coverage in a subsequent action brought against it by its insured who has incurred liability in the underlying action. Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill.2d 444, 451, 58 Ill.Dec. 828, 430 N.E.2d 1079; Ayers v. Bituminous Insurance Co. (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 33, 35, 54 Ill.Dec. 413, 424 N.E.2d 1316, appeal denied, 85 Ill.2d 576.

Generally, the insurer's duty to defend includes the right to assume control of the litigation. "The purpose of such right is to allow insurers to protect their financial interest in the outcome of litigation and to minimize unwarranted liability claims. Giving the insurer exclusive control over litigation against the insured safeguards the orderly and proper disbursement of large sums of money involved in the insurance business." (Parker v. Agricultural Insurance Co. (1981), 109 Misc.2d 678, 681, 440 N.Y.S.2d 964; 7C Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4681, pp. 2-5 (1979).) Of course, the insured, at his own expense, may choose to hire independent counsel.

The attorney hired by the insurance company to defend in an action against the insured owes fiduciary duties to two clients: the insurer and the insured. The attorney-client relationship between the insured and the attorney hired by his insurer imposes upon the attorney the same professional obligations that would exist had the attorney been personally retained by the insured. (Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 467, 30 Ill.Dec. 320, 392 N.E.2d 1365, affirmed, 81 Ill.2d 201, 40 Ill.Dec. 816, 407 N.E.2d 47.) Courts have recognized, however, that "in reality, the insurer's attorneys may have closer ties with the insurer and a more compelling interest in protecting the insurer's position, whether or not it coincides with what is best for the insured." (Purdy v. Pacific Automobile Insurance Co. (1984), 157 Cal.App.3d 59, 76, 203 Cal.Rptr. 524, 534; see also, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co. (8th Cir.1978), 585 F.2d 932, 938, n. 5.) This reality frequently gives rise to conflicts of interest between insurer and insured.

When conflicts arise, the Illinois supreme court has recognized a "limited exception" to the general rule that an insurer controls the defense of its insured. The insured is entitled to assume control of his own defense in the underlying action. (Clemmons v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 469, 478, 58 Ill.Dec. 853, 430 N.E.2d 1104.) The conflict confronting the attorney employed by the insurer may be resolved by full disclosure and consent from the parties. (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill.2d 187, 198, 355 N.E.2d 24.) However, the ethical problem is not solved by the insurer's electing to defend under a reservation of rights. (Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill.2d 444, 457, 58 Ill.Dec. 828, 430 N.E.2d 1079; Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill.2d 132, 156, 23 Ill.Dec. 541, 384 N.E.2d 335.) In a conflict situation where the insured rejects the insurer's offer to defend under a reservation of rights, the insurer's obligation to defend is satisfied by reimbursing the insured for the costs of independent counsel. Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill.2d 132, 152, 23 Ill.Dec. 541, 384 N.E.2d 335.

In determining whether a conflict of interest exists, Illinois courts have considered whether, in comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. (County of Massac v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 35, 43, 68 Ill.Dec. 678, 446 N.E.2d 584; see also, O'Bannon v. Northern Petrochemical Co. (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 734, 738-39, 69 Ill.Dec. 550, 447 N.E.2d 985.) An insurer's interest in negating policy coverage does not, in and of itself, create sufficient conflict of interest to preclude the insurer from assuming the defense of its insured. (113 Ill.App.3d 734, 739, 69 Ill.Dec. 550, 447 N.E.2d 985.) However, conflict of interest has been found where the underlying action asserts claims that are covered by the insurance policy and other causes which the insurer is required to defend but asserts are not covered by the policy. See, Thornton v. Paul, (1978), 74 Ill.2d 132, 23 Ill.Dec. 541, 384 N.E.2d 335; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill.2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24.

In the instant case, the complaint in the underlying action sought a large amount of punitive damages and a relatively small amount of compensatory damages. CNA disclaimed liability only for punitive damages. The insurer and the insured shared a common interest in a finding of no liability. However, if Nandorf was found liable, their interests diverged. CNA's interests would have been just as well served by an award of minimal compensatory damages and substantial punitive...