Connecticut v. Barrett

• Citation: 479 U.S. 523,107 S.Ct. 828,93 L.Ed.2d 920
• Decision Date: 27 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-899,85-899
• Parties: CONNECTICUT, Petitioner v. William BARRETT
• Court: United States Supreme Court

479 U.S. 523

107 S.Ct. 828

93 L.Ed.2d 920

CONNECTICUT, Petitioner

v William BARRETT.

No. 85-899.

Argued Dec. 9, 1986.

Decided Jan. 27, 1987.

Syllabus

Respondent, while in custody on suspicion of sexual assault, was three times advised by the police of his Miranda rights. On each occasion, after signing and dating an acknowledgment that he had been given those rights, respondent indicated to the police that he would not make a written statement, but that he was willing to talk about the incident that led to his arrest. On the second and third such occasions, he added that he would not make a written statement outside the presence of counsel, and then orally admitted his involvement in the sexual assault. One of the police officers reduced to writing his recollection of respondent's last such statement, and the confession was introduced into evidence at respondent's trial. The trial court refused to suppress the confession, finding that respondent had fully understood the Miranda warnings and had voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Respondent's conviction of sexual assault, inter alia, was reversed by the Connecticut Supreme Court which held that his expressed desire for counsel before making a written statement constituted an invocation of his right to counsel for all purposes, that he had not waived that right by initiating further discussion with the police, and that therefore the incriminating statement was improperly admitted into evidence under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378.

Held: The Constitution did not require suppression of respondent's incriminating statement. Pp. 527-530.

(a) Respondent's statements to the police made clear his willingness to talk about the sexual assault, and, there being no evidence that he was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled" into speaking to the police, the trial court properly found that his decision to do so constituted a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. Although the Miranda rules were designed to protect defendants from being compelled by the government to make statements, they also give defendants the right to choose between speech and silence. Pp. 527-529.

(b) Respondent's invocation of his right to counsel was limited by its terms to the making of written statements, and did not prohibit all further discussion with police. Requests for counsel must be given broad, all-inclusive effect only when the defendant's words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are ambiguous. Here, respondent clearly and unequivocally expressed his willingness to speak to police about the sexual assault. Pp. 529-530.

(c) The distinction drawn by respondent between oral and written statements did not indicate an understanding so incomplete as to render his limited invocation of the right to counsel effective for all purposes. To so hold would contravene his testimony, and the trial court's finding, that he fully understood his Miranda warnings, including the warning that anything he said to police could be used against him. A defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions does not vitiate their voluntariness. P. 530.

197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044 (1985) reversed and remanded.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, 530. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, 536.

Julia DiCocco Dewey, New Haven, Conn., for petitioner.

Charles A. Rothfeld, for the U.S., as amicus curiae, in support of the petitioner, by special leave of Court.

Robert L. Genuario, Fairfield, Conn., for respondent.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent William Barrett was convicted after a jury trial of sexual assault, unlawful restraint, and possession of a controlled substance. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the convictions. It held that incriminating statements made by Barrett should have been suppressed under our decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), because Barrett, though stating his willingness to speak to police, had indicated that he would not make a written statement outside the presence of counsel. 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044 (1985). We granted certiorari to consider the federal constitutional issues presented by this holding. 476 U.S. 1114, 106 S.Ct. 1967, 90 L.Ed.2d 652 (1986). We reverse.

In the early morning of October 24, 1980, Barrett was transported from New Haven, Connecticut, to Wallingford, where he was a suspect in a sexual assault that had occurred the previous evening. Upon arrival at the Wallingford police station, Officer Peter Cameron advised Barrett of his rights, and Barrett signed and dated an acknowledgment that he had received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Barrett stated that "he would not give the police any written statements but he had no problem in talking about the incident." App. 12A.

Approximately 30 minutes later, Barrett was questioned by Officer Cameron and Officer John Genovese. Before this questioning, he was again advised of his Miranda rights and signed a card acknowledging that he had been read the rights. Respondent stated that he understood his rights, and told the officers that he would not give a written statement unless his attorney was present but had "no problem" talking about the incident. Id., at 21A. Barrett then gave an oral statement admitting his involvement in the sexual assault.

After discovering that a tape recorder used to preserve the statement had malfunctioned, the police conducted a second interview. For the third time, Barrett was advised of his Miranda rights by the Wallingford police, and once again stated that "he was willing to talk about [the incident] verbally but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney came." Id., at 44A. He then repeated to the police his confession regarding the previous evening's events. When the officers discovered that their tape recorder had again failed to record the statement, Officer Cameron reduced to writing his recollection of respondent's statement.

The trial court, after a suppression hearing, held that the confession was admissible. It found that respondent not only indicated that he understood the warnings, but also "offered the statements that he did not need anything explained to him because he understood. So it was not merely a passive acquiescence. . . ." Id., at 70A. Barrett's decision to make no written statement without his attorney "indicate[d] to the Court that he certainly understood from having his rights read to him that . . . he was under no obligation to give any statement." Ibid. The court held that Barrett had voluntarily waived his right to counsel and thus allowed testimony at trial as to the content of Barrett's statement. Barrett took the stand in his own defense and testified that he had understood his rights as they were read to him. Id., at 130A. He was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 9 to 18 years.

The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that respondent had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to make written statements without the presence of his attorney. In the court's view, Barrett's expressed desire for counsel before making a written statement served as an invocation of the right for all purposes:

"The fact that the defendant attached his request for counsel to the making of a written statement does not affect the outcome of . . . our inquiry. No particular form of words has ever been required to trigger an individual's fifth amendment protections; nor have requests for counsel been narrowly construed. The defendant's refusal to give a written statement without his attorney present was a clear request for the assistance of counsel to protect his rights in his dealings with the police. Such a request continues to be constitutionally effective despite the defendant's willingness to make oral statements. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant did invoke his right to counsel under the fifth and fourteenth amendments." 197 Conn., at 57, 495 A.2d, at 1049 (citations omitted).

This invocation, the court believed, brought the case within what it called the "bright-line rule for establishing a waiver of this right." Id., at 58, 495 A.2d, at 1049. That rule requires a finding that the suspect "(a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam ). See also Edwards, supra, 451 U.S., at 485, 486, n. 9, 101 S.Ct., at 1885 n. 9. Because Barrett had not initiated further discussions with police, the court found his statement improperly admitted.

We think that the Connecticut Supreme Court erred in holding that the United States Constitution required suppression of Barrett's statement. Barrett made clear to police his willingness to talk about the crime for which he was a suspect. The trial court found that this decision was a voluntary waiver of his rights, and there is no evidence that Barrett was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled" into this waiver. Miranda, 384 U.S., at 476, 86 S.Ct., at 1628. The Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless held as a matter of law ¹ that respond- ent's limited invocation of his right to counsel prohibited all interrogation absent initiation of further discussion by Barrett. Nothing in our decisions, however, or in the rationale of Miranda, requires authorities to ignore the tenor or sense of a defendant's response to these warnings.

The fundamental purpose of the Court's decision in Miranda was "to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation...