Joyner, In re

Citation769 P.2d 967,256 Cal.Rptr. 785,48 Cal.3d 487
Decision Date03 April 1989
Docket NumberNo. 25596,25596
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 769 P.2d 967 In re Eric W. JOYNER on Habeas Corpus. Crim.

Donald Specter, San Quentin, and Steven Fama, for petitioner.

Manuel E. Nestle, Berkeley, as amicus curiae on behalf of petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Asst. Atty. Gen., Martin S. Kaye and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

KAUFMAN, Justice.

Petitioner Eric W. Joyner was convicted of grand theft (Pen.Code, § 487) 1 and robbery ( § 211), with an enhancement for being armed with a firearm ( § 12022, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to a term of four years in state prison concurrent with two Florida prison terms previously imposed for unrelated offenses. Petitioner seeks presentence custody credits against his California sentence for custody time in Florida and California from the date a "hold" was placed against him for the California offenses until he was sentenced in California, all of which time has already been credited against petitioner's Florida sentence. The case presents the recurring troublesome question of when custody is "attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted" within the meaning of section 2900.5, subdivision (b).

We hold that a period of time previously credited against a sentence for unrelated offenses cannot be deemed "attributable to proceedings" resulting in a later-imposed sentence unless it is demonstrated that the claimant would have been at liberty during the period were it not for a restraint relating to the proceedings resulting in the later sentence. In other words, duplicative credits against separately imposed concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses will be granted only on a showing of strict causation. Under this test, petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement to the credits he seeks.

I

In January 1983, arrest warrants were issued in California charging petitioner with robbery and grand theft. Petitioner was arrested in Florida on March 15, 1983, for crimes committed in that state. On the same day, Florida authorities discovered the outstanding California arrest warrants and, after notifying the California authorities, placed a hold 2 on petitioner at California's request. There is no evidence or allegation that petitioner made any attempt to obtain his release by posting bond or otherwise, or that the hold prevented petitioner from doing so. Upon learning that petitioner was a Florida probationer, Florida authorities instituted probation revocation proceedings.

Petitioner pled guilty to the Florida burglary and grand theft charges and on July 19, 1983, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 3 years in the Florida state prison, with credit for 126 days of presentence custody. On September 2, 1983, petitioner's Florida probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a 3-year term for burglary, with credit for 352 days of presentence custody. This term was ordered to run concurrently with the terms imposed on July 19.

Petitioner was then extradited to California, where he entered negotiated pleas of guilty to the charges of robbery and grand theft. Before accepting the pleas, the court advised petitioner that his California sentence would be served "independently of the Florida sentence." On December 29, 1983, the California court sentenced petitioner to state prison for a four-year term. The court failed to state whether the term was to run concurrently with or consecutive to the Florida terms and thus, by operation of section 669, 3 the term ran concurrently with the Florida sentences. The court expressly denied defendant's request for presentence custody credit. Petitioner continued to serve his Florida sentences while in California, both before and after sentencing in this state.

A divided Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of credits. (People v. Joyner (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 364, 207 Cal.Rptr. 636.) 4 We denied a petition for hearing.

Petitioner subsequently filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. 5 To resolve a conflict in the Court of Appeal cases addressing presentence credit issues similar to those presented here, we issued an order to show cause.

II

We begin with the language of the controlling statute. Section 2900.5 provides, in pertinent part: "(a) In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, including ... any time spent in a jail, ... prison, ... or similar residential institution, all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order ... shall be credited upon his term of imprisonment.... [p ] (b) For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed."

This court first addressed the meaning of section 2900.5 in the context of multiple proceedings in In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789. In that case the petitioner was serving a state prison sentence for manslaughter when he was charged with an unrelated murder and transferred to a county jail pending trial on the new charge. Following conviction on the murder charge, and the imposition of a state prison sentence concurrent with the sentence for manslaughter, the petitioner claimed presentence credit under section 2900.5. In a decision holding that the petitioner was not entitled to any presentence credit, Justice Richardson, writing for a unanimous court, stated that the petitioner "would necessarily have served that ... period in state prison for the original manslaughter conviction" and that he "was already receiving credit for that period against his original conviction." (Rojas, supra, at p. 155, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789.)

The court continued: "Defendant's chief semantic argument is that because subdivision (b) of section 2900.5 does not read 'exclusively attributable to proceedings' he should be granted the credit he seeks. He is in error. Although the word 'exclusively' does not appear, it is clearly provided that credit is to be given 'only where' custody is related to the 'same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.' The sensible inference is that a defendant is not to be given credit for time spent in custody if during the same period he is already serving a term of incarceration." (Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 155-156, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789, original italics.) The Rojas court concluded: "Section 2900.5 does not authorize credit where the pending proceeding has no effect whatever upon a defendant's liberty." (Id. at p. 156, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789.) Contrary language in In re Pollock (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 779, 145 Cal.Rptr. 833, which had interpreted section 2900.5 " 'to provide that a defendant is entitled to receive credit upon a prison sentence for time spent in jail awaiting disposition of the criminal proceedings resulting in that sentence even though during that same period of jail time the defendant is serving a prison sentence on another conviction,' " was expressly disapproved. (Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 157, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789.)

In the instant case, petitioner was in custody on the unrelated Florida charges during the entire time for which he seeks credit. Once the first Florida sentence was imposed, and petitioner began serving that sentence, petitioner's situation was indistinguishable from that of the petitioner in Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789--the custody was as a practical matter unavoidable and therefore could not be attributable to the California proceedings from which the hold originated. (See State v. Moliga (App.1987) 113 Idaho 672, 747 P.2d 81, 83-85.) The period from petitioner's arrest in Florida to his sentencing in that state presents a slightly different issue. In determining the proceedings to which this period may properly be attributed, it is significant that the period has been credited against petitioner's Florida sentences, making it also a period during which petitioner in effect was serving a sentence on another conviction. While petitioner's custody during this time may not have been unavoidable, the record contains no evidence that petitioner ever posted bail on the Florida charges or that he could have obtained release had the California hold not been placed against him. It has not been shown, in short, that the California hold, the precise nature and terms of which are not disclosed by the record (see fn. 2, ante ), had any effect upon petitioner's liberty at any time. Thus petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his presentence custody was, within the meaning of section 2900.5, "attributable to" anything other than the Florida proceedings. Accordingly, the logic of Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789, dictates that petitioner's claim to presentence credit be rejected in its entirety on the present record.

In resolving questions of statutory construction, the decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting similarly worded statutes, although not controlling, can provide valuable insight. (See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 298, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58.) As the federal government and most other states have enacted statutes similar to section 2900.5, decisions from those jurisdictions may assist us in resolving our common problem of statutory construction. Our review of the pertinent case law reveals that the ...

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