State v. Thornton

Decision Date04 October 1904
Citation48 S.E. 602,136 N.C. 610
PartiesSTATE v. THORNTON.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Sampson County; Ferguson, Judge.

F. A Thornton was convicted of simple assault, and appeals. Affirmed.

Defendant was a school teacher, and the prosecutor one of his pupils about 10 years old. The boys of the school had been guilty of misconduct, and the defendant warned them, and threatened to punish any repetition of it. There was evidence tending to show that the prosecutor had repeated the act complained of and other evidence that it was accidentally, and not intentionally, done. There was also evidence tending to show that the defendant whipped the prosecutor immoderately, and in anger, and other evidence tending to show the contrary. It is not necessary to set out the evidence in full. The defendant asked the court to charge the jury that there was no evidence of malice in this case. This was refused, and the defendant excepted. At the request of the defendant the court charged the jury: (1) That the law permits a teacher to inflict corporal punishment upon the pupil to enforce discipline and obedience to the rules of the school, and when it is administered under such circumstances the burden is on the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the teacher was actuated by malice towards the pupil, or that the injury inflicted is permanent; and that, unless they found that there was either malice or a permanent injury, they should acquit the defendant. (2) The difference between general and particular malice, as stated in Brooks v. Jones, 33 N.C. 260, was then explained to the jury. (3) That the defendant had the right to whip the prosecutor for any violation of the rules of the school, and, even though the jury should find that the whipping was more than was necessary, and was attended by bodily pain and suffering they should not convict unless they found that there was either malice or a permanent injury; the latter being an injury which is lasting and will continue indefinitely. After giving these special instructions at the defendant's request, the court charged generally in regard to the rights, duties, and liabilities of a teacher with respect to his pupil, to which there was no exception. The court told the jury that there was no permanent injury to the prosecutor, and then gave this instruction to the jury, to which the defendant excepted: "If the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the punishment was excessive, they may take the excessive punishment into consideration with the other evidence in the case in determining whether the defendant was actuated by malice." The court further charged substantially as follows: That if they found from the testimony that the defendant bore malice against the prosecutor, and whipped the latter excessively to gratify his malice, ill will, or grudge, or for the purpose of being revenged on him [[whether the defendant was actuated by previous malice towards the prosecutor individually, which still existed, or his purpose and intent were to be revenged on him for the misconduct of the other boys in popping the matches, his motive being malice or vengeance as thus explained, and not merely the enforcement of the rules of the school], they should convict the defendant. The defendant objected to so much of the charge as is in brackets. The court stated fully the contentions of both sides, to which there was no exception. Verdict of guilty, judgment, and appeal by defendant.

Geo. E. Butler and T. M. Argo, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for the State.

WALKER J. (after stating the facts).

We are unable to see how any of the evidence which was excluded by the court upon objection by the state had any bearing on the case. The government of the school before the defendant was installed as its master, and the request of the committee that he should preserve order and enforce discipline, had no tendency to prove the absence of malice at the time he whipped his pupil. He had a perfect right to punish his pupil for the purpose of correction; but, even if the school had not been well managed, and he had been specially requested to be more strict in compelling obedience to the rules, he had no more authority by reason thereof than he would otherwise have possessed, and his criminal liability for an excessive and malicious use of his power would be just the same. Similar evidence was held to have been properly excluded in State v. Dickerson, 98 N.C. 708, 3 S.E. 687. The defendant had the right to prove his good character, and to have it considered by the jury, but it should always be confined to general character. This has now become familiar learning. The good effect the chastisement of the prosecutor had upon the discipline of the school was manifestly irrelevant. Suppose the defendant had grievously wounded the prosecutor, or disfigured or maimed him, would such evidence be competent, and, if not in such a case, why should it be if the punishment was excessive and inflicted maliciously? The law does not tolerate evil that good may come. A teacher by his very excesses may inspire terror in his pupils, and thus subdue them to his will and authority; but the law will not excuse his cruel acts for the sake of good discipline in his school.

The rule by which the criminal liability of a teacher for punishment inflicted on his pupil is determined was clearly and forcibly stated by Gaston, J., in State v Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416. It has been accepted as a leading authority upon this subject, not only by this court, but by the...

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