Bailey v. State

• Citation: 48 So. 498,158 Ala. 18
• Parties: BAILEY v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 30 June 1908
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

48 So. 498

158 Ala. 18

BAILEY v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1908

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1909.

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; W. H. Thomas, Judge.

Application by Alonzo Bailey for discharge from imprisonment by writ of habeas corpus. From an order refusing his discharge he appeals. Affirmed.

Troy Watts & Letcher, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., and Thomas W. Martin, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

DENSON J.

Alonzo Bailey, after a preliminary trial had before B. C. Young, a justice of the peace in Montgomery county, on a charge made against him for obtaining $15 under a contract in writing with intent to injure or defraud his employer, was regularly committed for said offense to the custody of the sheriff of said county, for detention until he should be legally discharged. He was received into custody by the sheriff, and by him imprisoned in the county jail on the 6th day of April 1908. On the 14th day of April Bailey applied to the Hon. William H. Thomas, associate judge of the city court of Montgomery, for his discharge by the writ of habeas corpus. On the hearing the judge fixed bail at $150, but refused to discharge the petitioner absolutely. From the order refusing his discharge the applicant comes here by appeal.

The law under which the applicant was charged with crime, and under which the commitment was made, is an act entitled "An act, to amend an act entitled an act to amend section 4730 of the Criminal Code of 1896, approved October 1, 1903." Gen. Acts 1907, p. 636. The statute, in its form as section 4730 of the Code of 1896, came before this court for construction in the case of Ex parte Riley, 94 Ala. 82, 10 So. 528, and there it was clearly pointed out that a mere breach of contract is not by the statute made a crime, but that the criminal feature of the statute consists in the entering into a contract with the intent to injure or defraud the employer, and the refusal of the employé to perform the contract, with a like intent. Dorsey's Case, 111 Ala. 40 20 So. 629; McIntosh's Case, 117 Ala. 128, 23 So. 668. In neither of the cases cited was the constitutionality of the statute presented for consideration; but in the case of State v. Vann, 150 Ala. 66, 43 So. 357, the constitutionality of the statute, as section 4730 of the Code of 1896, was presented for determination, and it was there insisted that the statute was obnoxious to the twentieth section of the Bill of Rights of 1901, which is in this language: "That no person shall be imprisoned for debt." The insistence was overturned, and the statute was held not to be unconstitutional, the court, as the basis of the ruling, again pointing out the fact that "a mere breach of contract is not by the statute made a crime," but that the criminal feature consists in the intent to injure or defraud. This intent to injure or defraud marks the line of cleavage between the statute in judgment and the one approved March 1, 1901 (Acts 1900-01, p. 1208), which made it a misdemeanor for any person, who had contracted in writing to labor for or serve another for any given time, etc., and who, before the expiration of such contract, and without the consent of the other party, and without sufficient excuse (to be judged by the court), shall leave such other party, etc. This last statute was by Judge Jones of the federal court held to be obnoxious to the state Constitution (Peonage Cases [D. C.] 123 F. 671); and was by this court held to be unconstitutional in Toney's Case, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332, 67 L. R. A. 286, 109 Am. St. Rep. 23, because of the restrictions it attempts to place on the right to make contracts. These two cases are now urged as authority in support...