U.S. v. Luster, 05-4312.

Citation480 F.3d 551
Decision Date15 March 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-4312.,05-4312.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dewayne LUSTER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
480 F.3d 551
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Dewayne LUSTER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 05-4312.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued May 1, 2006.
Decided March 15, 2007.

[480 F.3d 553]

Melanie C. Conour, Cynthia J. Ridgeway (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jack F. Crawford (argued), Crawford & Devane, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and MANION and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge.


A jury convicted Dewayne Luster of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and the district court sentenced him to 200 months' imprisonment. Luster claims the trial evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He also argues the district court erred in admitting testimony that he purchased drugs from one of the coconspirators prior to the charged conspiracy. Lastly, he challenges his guidelines sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm by his coconspirators. We find none of Luster's arguments persuasive and affirm his conviction and sentence.

First, ample evidence supported the jury's finding that Luster participated in an extensive cocaine distribution operation headed by codefendant Prentice Davis. Numerous recordings of telephone conversations between Luster and Dramane Johnson, Davis's primary distribution agent, showed Luster placing frequent orders for large quantities of cocaine he knew were tied to Davis. This and other evidence permitted the inference that Luster worked cooperatively with Johnson and Davis to distribute cocaine and was not merely in a "buyer-seller" relationship with them, as he maintains. Second, the evidence Luster argues should have been excluded—Davis's testimony that Luster bought cocaine from him in 2000—was properly admitted under the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine because it provided the jury essential background information about the origins and operational structure of the charged conspiracy. Third, the district court properly applied the firearms sentencing enhancement because Luster reasonably could have foreseen that Davis and Johnson possessed firearms in furtherance of their large cocaine distribution enterprise.

480 F.3d 554
I. Background

Federal agents linked Dewayne Luster to a cocaine distribution ring Prentice Davis ran out of his Indianapolis music studio. Davis would purchase large quantities of cocaine on credit from a supplier in Chicago and then pay Dramane Johnson, his cousin, to resell most of it to smaller distributors in the Indianapolis area. The government alleged Luster was one such distributor because on several occasions agents observed him (either via wiretaps or surveillance) placing and discussing orders with Johnson for "tank tops" and "tee shirts," words the government contended were code for 4.5 and 9 ounces of cocaine, respectively. The government ultimately charged Davis, Johnson, Luster, and four others with conspiracy to distribute cocaine from September 2003 to May 2004, but only Luster proceeded to trial. A jury convicted him and the district court sentenced Luster to 200 months' imprisonment.

At trial the government presented three categories of evidence against Luster: (1) wiretap and surveillance records of Luster's dealings with Davis and Johnson; (2) physical items seized from Luster's apartment; and (3) Davis's testimony detailing the system by which he and Johnson structured their cocaine transactions, some of which involved Luster. The wiretap and surveillance evidence included several recordings of phone conversations from 2003 and 2004 in which Luster ordered "tank tops" from Johnson. Acting on one of these conversations, local law enforcement officers observed Luster and Johnson meeting in person in a liquor store parking lot in February 2004 to discuss a "tank top" order. The evidence seized from Luster's apartment included detailed ledgers and a cocaine "rebricker," two items a testifying federal narcotics agent identified as common tools of the cocaine trade.

Davis, testifying pursuant to his plea agreement, explained at length the inner workings of his cocaine distribution operation. After driving to Chicago to pick up multiple kilograms of cocaine, Davis would return to Indianapolis and pay Johnson to do most of the leg work. Though Davis occasionally sold cocaine directly to customers, it was generally Johnson who brokered individual transactions and found new customers, and Davis paid him at a rate of $500 per kilogram sold or delivered. Johnson had unfettered access to Davis's cocaine and was permitted to sell it without first paying Davis or obtaining his permission. Johnson's only obligation was to reimburse Davis at a predetermined wholesale rate for the cocaine he sold. In addition to the $500-per-kilogram flat fee, any percentage Johnson charged his customers above the wholesale rate was his profit to keep.

Davis testified that he neither sold drugs nor discussed drugs with Luster from September 2003 to May 2004, the period of the alleged conspiracy. Davis did state, however, that he saw Luster and Johnson together as often as twice a week during this period, and that he generally had no interest in knowing the identities of the people buying his cocaine from Johnson. Davis also testified about a 2000 incident in which Luster stopped by his recording studio. Luster said he was tired of purchasing Davis's cocaine from "Rio," one of Davis's other middlemen, and asked to buy a half-kilogram directly from Davis. Davis sold the cocaine to Luster, but because Luster ultimately paid only $7000 of the $11,500 the two agreed upon, Davis refused to make any future sales directly to Luster. Luster had opposed the government's pretrial motion to admit Davis's testimony about the 2000 transaction, arguing that it was prejudicial "other acts" character evidence, but the district court

480 F.3d 555

ruled the testimony admissible under the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine and as evidence of Luster's knowledge and intent, permissible noncharacter purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

The trial lasted one week and culminated in a jury verdict against Luster. At sentencing Luster objected to the proposed finding in his presentence report that possession of firearms by his codefendants was reasonably foreseeable to him, a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court overruled Luster's objection and factored the enhancement into Luster's advisory guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. The court then sentenced Luster to 200 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release.

II. Discussion

Davis raises three challenges to his conviction and sentence. First, he claims the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's determination that he conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute between September 2003 and May 2004. Second, he maintains...

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    ...be satisfied by evidence that a co-conspirator "regularly carried a gun during the course of the conspiracy." See United States v. Luster , 480 F.3d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 2007). The district court found that Michael Jones possessed a gun at the January 2018 transaction based on exactly this ty......
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    ...on the hook for firearms possessed by their coconspirators so long as such possession was reasonably foreseeable." United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Mumford, 25 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[D]istrict courts must no longer limit their r......
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    ...show that, based on the evidence presented at trial, no rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.1998) ("Only if the record is devoid of evidence from which a jury ......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Relevance
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Antitrust Evidence Handbook
    • 1 Enero 2016
    ...evidence of other conduct if it is “inextricably intertwined” with the conduct at issue in the litigation. See United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Acts that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the crime on trial are admissible in this circuit because they lie outsid......
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    • 1 Enero 2016
    ...v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 9 United States v. Londondio, 420 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2005), 13 United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007), 57 United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967), 155 United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 1993), 24 United ......

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