Hunt v. Sapien

Decision Date29 March 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-3004-JWL.,05-3004-JWL.
Citation480 F.Supp.2d 1271
PartiesJ.C. HUNT, Plaintiff, v. Robert SAPIEN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas

Timothy J. Muir, The Muir Law Firm, LLC, Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiff.

Trevin E. Wray, Office of Attorney General, Topeka, KS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

This case concerns a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim filed by Plaintiff J.C. Hunt against various prison officials at the El Dorado Correctional Facility. Those officials are: Roger Werholtz ("Secretary Werholtz"), the Secretary of Corrections for the State of Kansas; Ray Roberts ("Warden Roberts"), the Warden of El Dorado Correctional Facility; and Robert Sapien, who was Mr. Hunt's Unit Team Manager at El Dorado Correctional Facility. Based on his confinement in administrative segregation for over 850 days, Mr. Hunt alleges a constitutional deprivation of his right to due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This matter is presently before the court on defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 92). Therein, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions and the court agrees. Accordingly, their motion is granted.1

I. Statement of Material Facts

Mr. Hunt was placed in administrative segregation at Hutchinson Correctional Facility on January 15, 2003 as an "other security risk" pursuant to Kansas Department of Corrections' Internal Management Policy and Procedure (IMPP) 20-104(I)(B)(13), which provides "the warden may place in administrative segregation ... any inmate ... if the inmate ... ha[s] engaged in behavior which has threatened the maintenance of security or control in the correctional facility." The Administrative Segregation Report, included in the Martinez Report, states that Mr. Hunt was placed in administrative segregation because of his role as "an active leader with the BGD [Black Gangster Disciples] organization. He is known to strong arm weaker inmates and plays major games with staff." The report also states that Mr. Hunt "plays the role of enforcer for the organization and has been named as the, person carrying out `violations' that are handed down on behalf of the organization?' The report goes on to describe his "past history in which he was involved in attacking a group of white [supremacists] in the facility. During the attack he was observed giving orders to other inmates."

On January 17, 2003, Mr. Hunt was transferred to El Dorado Correctional Facility, where his administrative segregation placement continued. An initial review, attended by Mr. Hunt, was conducted at that facility on January 21, 2003. Mr. Hunt's comments at that review were recorded: "From the time I was released in 1998 I haven't been in any trouble and I have good reports." According to Warden Roberts, following the initial review, Mr. Hunt received weekly reviews for the first two months, followed by monthly reviews, 180 day reviews, and annual reviews. At, each of these reviews that he attended, Mr. Hunt was afforded the opportunity to, voice his concerns regarding his placement in administrative segregation.

The Kansas Parole Board conducted parole hearings for Mr. Hunt in October of 2003 and October of 2004. Mr. Hunt was present at these hearings and had the opportunity to present factors for the board's consideration. At both hearings, the Parole Board decided to pass Mr. Hunt for parole due to the serious circumstances of his crime, his history of criminal activities, the violent nature, of his crime, his previous incarceration, his failure on parole, and the objections to parole. At the 2004 parole hearing, the Parole Board decided to defer Mr. Hunt's subsequent parole hearing for three years because it determined it was not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing if held before then, due to Mr. Hunt's presenting high risk factors. The final action notices from the Parole Board following these hearings did not mention Mr. Hunt's placement in administrative segregation as a reason for passing him for parole.

On November 11, 2004, Mr. Hunt filed a grievance form with his unit team manager, Mr. Sapien, stating: "On Jan. 15th, 2003, I was placed in admin. seg. in H.C.F. under the O.S.R. status for several unfounded allegations. I am not a gang leader or member nor have I been issued any disciplinary reports to warrant being punished in this cruel and unusual fashion." " Mr. Hunt goes on to explain various other reasons why his placement in administrative segregation is unwarranted. In his response to this grievance, Mr. Sapien noted that the grievance referenced the same concern voiced in several previous grievances and that his grievance response remained the same: after investigation, it was deemed appropriate to keep Mr. Hunt in administrative segregation out of concern for the safety and security of the facility, staff and other inmates.

Mr. Hunt appealed this response to Warden Roberts and ultimately to Secretary Werholtz. Secretary Werholtz's response stated that Mr. Hunt had failed to offer evidence or argument to suggest that the responses given by Warden Roberts and Mr. Sapien were inappropriate. Mr. Hunt attached documentation verifying this grievance procedure to his complaint. In early June of 2005, Mr. Hunt was transferred to a transitional housing unit to prepare him for release to general population.

Mr. Hunt filed this proceeding on January 5, 2005, alleging that his placement in administrative segregation deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest2 and violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.3 Although phrased as two separate claims in the pretrial order, the court concludes that these "separate" claims actually constitute one claim, that is, that the defendants violated Mr. Hunt's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by: (1) depriving him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest (2) without adequate process.. The proceeding is currently before this court on defendants' motion for summary judgment, in which they argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burke v. Utah Transit Auth. & Local 382, 462 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.2006). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence allows a reasonable jury to resolve the issue either way." Haynes v. Level 3 Communications, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir.2006). A fact is "material" when "it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir.2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant may not simply rest upon his or her pleadings but must "bring forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which he or she carries the burden of proof." Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir.2005). To accomplish this, sufficient evidence pertinent to the material issue "must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein." Diaz v. Paul J. Kennedy Law Firm, 289 F.3d 671, 675 (10th Cir.2002).

Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. I).

III. Analysis

The defendants in this case argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The purpose of qualified immunity is to avoid excessive disruption of governmental functions and to dispose of frivolous claims in the early stages of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Phillips v. James, 422 F.3d 1075, 1080 (10th Cir. 2005).

When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must overcome a heavy two-part burden: (1) the plaintiff must establish that the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's allegedly unlawful actions. Blossom v. Yarbrough, 429 F.3d 963, 967 (10th Cir.2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151); Phillips, 422 F.3d at 1080 (same).

A. No Constitutional Violation

In attempting to overcome the first prong of the defendants' qualified immunity defense, Mr. Hunt alleges that the...

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    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
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    ...590, 594 (8th Cir.1983) (due process requires procedure for periodic review of administrative segregation status); Hunt v. Sapien, 480 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1277 (D.Kan.2007) (placement was not indefinite where reviewed weekly for the first 60 days, and subsequently reviewed monthly, after 180 da......
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